| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/14/2017 - 11/15/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53022 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARIC HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/18/2017
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2017
Event Time: 02:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"Eight hour report due to HPCl [High Pressure Coolant Injection] inoperability.
"HPCl valve operability testing was performed on October 18, 2017. Following satisfactory completion of opening stroke timing, the control switch for HPCI-MOV-MO19, HPCI Injection Valve, was taken to close. The valve indicates that it moved to an intermediate position, but it has not indicated that it has fully closed. This resulted in the valve being declared inoperable. This valve is normally closed and automatically opens on a HPCI initiation signal.
"HPCl was previously declared inoperable at time 0136 [CDT] on October 18 for surveillance testing. Entry was made into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable at that time. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RClC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with declaration of HPCI inoperable.
"Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned.
"HPCI is a single train safety system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [structures, systems, and components] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition has been entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/14/17 AT 0849 EST FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 18, 2017 at 0209 CDT (EN# 53022). Subsequent evaluation concluded HPCI-MOV-MO19 was still capable of performing its safety function with the failed torque switch identified during troubleshooting and would have supported the operability of the HPCI system. HPCI-MOV-MO19 only has a safety function to open to support HPCI safety function. The failed torque switch only affects the close function of the valve; therefore the HPCI system remained fully capable of performing its required safety function and was operable with the identified condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Haire). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53055 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: WESTLAKE LONGVIEW CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: LONGVIEW State: TX
County:
License #: 06294
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 11/06/2017
Notification Time: 13:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was received from the State of Texas by email:
"On November 6, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that a shutter was stuck in the closed position. The Ronan SA1 shutter was closed for maintenance on a hopper and failed to reopen. The gauge contains a 50 millicurie Cesium-137 source. The Licensee stated a service company has been contacted to repair the gauges in the next few days. No individual received significant exposure to radiation due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-9519 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53069 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TRENT SLYDON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/14/2017
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2017
Event Time: 11:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
MICHELLE EVANS (NRR)
KRIS KENNEDY (R4)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HYDROGEN LINE LEAK
At 1118 CST on 11/14/17, Cooper Nuclear Generating Station declared an Unusual Event due to a hydrogen leak on a main generator purge line. The leak was reported to be caused by Maintenance cutting into a one inch line. The total size of the leak is unknown, however, it is estimated to be depressurizing in the main generator at approximately 1lb per hour. The current pressure is 52 to 53 lbs. pressure and is stable. The operations staff have entered their abnormal procedure and are taking actions to isolate the leak. Operators have isolated the source of hydrogen and have opened the exterior roll up doors to increase the airflow and minimize the concentration of hydrogen in the area. The area has been evacuated and hot work has been stopped.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NNSA (via email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1433 EST ON 11/14/2017 FROM ROY GILES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On 11/14/2017, Nebraska Public Power District will issue a press release concerning the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event (EN#53069) declared today at 1118 [CST] for a small hydrogen leak in the turbine building.
"This is a four hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made which is related to heightened public or government concern."
Notified the R4DO (Kozal).
* * * UPDATE AT 1904 EST ON 11/14/17 FROM TRENT SYDOW TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
At 1744 CST the licensee exited from the Unusual Event. The leak was patched under a temporary repair. The patch was tested to verify the leak has stopped.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified the R4DO (Kozal), IRDMOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS, FEMA, NICC and NNSA (via email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53070 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WESLEY CONKLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/14/2017
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 03:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On September 15, 2017, during a TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] review of Operations logs, it was determined that a reportable condition occurred in January 2017 but no NRC report had been made. On January 10, 2017, at 0300 Central Standard Time (CST), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The Group 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A.' At 0311 CST, Operations personnel discovered that the 3A1 RPS circuit protector had tripped on undervoltage.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywall Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywall Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"All affected equipment responded as designed. This condition was the result of an undervoltage condition on the 3A1 circuit protector. During trouble shooting, the undervoltage setpoints were found to be 116 VAC and 115 VAC, when the normal as left acceptance band is 109.7 VAC to 111.3 VAC. The 3A RPS protective relays had been previously replaced in September 2016. The most likely cause of the undervoltage condition in these relays is infant mortality.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." | |