Event Notification Report for August 14, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/13/2017 - 08/14/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
5290652907529005290252903
Agreement State
Event Number: 52906
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: ISOMEDIX OPERATIONS
Region: 1
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: ISOMEDIX OPERATIONS
Region: 1
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR SOURCE RACKS INOPERABLE
Following a panoramic irradiator two day shutdown, a restart with three source racks commenced. Air pressure was applied to raise the source racks. During the restart, two source racks (racks 1 and 3) did not descend into the irradiator pool as designed. During an investigation, two release valves associated with the two source racks did not operate properly. Operators manually released air pressure and all source racks descended into the irradiator pool. The deficient release valves were replaced and the source racks were satisfactorily retested. The source racks all properly descended into the pool. The time the source racks were inoperable for approximately 1.5 hours.
Following a panoramic irradiator two day shutdown, a restart with three source racks commenced. Air pressure was applied to raise the source racks. During the restart, two source racks (racks 1 and 3) did not descend into the irradiator pool as designed. During an investigation, two release valves associated with the two source racks did not operate properly. Operators manually released air pressure and all source racks descended into the irradiator pool. The deficient release valves were replaced and the source racks were satisfactorily retested. The source racks all properly descended into the pool. The time the source racks were inoperable for approximately 1.5 hours.
Agreement State
Event Number: 52907
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CRAWFORD AND ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 4
City: MODESTO State: CA
County:
License #: 7971-50
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAMANI HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: CRAWFORD AND ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 4
City: MODESTO State: CA
County:
License #: 7971-50
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAMANI HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the State of California via email:
"On 08/14/17, RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] received an incident report from Office of Emergency Services regarding a damaged moisture density gauge. A CPN gauge, Model MC-3, S/N M380108935, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241 was run over by a heavy construction equipment at a job site in the city of Santa Clara, CA. The top of the gauge housing was damaged with a broken rod, however, the user managed to retrieve the source back into shielded position. The damaged gauge was placed in the transport case and taken to the licensee's facility for disposal. Fire department was at the incident site, performed surveys using a survey meter (no survey meter information available) and the readings did not indicate any contamination. According to the gauge user, Fire Department readings indicated 500 uR/hr at the damaged gauge and 6 uR/hr at 15 feet from the gauge. The gauge will be transported to CPN for leak testing and disposal on 08/15/17. RHB will be following up on this incident."
California 5010 Number: 081417
The following information was provided by the State of California via email:
"On 08/14/17, RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] received an incident report from Office of Emergency Services regarding a damaged moisture density gauge. A CPN gauge, Model MC-3, S/N M380108935, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241 was run over by a heavy construction equipment at a job site in the city of Santa Clara, CA. The top of the gauge housing was damaged with a broken rod, however, the user managed to retrieve the source back into shielded position. The damaged gauge was placed in the transport case and taken to the licensee's facility for disposal. Fire department was at the incident site, performed surveys using a survey meter (no survey meter information available) and the readings did not indicate any contamination. According to the gauge user, Fire Department readings indicated 500 uR/hr at the damaged gauge and 6 uR/hr at 15 feet from the gauge. The gauge will be transported to CPN for leak testing and disposal on 08/15/17. RHB will be following up on this incident."
California 5010 Number: 081417
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52900
Rep Org: NIST
Licensee: NIST
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County:
License #: SNM-362
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MANUEL MEJIAS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: NIST
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County:
License #: SNM-362
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MANUEL MEJIAS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/14/2017
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 14:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2017
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 14:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MATERIAL IDENTIFIED LOST AFTER INVENTORY
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) determined that 24.9 microCuries of Cf-252 is being considered lost after performing an examination of inventory records. The missing material was identified during a leak test conducted on Wednesday August, 9, 2017. After identification of the missing material, NIST performed a physical inspection of all laboratories and examined physical inventory records. NIST has identified that there is a potential for this material to have been shipped to the Department of Energy and is still awaiting a response to verify that information.
NIST has performed a courtesy notification to the NRC R1 (Ullrich) and PM (Naquin) regarding this incident.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1631 EDT ON 8/16/2017 FROM MANUEL MEJIAS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The purpose of this communication is to provide additional details surrounding the circumstances that have led to location of the Cf-252 source reported as missing under 10CFR20.2201(a)(i) at 14:54EDT on 8/14/2017. A call to the Ops Center was made today at 16:31EDT. The purpose of the call was to retract Event #52900 after successfully locating the source with NIST unique identifier number RS75-0086 (known by the Department of Energy as NS-86). The source was located inside a restricted area, the same room where the empty storage container was located.
"After reporting event #52900, at my direction as Radiation Safety Officer and with the support of NIST Senior Management, multiple efforts were started to investigate the probable disposition of the source (also as directed by 10CFR20.2201(b)(iii)). During those efforts, all records for shipments of Cf-252 were reviewed and colleagues at the DOE were contacted to exhaust the possibility that the material had been transferred out of NIST. Having no record of the source departing the facility, a new round of radiological surveys was started of the restricted facilities where the source had been previously authorized. After removal of all other neutron-emitting shielding containers from the immediate area, a residual field of neutron radiation was detected. This seemed indicative of the presence of a source. At this time it was observed that a radioactive source was outside of the storage containers. This source is/was of very small dimensions [approximately one inch in diameter]. The source matched the description and nearby was found the hazards information tag that corresponded to RS#75-0086.
"Given that the source was always in a restricted area with low-occupancy, we have determined that no hazards to individuals have resulted from this source misplacement."
Notified ILTAB (Ahern), R1DO (Gray), and NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) determined that 24.9 microCuries of Cf-252 is being considered lost after performing an examination of inventory records. The missing material was identified during a leak test conducted on Wednesday August, 9, 2017. After identification of the missing material, NIST performed a physical inspection of all laboratories and examined physical inventory records. NIST has identified that there is a potential for this material to have been shipped to the Department of Energy and is still awaiting a response to verify that information.
NIST has performed a courtesy notification to the NRC R1 (Ullrich) and PM (Naquin) regarding this incident.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1631 EDT ON 8/16/2017 FROM MANUEL MEJIAS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The purpose of this communication is to provide additional details surrounding the circumstances that have led to location of the Cf-252 source reported as missing under 10CFR20.2201(a)(i) at 14:54EDT on 8/14/2017. A call to the Ops Center was made today at 16:31EDT. The purpose of the call was to retract Event #52900 after successfully locating the source with NIST unique identifier number RS75-0086 (known by the Department of Energy as NS-86). The source was located inside a restricted area, the same room where the empty storage container was located.
"After reporting event #52900, at my direction as Radiation Safety Officer and with the support of NIST Senior Management, multiple efforts were started to investigate the probable disposition of the source (also as directed by 10CFR20.2201(b)(iii)). During those efforts, all records for shipments of Cf-252 were reviewed and colleagues at the DOE were contacted to exhaust the possibility that the material had been transferred out of NIST. Having no record of the source departing the facility, a new round of radiological surveys was started of the restricted facilities where the source had been previously authorized. After removal of all other neutron-emitting shielding containers from the immediate area, a residual field of neutron radiation was detected. This seemed indicative of the presence of a source. At this time it was observed that a radioactive source was outside of the storage containers. This source is/was of very small dimensions [approximately one inch in diameter]. The source matched the description and nearby was found the hazards information tag that corresponded to RS#75-0086.
"Given that the source was always in a restricted area with low-occupancy, we have determined that no hazards to individuals have resulted from this source misplacement."
Notified ILTAB (Ahern), R1DO (Gray), and NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52902
Rep Org: MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Licensee: MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC
Region: 4
City: BOISE State: ID
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK FADEL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC
Region: 4
City: BOISE State: ID
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK FADEL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/14/2017
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ILTAB (EMAI)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ILTAB (EMAI)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)
TWO NUCLEOSTAT IONIZER BARS IDENTIFIED MISSING
Two NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars were determined to be missing after a search of metal recycling, potential other locations, and an inventory. The two NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars were identified to be missing from a shipment that was received on July 31, 2017. This shipment contained one of the three expected NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars. The licensee stated that the area where the cardboard boxes are broken down and stored still remains to be searched. The licensee stated that the local metal waste disposal facility was contacted regarding the event and will be contacting the local landfill regarding the issue.
Device Information:
NRG Nucleostat Ionizer Bars
Part Number: P-2001-006
Serial Numbers: A2LA345 and A2LA347
Activity: 14.06 milliCuries of Po-210
* * * RETRACTION AT 1247 EDT ON 08/15/17 FROM ASHLEY KUNZ TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
At 0900 MST on 8/15/2017 the two devices were found intact. A team of Emergency response technicians and site services janitorial members searched the remaining area containing broken down cardboard boxes. The two devices were placed into a locked area pending review by the manufacturer prior to being placed into use. Because the devices were found intact, this event is being retracted.
Notified the R4DO(Farnholtz), NMSS Events, ILTAB and CNSC (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Two NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars were determined to be missing after a search of metal recycling, potential other locations, and an inventory. The two NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars were identified to be missing from a shipment that was received on July 31, 2017. This shipment contained one of the three expected NRD Nucleostat Ionizer Bars. The licensee stated that the area where the cardboard boxes are broken down and stored still remains to be searched. The licensee stated that the local metal waste disposal facility was contacted regarding the event and will be contacting the local landfill regarding the issue.
Device Information:
NRG Nucleostat Ionizer Bars
Part Number: P-2001-006
Serial Numbers: A2LA345 and A2LA347
Activity: 14.06 milliCuries of Po-210
* * * RETRACTION AT 1247 EDT ON 08/15/17 FROM ASHLEY KUNZ TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
At 0900 MST on 8/15/2017 the two devices were found intact. A team of Emergency response technicians and site services janitorial members searched the remaining area containing broken down cardboard boxes. The two devices were placed into a locked area pending review by the manufacturer prior to being placed into use. Because the devices were found intact, this event is being retracted.
Notified the R4DO(Farnholtz), NMSS Events, ILTAB and CNSC (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52903
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN J. KAPOSTASY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN J. KAPOSTASY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 22:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2017
Event Time: 22:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT MOMENTARY LOW VACUUM
"On August 14th, 2017 at 2257 [EDT], while shutting down the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) Train B, secondary containment pressure momentarily lowered. This resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for Secondary Containment to not be met for 15 seconds. The minimum Secondary Containment vacuum observed during that time was 0.52 inch of vacuum water gauge.
"Secondary Containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.66 inch of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by the AEGTS Train A that remained in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable is reportable under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) & (D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to:(C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On August 14th, 2017 at 2257 [EDT], while shutting down the Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) Train B, secondary containment pressure momentarily lowered. This resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for Secondary Containment to not be met for 15 seconds. The minimum Secondary Containment vacuum observed during that time was 0.52 inch of vacuum water gauge.
"Secondary Containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.66 inch of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by the AEGTS Train A that remained in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable is reportable under [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) & (D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to:(C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."