| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/14/2017 - 04/17/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52564 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WAYNE CLAYTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 02/18/2017
Notification Time: 02:58 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 23:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 30 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM RESULTING FROM FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILURE
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"On February 17, 2017 at 2353 CST, Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram signal was received due to Turbine Control Valves Fast Closure. The turbine trip was due to receipt of Level 8 Trip due to a failure of the Feedwater Regulating Valve to Full open. Plant is in a stable condition with reactor pressure being maintained by the Turbine Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with Feedwater thru the Low Flow Feedwater Regulating Valve. Further investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
All control rods fully inserted, and decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM BROCK POLLMANN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1721 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *
"Upon further review of the event data, it was determined that the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) had initiated a manual scram, which was followed by a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure automatic scram when the turbine tripped."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Jeffers). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52581 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/28/2017
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2017
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 28 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"On February 28, 2017 at 0930 [EST], a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS [Reactor Coolant System] leakage. A leak was identified between 13RC6 and 13SS661, 13 RCS hot leg sample isolation valves at 1000 [EST]. These valves are manual isolation valves in the reactor coolant hot leg sample line. Leak isolation could not be initially verified and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.4.6.2a, RCS operational leakage, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage.
"This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for 'The initiation of a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) or 'Any event of condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded.'
"The unit was placed in mode 3 at 1554 [EST] on 02/28/2017.
"This condition has no impact on public health and safety."
Per Technical Specifications, the unit is proceeding to mode 5. The leak rate at the time of shutdown was 0.33 gpm. This event has no effect on Unit 2.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey and the State of Delaware.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MATT MOG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1144 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52581 made on 2/28/2017 at 1624 (EST). Previously, PSEG notified the NRC that Salem Unit 1 initiated a shutdown required by Technical Specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary Leakage.
"Subsequent to the initial report, PSEG has determined that the leak occurred in tubing downstream of the design specification break between Safety Related, Nuclear Class 1, Seismic Class1 and Non-Safety-Related, Nuclear Class 2, Seismic Class 2. Therefore, the observed leakage is not RCS pressure boundary leakage as defined in the Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications and in the tubing design classification specification.
"At the time of the event, during initial entry into the containment, the volume of steam present and the height of the break above the floor made it difficult to ascertain the location of the steam source with certainty. The initial judgment of RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage was conservative under these circumstances. The plant was taken offline to minimize radiation exposure when personnel operated the isolation valves. Following the shutdown, the leak was isolated. Based on an observed reduction in RCS leak rate and visual verification of leakage isolation, the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was exited and the unit remained in Mode 3, Hot Standby, to affect repairs. The condition did not meet the Technical Specification Pressure Boundary Leakage definition of leakage through a non-isolable fault in a RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.
"The leakage did not impact the ability to shut down the unit and no TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage from flawed sample system tubing does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and PSEG is retracting the notifications made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee."
Notified R1DO (Jackson). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52582 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TRICIA LOULA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/28/2017
Notification Time: 21:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2017
Event Time: 18:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SHORT DURATION LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"At 1825 [CST] on 02/28/2017, Dresden Station received unexpected alarm 923-5 C-1, RX BLDG DP LO [Reactor Building Differential Pressure Low]. Reactor Building differential pressure was observed to briefly lose vacuum and return to a normal reading of 0.6 inches vacuum water gauge. At the time of the transient, Grundy County was under a Severe Weather Warning and gusts of wind were being monitored from the Main Control Room up to approximately 57 mph. The Reactor Building differential pressure returned to [greater than or equal to] 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge at 18:25 after 18 seconds with no operator action. Operators observed differential pressure reading to lose vacuum, below 0 inches vacuum water gauge, for approximately 3 seconds.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"An issue report has been initiated and a 60-day Licensee Event Report will be submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION ON 4/14/17 AT 1429 EDT FROM BOBBY SHORT TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52582 made on 2/28/17 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The previous notification reported a potential loss of Reactor Building differential pressure due to high wind conditions and associated entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 Condition A for failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 to maintain differential pressure above 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge.
"After further evaluation, it has been determined that the high winds caused a momentary low pressure pocket on the leeward side of the Reactor Building causing the differential pressure reading seen in the Main Control Room, but it did not challenge Reactor Building differential pressure or Secondary Containment. Reactor Building differential pressure indication utilizes four transmitters, one on each wall of the Reactor Building, and the most conservative reading is transmitted to the indicator in the Main Control Room. Wind conditions impacting a single transmitter would result in indication of low Reactor Building differential pressure in the Main Control Room. Procedures direct action to obtain local readings from all four Reactor Building differential pressure transmitters. After the low indication in the Main Control Room, Equipment Operators were dispatched to obtain local indication and all four transmitters were found to be indicating 0.6 inches vacuum water gauge.
"This was a short duration transient with no indications of an equipment failure that could impact Secondary Containment. The entire transient occurred within an 18 second window where differential pressure indication began at 0.6 inches vacuum water gauge, dropped to below 0 inches vacuum water gauge, and subsequently restored to 0.6 inches vacuum water gauge with no operator intervention. Furthermore, a significant change in Reactor Building differential pressure would impact readings on Drywell pressure because the Reactor Building pressure is used as a reference leg. Trends of Drywell pressure during the event indicated no adverse conditions implying that Reactor Building differential pressure was stable. Thus, it has been concluded that this was an indication issue and at no point during the transient would Secondary Containment have been unable to perform its safety function.
"Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and the ENS notification is being retracted. There is no longer a requirement for an associated 60-day Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Jeffers). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52667 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: NOT PROVIDED
Region: 1
City: NOT PROVIDED State: NY
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JANAKI KRISHNOMOORTHY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/06/2017
Notification Time: 12:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE ADMINISTERED TO PATIENT
The following information was provided by the State of New York via facsimile:
"On 04/05/2017, a patient with metastatic esophageal cancer received right hepatic lobar treatment [to the liver] with Y90 from SIRTEX microspheres.
"The intended activity was 32.9 mCi. Drawn activity was 32.7 mCi. The administered activity measured at the end of the procedure was 8.2 mCi [25 percent of intended activity].
"Probable cause stated by the licensee: 'clumping' of microspheres resulting in occlusion of vial 'delivery C' needle provided by the vendor. The licensee plans to (1) request review from the manufacturer of the preparation and handling of the microspheres prior to arrival to the IR suite, (2) Since the patient is already planned for a left lobar treatment, a whole liver treatment will be planned to deliver the deficit dose to the right lobe."
NY Event Report ID No. NYDOH-NY-17-06
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52671 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: L-06462
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/09/2017
Notification Time: 13:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILS TO RETRACT PROPERLY
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On April 9, 2017, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that on April 8, 2017, one of his crew was unable to retract a 95 curie iridium-192 source into a Spec 150 exposure device [at a work site 2 miles inside the Texas border near Jal, NM]. The RSO stated that after the first exposure for the day, the radiographers noted they could not lock the source inside the exposure device. The radiographers established a two millirem per hour boundary and evacuated two trailers that were inside the two millirem per hour barrier. The RSO stated the people were in the trailer for five minutes before the radiographers had them leave the area. The radiographers contacted the site RSO who responded to the scene. The site RSO found the guide tube had separated from the front of the exposure device. The site RSO was able to retract the source into the fully shielded position. The RSO stated they believe that sand had built up in the guide tube to camera connection which prevented the guide tube connector to fully seat in the connection. The RSO stated his initial calculations indicated no member of the general public exceeded any exposure limits. No licensee personnel exceeded any exposure limit from this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9478 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52679 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALAN SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 04/14/2017
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2017
Event Time: 00:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup | Event Text DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER SIMULTANEOUSLY ALIGNED FOR VENTING
"On April 14, 2017, at approximately 0015 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), during a control board walk-down, it was discovered that the drywell and the suppression chamber were simultaneously aligned for venting. This alignment created a flow path from the drywell to the suppression chamber, which would have bypassed the pressure suppression function of the suppression chamber water volume during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This condition existed tor approximately 43 minutes, from 2347 EDT on April 13, 2017, when Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 2, until 0030 on April 14, 2017, when the proper alignment was restored. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, the change from Mode 4 to Mode 2 with primary containment inoperable constitutes operation prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)).
"The condition did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment, Condition A, which requires Primary Containment to be restored to operable within 2 hours. Unit 2 exited Condition A within 43 minutes when the proper alignment was restored. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52681 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW MOG
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/14/2017
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2017
Event Time: 13:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START DUE TO LOSS OF A 4160 V BUS
"At 1357 [EDT] on April 14, 2017, an unplanned automatic start signal was generated for the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The station was in the process of transferring the 2C 4160 volt vital bus from the 24 Station Power Transformer (SPT) to the 23 SPT, which are the offsite power in-feeds for the 2C 4160 volt vital bus. The 24 SPT infeed breaker opened as expected; however, the 23 SPT infeed breaker failed to close. The failure to swap from the 24 SPT to 23 SPT resulted in a momentary loss of power to the 2C 4160 volt vital bus generating the automatic start signal for the 2C EDG. The 2C 4160 volt vital bus was automatically re-energized by the 2C EDG as expected.
"Abnormal operating procedures were entered for loss of the 2C 4160 volt vital bus. Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 1 operating at 100% power. All equipment operated as expected.
"At 1555 [EDT], 2C 4160 volt vital bus was reenergized from 24 SPT, and the 2C EDG was secured in accordance with station implementing procedures.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Lower Alloways Creek Township, State of New Jersey, and State of Delaware will be notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52682 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAMON HESSIG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/15/2017
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2017
Event Time: 04:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text VALID REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND PARTIAL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATIONS ON LOW WATER LEVEL
"During shutdown activities with the reactor subcritical, actions were being taken to remove 11 Reactor Feed Pump from service in support of a scheduled refueling outage. Reactor Water Level on Safeguards level instrumentation dropped below +9 inches, which resulted in a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) Scram signal and Partial Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) signal. All systems functioned as required. Reactor Water Level on Safeguards instrumentation was restored to greater than +9 inches immediately. RPS and PCIS logic was reset. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This actuation of these systems is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |