Event Notification Report for September 07, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/06/2017 - 09/07/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
52952529535295453046
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52952
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM JONES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM JONES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 00:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 23:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2017
Notification Time: 00:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 23:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2017
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHERINE HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHERINE HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT - HURRICANE WARNING
"At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 [EDT]. In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants.
"Both units are currently stable at 100% power level.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high.
Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 0458 EDT ON 09/11/17 FROM TIM JONES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"At 0400 [EDT] on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL [Emergency Action Level] has been exited."
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).
"At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 [EDT]. In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants.
"Both units are currently stable at 100% power level.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high.
Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 0458 EDT ON 09/11/17 FROM TIM JONES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"At 0400 [EDT] on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL [Emergency Action Level] has been exited."
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52953
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: IRISNDT, INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 06435
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: IRISNDT, INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 06435
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED SOURCE ON SPEC 150 EXPOSURE DEVICE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On September 8, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services - Radiation Branch] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of their crews had experienced a source disconnect on September 7, 2017 at a field site. The crew was using a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 92 curie iridium - 192 source. The crew was working inside a shooting bay at a customer's location when the event occurred. The radiographers had completed an exposure and attempted to retract the source. The RSO stated the radiographers could not get the lock on the camera to trip. As they approached the camera they noted the dose rate reading on their dose rate meter was pegged so they retreated to the area where they operated the crank out device and called the RSO. The RSO, who is authorized by their license to recover sources, drove to the location and performed the source recovery. The RSO placed shielding over the source which was located in the collimator and removed the guide tube from the camera. The RSO found the drive cable sticking through the front of the camera. He disconnected the crank out device from the rear of the camera and found the drive cable had gone completely through the camera. The RSO found that the drive cable had broken inside the drive cable protective housing about 18 feet from the source. The RSO manually retracted the source into the camera by pulling on the drive cable. The source was returned to its fully shielded position. The licensee will send drive cable assembly to the manufacturer for inspection. No over exposure or exposure to a member of the general public occurred as a result of this event. Additional information on this event will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9508
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On September 8, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services - Radiation Branch] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of their crews had experienced a source disconnect on September 7, 2017 at a field site. The crew was using a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 92 curie iridium - 192 source. The crew was working inside a shooting bay at a customer's location when the event occurred. The radiographers had completed an exposure and attempted to retract the source. The RSO stated the radiographers could not get the lock on the camera to trip. As they approached the camera they noted the dose rate reading on their dose rate meter was pegged so they retreated to the area where they operated the crank out device and called the RSO. The RSO, who is authorized by their license to recover sources, drove to the location and performed the source recovery. The RSO placed shielding over the source which was located in the collimator and removed the guide tube from the camera. The RSO found the drive cable sticking through the front of the camera. He disconnected the crank out device from the rear of the camera and found the drive cable had gone completely through the camera. The RSO found that the drive cable had broken inside the drive cable protective housing about 18 feet from the source. The RSO manually retracted the source into the camera by pulling on the drive cable. The source was returned to its fully shielded position. The licensee will send drive cable assembly to the manufacturer for inspection. No over exposure or exposure to a member of the general public occurred as a result of this event. Additional information on this event will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9508
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52954
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEVENNEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEVENNEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 15:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2017
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 15:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONFIRMED POSITIVE FFD TEST
"A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty [FFD] test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been removed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty [FFD] test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been removed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 53046
Facility: LOUISIANA ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
NRC Notified By: RICARDO MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
NRC Notified By: RICARDO MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/31/2017
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2017
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
WRONG IROFS PROCEDURE FOLLOWED PRIOR TO FILLING CYLINDER
The following event occurred on 9/7/17 but was not discovered until 1511 MDT on 10/30/17.
"Appendix A to 10 CFR 70(b)(2).
"While performing an extent of condition on a previous condition report in the UUSA [URENCO USA] corrective action program, UUSA discovered a product cylinder that had been introduced to the process inadvertently as a new or washed cylinder when it in fact was a heeled cylinder. The discrepancy caused the incorrect IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] to be applied when connecting the cylinder to the process; IROFS16a for new/washed cylinders and IROFS16e/f for heeled cylinders.
"The IROFS applicable (16e/f), administratively limits moderator (hydrogenous) mass in heeled cylinders containing enriched uranic material to ensure sub-criticality by limiting cylinder vapor pressure and heeled 30B cylinder weight. IROFS16e was completed SAT using the IROFS16a surveillance and the Product connect procedure. IROFS16f, an independent weight check and vapor pressure check, was not completed during the cylinder connect.
"The IROFS performed (16a), administratively limits moderator mass (hydrocarbon oil and water) in new and cleaned 30B cylinders containing enriched uranic material to ensure sub-criticality by allowing no visible oil and by limiting cylinder vapor pressure.
"Both of the aforementioned IROFS prevent criticality by limiting moderator mass, however the performance is different in heeled cylinders. IROFS16e/f are implemented by independently limiting cylinder vapor pressure and weight prior to introducing product into the cylinder.
"Cylinder UREU103960 was connected to the process on September 7, 2017, filled with product material, heated, and liquid sampled. A criticality DID NOT occur. Existing sample results show normal for contaminants boron, technetium, and silica. Sample testing for purity showed UF6 at a temperature 24C acceptable per ASTM C996 standards of [greater than] 99.5 [percent].
"10 CFR 70.50(c)(1)(iii):
"(A) The IROFS not performed prevent criticality. No criticality occurred, no radiological hazard, nor chemical hazards were present.
"(B) No exposure occurred.
"(C) UUSA Shift Operations inadvertently treated the cylinder with the wrong classification. The pedigree of the cylinder was misinterpreted and the IROFS16a surveillance was performed instead of the correct IROFSI6e/f surveillance.
"(D) IROFS remain available and reliable to perform their function. IROFS16 series are applicable during cylinder connects and are established by the performer of the cylinder connect evolution. The IROFS are not affected for future cylinder evolutions.
"(iv) The cylinder is currently inside the Cylinder Receipt and Dispatch Building. No external conditions affect this event.
"(v) UUSA immediately treated the cylinder as an anomalous condition in accordance with internal procedures and Operations Reporting Manual. The cylinder had been through the sampling process and the results are being reviewed by UUSA NCS/ISA Engineering staff.
"(vi) No criticality event occurred. The cylinder is in a criticality safety anomalous condition. There are currently no other cylinders immediately adjacent and the area has been roped off.
"(vii) No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.
"(viii) No state or other federal agencies will be notified.
"(ix) No press releases are planned.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: No Event Occurred
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The cylinder is in a criticality safety anomalous condition. Existing sample results from cylinder contents are being reviewed.
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Condition has been entered into facility's Corrective Action Program"
The licensee will inform NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
* * * UPDATE AT 1629 EDT ON 11/02/2017 FROM RICARDO MEDINA TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"11/2/2017 1429 MST Update: Based on existing liquid sample results, conservatively assuming a moderator concentration of 0.5 percent, the filled cylinder's heel meets the acceptance criteria. This demonstrates a criticality event to be highly unlikely and therefore, the anomalous condition was exited at 1242 MST."
Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NMSS (via email) and Fuels Group (via email).
The following event occurred on 9/7/17 but was not discovered until 1511 MDT on 10/30/17.
"Appendix A to 10 CFR 70(b)(2).
"While performing an extent of condition on a previous condition report in the UUSA [URENCO USA] corrective action program, UUSA discovered a product cylinder that had been introduced to the process inadvertently as a new or washed cylinder when it in fact was a heeled cylinder. The discrepancy caused the incorrect IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] to be applied when connecting the cylinder to the process; IROFS16a for new/washed cylinders and IROFS16e/f for heeled cylinders.
"The IROFS applicable (16e/f), administratively limits moderator (hydrogenous) mass in heeled cylinders containing enriched uranic material to ensure sub-criticality by limiting cylinder vapor pressure and heeled 30B cylinder weight. IROFS16e was completed SAT using the IROFS16a surveillance and the Product connect procedure. IROFS16f, an independent weight check and vapor pressure check, was not completed during the cylinder connect.
"The IROFS performed (16a), administratively limits moderator mass (hydrocarbon oil and water) in new and cleaned 30B cylinders containing enriched uranic material to ensure sub-criticality by allowing no visible oil and by limiting cylinder vapor pressure.
"Both of the aforementioned IROFS prevent criticality by limiting moderator mass, however the performance is different in heeled cylinders. IROFS16e/f are implemented by independently limiting cylinder vapor pressure and weight prior to introducing product into the cylinder.
"Cylinder UREU103960 was connected to the process on September 7, 2017, filled with product material, heated, and liquid sampled. A criticality DID NOT occur. Existing sample results show normal for contaminants boron, technetium, and silica. Sample testing for purity showed UF6 at a temperature 24C acceptable per ASTM C996 standards of [greater than] 99.5 [percent].
"10 CFR 70.50(c)(1)(iii):
"(A) The IROFS not performed prevent criticality. No criticality occurred, no radiological hazard, nor chemical hazards were present.
"(B) No exposure occurred.
"(C) UUSA Shift Operations inadvertently treated the cylinder with the wrong classification. The pedigree of the cylinder was misinterpreted and the IROFS16a surveillance was performed instead of the correct IROFSI6e/f surveillance.
"(D) IROFS remain available and reliable to perform their function. IROFS16 series are applicable during cylinder connects and are established by the performer of the cylinder connect evolution. The IROFS are not affected for future cylinder evolutions.
"(iv) The cylinder is currently inside the Cylinder Receipt and Dispatch Building. No external conditions affect this event.
"(v) UUSA immediately treated the cylinder as an anomalous condition in accordance with internal procedures and Operations Reporting Manual. The cylinder had been through the sampling process and the results are being reviewed by UUSA NCS/ISA Engineering staff.
"(vi) No criticality event occurred. The cylinder is in a criticality safety anomalous condition. There are currently no other cylinders immediately adjacent and the area has been roped off.
"(vii) No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.
"(viii) No state or other federal agencies will be notified.
"(ix) No press releases are planned.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: No Event Occurred
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The cylinder is in a criticality safety anomalous condition. Existing sample results from cylinder contents are being reviewed.
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Condition has been entered into facility's Corrective Action Program"
The licensee will inform NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
* * * UPDATE AT 1629 EDT ON 11/02/2017 FROM RICARDO MEDINA TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"11/2/2017 1429 MST Update: Based on existing liquid sample results, conservatively assuming a moderator concentration of 0.5 percent, the filled cylinder's heel meets the acceptance criteria. This demonstrates a criticality event to be highly unlikely and therefore, the anomalous condition was exited at 1242 MST."
Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NMSS (via email) and Fuels Group (via email).