| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/15/2017 - 09/18/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 52951 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: INGREDION
Region: 3
City: BEDFORD PARK State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01065-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY FORSEE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/07/2017
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEVEL GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received from the State of Illinois via email:
"At approximately 1052 [CDT] on 9/7/17, the RSO for lngredion (IL-01065-02) reported a shutter stuck in the 'on' position for a level gauge at their licensed facility in Bedford Park. The inoperable condition of the shutter and the resulting removal of the gauge from service occurred on 9/6/17. Reportedly, due to the mounting location of the device, no potential for exposure to personnel existed. The gauge has been removed and locked out by SAHCI [Stan A Huber Consultants, Inc.]. No surfaces of the gauge exceed 2 mR/hour and appropriate action for disposal is pending.
"The licensee reports an electronic switching device operates the shutter. This automatic device was bent and deformed as part of the operating process and the rod portion of the shutter was cracked most of the way through. As part of the remediation process, the shutter push rod broke off completely. Several unsuccessful attempts were made using WD40 and a pin to close the shutter. The gauge was removed from operation by SAHCI, keeping the primary beam away from all personnel. A 2x4x4 inch lead brick was secured to the face of the gauge. The exposure rate at the face of the gauge was less than 2mR/hr at all accessible surfaces. The gauge was secured in the locked radioactive material storage cabinet. The storage cabinet has five nuclear gauges stored within. The outside of the storage cabinet is less than 2mR/hr at the surface.
"The current plan is to properly dispose of the stuck shutter gauge. [SAHCI] request a disposal quote.
"The SSDR indicates maximum exposure rates for this device (max 500 mCi Cs-137) when the shutter is in the 'ON' position are less than 50 mR/hr at 5 cm and less than 5 mR/hr at 30 cm." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52953 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: IRISNDT, INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 06435
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED SOURCE ON SPEC 150 EXPOSURE DEVICE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On September 8, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services - Radiation Branch] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of their crews had experienced a source disconnect on September 7, 2017 at a field site. The crew was using a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 92 curie iridium - 192 source. The crew was working inside a shooting bay at a customer's location when the event occurred. The radiographers had completed an exposure and attempted to retract the source. The RSO stated the radiographers could not get the lock on the camera to trip. As they approached the camera they noted the dose rate reading on their dose rate meter was pegged so they retreated to the area where they operated the crank out device and called the RSO. The RSO, who is authorized by their license to recover sources, drove to the location and performed the source recovery. The RSO placed shielding over the source which was located in the collimator and removed the guide tube from the camera. The RSO found the drive cable sticking through the front of the camera. He disconnected the crank out device from the rear of the camera and found the drive cable had gone completely through the camera. The RSO found that the drive cable had broken inside the drive cable protective housing about 18 feet from the source. The RSO manually retracted the source into the camera by pulling on the drive cable. The source was returned to its fully shielded position. The licensee will send drive cable assembly to the manufacturer for inspection. No over exposure or exposure to a member of the general public occurred as a result of this event. Additional information on this event will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9508 |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52967 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RONNIE SIMMONS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/13/2017
Notification Time: 01:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2017
Event Time: 00:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2017 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (R3RA)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LETDOWN RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE TO THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK
At 0047 EDT, the licensee declared a notification of unusual event under emergency action level (EAL) S8 due to actuation of the letdown relief valve which resulted in reactor coolant system leakage to the pressurizer relief tank exceeding 10 gpm.
The plant was in mode 3 at the time making preparations to proceed to cold shutdown to support their refueling outage. Operators were in the process of reducing reactor coolant system letdown from 120 gpm to 45 gpm when the letdown system relief valve lifted. The relief discharged to the pressurizer relief tank at approximately 12 gpm. Operators isolated the letdown line which reduced the leakage to approximately 1 gpm.
Plant staff is in the process of determining where the 1 gpm leakage is from and evaluating the basis for terminating the unusual event.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0807 EDT ON 9/13/17 * * *
At 0800 EDT, the licensee terminated the notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the letdown line was isolated which reduced leakage to less than the EAL threshold of 10 gpm.
The cause of the letdown relief lifting is still under investigation.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the state of Michigan and Berrien County.
The licensee has issued a press release to the media concerning this event.
Notified R3DO (Riemer), IRD MOC (Stapleton), NRR (Miller), DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA Ops Center, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * RETRACTION FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1617 EDT ON 9/15/17 * * *
"The condition reported in Event Notification #52967 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) has been evaluated, and determined not to have met the threshold for classification as an Unusual Event under Emergency Action Level (EAL) S-8 and is being retracted.
"During the events of 9/13/17, Control Room staff calculated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) through the Letdown Relief Valve to be greater than the EAL S-8 threshold of 10 gallons per minute. Subsequent review of trends associated with PRT level increase during the event determined that the RCS leakage to the PRT was less than 10 gallons per minute and therefore did not represent an Unusual Event under EAL S-8.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified R3DO (Riemer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52973 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LONNIE CRAWFORD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/16/2017
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2017
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
"On September 16th, 2017 at 1330 hrs. [EDT], a loss of secondary containment differential pressure (D/P) occurred due to an equipment failure. This caused a reduction in Reactor Building Zone 2 (Unit 2) D/P to less than the required 0.25 inches WC per SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1.
"2V206B, Reactor Building Zone 2 Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fan, was manually started and Reactor Building Zone 2 D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC by 1333 hrs.
"Reactor Building Zone 1 (Unit 1) and Zone 3 (Units 1&2) ventilation remained in service and stable.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52974 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL NAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/17/2017
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2017
Event Time: 09:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AND PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control.
"The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred.
"These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed.
"This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation." | |