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Event Notification Report for May 19, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/18/2017 - 05/19/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52669 52743 52746 52762 52763

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52669
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/06/2017
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY

"At 1620 EDT on April 6, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) door was found ajar. At that time, both control room ventilation filtrations trains (CREVS) were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, condition B, due to the inoperability of the Control Room Envelope (CRE). At 1623 EDT, the door was closed, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.

"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. Additionally, it ensures that the occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID ALLEN TO S. SANDIN ON 5/18/17 AT 1459 EDT * * *

"Event Notification EN 52669, made on 4/06/2017, is being retracted because additional reviews have been performed supporting that a loss of safety function did not occur.

"Watts Bar Unit 2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because when the door was found open it was capable of being closed and able to support the control room envelope function. A simulation performed on 04/07/17 also showed that with the door in question opened 1-2 inches that the control room pressure would have remained above the TS required positive pressure of 0.125 inches of water.

"The control room envelope is designed such that the door is expected to be opened to allow personnel entry and exit, and thus positive pressures in the control room will fluctuate. The event that occurred is similar to a number of individuals entering and exiting the control room in series. Since the control room envelope function was not lost, this event is not reportable and NRC Event Number 52669 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Blamey).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52743
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: KEANE FRAC LP
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L06829
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 05/10/2017
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INOPERABLE SHUTTERS ON TWO STORED GAUGES

The following information was received from the state of Texas via email:

"On May 10, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that during routine testing it found the shutters on two Berthold model LB8010 nuclear gauges that were in storage were inoperable. The shutters were in the closed position. Each gauge contains a 20 milliCurie cesium - 137 source. One source handle was reported as missing and the other handle rotates around the shutter's operating shaft, but does not turn the shaft. The licensee has contacted the manufacture to inspect and repair or replace the gauges. The gauges are not an exposure risk to members of the general public or the licensee's work force. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I 9486

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Agreement State Event Number: 52746
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: ZEVACOR PHARMA INC
Region: 1
City: SOMERSET State: NJ
County:
License #: 439619
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/11/2017
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IMPROPER SHIPPING PACKAGE LABELS

The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via facsimile:

"Notifications: Phone call was made to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [NJDEP] Bureau of Environmental Radiation on 5/10/17. The event occurred on 4/26/17.

"Event Description: PADEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] staff notified NJDEP staff of a package that was transported by a [New Jersey] pharmacy from a [Pennsylvania] nuclear medicine office. It appears that the package was accompanied by an inaccurate bill of lading and package label/[Transport Index]. and brought to the licensee's [Somerset, New Jersey] facility. Investigation is ongoing."

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Part 21 Event Number: 52762
Rep Org: EMERSON AUTOMATION SOLUTIONS
Licensee: VALVE AUTOMATION, INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SUE OOI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/18/2017
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 OF BETTIS BRAND SEISMIC QUALIFIED G SERIES SPRING RETURN ACTUATORS

The following report was received via fax:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, Valve Automation, Inc. (VAI) is writing to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that, due to a retroactive application of a more stringent parts classification analysis, the adaptor plate contained in Bettis Brand Seismic Qualified G Series Spring Return Actuators (the 'Affected Actuators') is now classified as 'critical,' and therefore subject to certain inspection and dedication requirements which may not have been satisfied in Affected Actuators sold in the period between 2010 and 2016.

"VAI has not received any information that absence of the inspection and dedication activities as a result of the prior classification has resulted in a safety hazard. In addition, VAI does not have the ability to determine whether or not a defect or non-compliance as defined in Part 21 exists. We are notifying customers and recommending remedial inspection of the Affected Actuators.

"1.0 Name and address of individual providing this information:

Sue Ooi
Vice President
Actuation Technologies
Emerson Automation Solutions
19200 Northwest Freeway Houston, Texas 17065
T + 12814774170

"2.0 Identification of the basic component at issue:

Adaptor plates bearing the following part numbers:
VA600688
VA600692
VA600873
VA600988

"3.0 Nature of the issue:

VAI is not aware of a 'defect' in the adapter plates of Affected Actuators, but due to a retroactive application of a more stringent parts classification analysis, an inspection and dedication noncompliance may exist concerning these adaptor plates.

"4.0 Number and location of affected components in use:

42 Affected Actuators, sold to direct customers located in the United States.

"5.0 Date the issue was discovered:

March 14, 2017

"6.0 Corrective action and advice given to purchasers:

Inspection Recommendation

Certain measurements should be taken to remedy the inspection nonconformance. All measurements may be taken in situ with the actuator assembled to the valve. Please refer to Figure A (attached) depicting the feature to be measured. The numbered measurements in Figure A correspond to the numbered measurement inspection procedure below. Table 1 provides measurement values for reference [Figure A and Table 1 were supplied with the original submittal and may be viewed at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/part21/ when posted]. Remedial inspection recommendations are to:

1. Confirm the thickness of the plate at the point where the bolt head & washer engage the flange surface. This location may be a milled flat section or counter sunk hole depending on the actuator size.

2. Verify full thread engagement for nuts installed on bolts for the housing flange.

3. Perform hardness testing on a small area on the outside diameter of the adaptor plate. The paint will need to be removed at the point of hardness testing.

Should the adaptor plate fail to meet the above specifications, please contact us promptly.

"7.0 Other advice to purchasers:

VAI recommends that users review applications where any Affected Actuators are used to determine any safety considerations in the operation of the plant.

"VAI is committed to the highest standards of safety and customer service in the nuclear industry, and remains dedicated to the supply of world class products to our customers. If you have any questions or require additional information related to this issue, please contact: Justin DeClue, Director of Global Quality, [Tel:] 281 477 4631."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52763
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: KELLI ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/18/2017
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2017
Event Time: 08:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction
4 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction

Event Text

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

"On May 17, 2017, at 1852 [EDT], Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and
corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 19, 2017
Friday, May 19, 2017