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Event Notification Report for November 2, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/01/2017 - 11/02/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52857 53048 53049

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Part 21 Event Number: 52857
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMSON KAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/13/2017
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES

The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:

"The plug valve designs provided for XOMOX model figure numbers 037AX, 067EG, and 037. These valves have been identified as used in nuclear and/or safety related applications.

"The stem for the Subject valve models was identified as being undersized based on allowable yield stress analysis of the stem while in torsion. The high stress condition was due to the high torque required to seat/unseat the plug when installed with a Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material. High friction factor inherent with this material causes torsional stress to exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Historical research performed thus far has not identified any notifications from the customer(s) regarding stem failure of the subject valves, indicating that the valves may still be in operation with no performance related or operating issues.

"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be .token to complete the action.

"Notifications letters have been sent to the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluomethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material.

"XOMOX has been advised to modify design calculations to provide a larger margin for allowable yield strength of the stem material to ensure the stem is properly sized when Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material is used.

"Crane will continue to review XOMOX records to determine if any other sites are impacted, which we expect to complete by August 31, 2017.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Samson Kay, Manager of Engineering at (630) 226-4983 or Jennifer Bregovy, Manager of Quality and Safety at (630) 226-4949."

The following facilities received these safety related orders: TVA Sequoyah, Pennsylvania Power & Light Susquehanna.

* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 8/29/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has initiate the final phase of the Part 21 research and is currently reviewing over 15,000 documents from the original XOMOX Canada historical archive to determine if any other nuclear sites were impacted by the subject Part 21. The investigation encompasses sales orders spanning from 1968 to 1992. CNI expects to complete the review by 10/30/2017."

Point of Contact: Samson Kay (630-226-4983) or Jennifer Bregovy (630-226-4949)

Notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Lopez), and Part 21 Resources (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 1627 EDT ON 11/01/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

The following information was provided as an update:

"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has completed approximately 40% of the review of the historical archive and will not be able to complete the review by the previously requested 10/30/2017 deadline.

"The historical review covers the following scope:

-XOMOX UK DEVON, ENGLAND - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves/Parts issued between 1987 - 1993
-XOMOX Canada & XOMOX A&M - Safety-Related Parts from 1979 - 1993
-XOMOX Cincinnati TUFFLINE - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued between 1970 -1993
-XOMOX Crane Nuclear - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued from 2001 until present.

"Note: Parts and valves were no longer supplied by XOMOX as safety-related or nuclear after 1993 until Crane Nuclear acquired XOMOX in June 29, 2001.

"The following sites . . . were identified as a safety-related valves effected by this letter. All sites were supplied to customer 'Delaval' which no longer exists. At the current pace of review, CNI expects to complete the review of the historical archive by 1/30/2018."

Delaval supplied valves to these Original Plant Name(s); TVA (doesn't show which plant), Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Columbia, Cleveland Electric, Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 and TVA, - Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants both of which were cancelled before completion.

Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53048
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CSERMAK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/01/2017
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2017
Event Time: 12:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

UNIT 2 FAILED LLRT SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE

"On November 1, 2017 at 1225 CDT, both the 2-220-58A Feed Water Inboard Check Valve and the 2-220-62A Feed Water Outboard Check Valve failed Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) acceptance criteria due to excessive leakage. These valves are considered primary containment isolation valves, and as such, are required to ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained.

"Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.12, 'Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program,' establishes limits for Primary Containment leakage. Based upon the results of the LLRT, Dresden, Unit 2, may not have met the limits for primary containment leakage during the last operating cycle as specified in TS 5.5.12.C.

"Dresden Unit 2 is currently in Mode 5 for a refueling outage and per Dresden TS 3.6.1.1, 'Primary Containment,' Primary Containment is not required in the current mode of operation (i.e., Mode 5). However, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), this event is reportable as a condition that resulted in a principal safety barrier being seriously degraded.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53049
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/01/2017
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2017
Event Time: 14:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DESIGN DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING ENGINEERING REVIEW

"At 1425 [CDT] on November 1, 2017, Operations was notified of a condition affecting Unit 3 4kV Shutdown Boards 3EA, 3EB, 3EC, and 3ED. It was discovered that multiple potential transformer (PT) primary fuses are GE type EJ1 size 0.5 AMP which does not coordinate with the PT's secondary fuses.

"A fault on the associated cable could clear the primary PT primary fuses for the 4kV Shutdown Board. This would result in the board tripping 4kV motor loads, disconnecting from Off-site power and connecting to the Emergency Diesel Generator. However, since the PT fuse is cleared, the under-voltage trips on the 4kV motors would remain in if there is no Common Accident Signal (CAS) present. The 4kV motor loads include Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps, Core Spray (CS) Pumps, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pumps, and Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pumps.

"Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables for all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards are routed in Fire Area 03-03 and Fire Area 16. Therefore a fire in either area could result in a loss of all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards motor loads. Cables for 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA and 3EB are both routed in Fire Area 21 which could result in a loss of both Division I Shutdown Board motor loads.

"Compensatory fire watch measures have been established.

"This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"CR 1354129 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, November 02, 2017
Thursday, November 02, 2017