| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/04/2017 - 04/05/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52544 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB EISENMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 02/08/2017
Notification Time: 22:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2017
Event Time: 20:24 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO UNACCOUNTED LOADS IN SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
"On February 3rd, 2017, during engineering modification reviews of electrical busses for a station switchyard transformer, electrical loads were identified on 4kV breakers that are not accounted for in the current safe shutdown analysis. Further reviews revealed the unanalyzed loads are associated with 26 cables that are routed through multiple fire zones in the Turbine Building and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 4kV rooms that have the potential to be affected from a fire event. Per NFPA 805 requirements, the cables need to be analyzed for overcurrent trip capability to demonstrate that the breakers will isolate a fault for a fire.
"Hourly Fire Watch tours have been established in the identified fire zones. The public health and safety is not impacted. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This is a late notification for the 8 hour report."
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERIK LANKHEET TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1522 ON 04/04/2017 * * *
"The condition reported in EN# 52544 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) has been evaluated, and determined not to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is being retracted.
"Fire Protection Engineering performed circuit analysis of the discovered loads and determined that the Fire Safety Analysis credited power supply for an established recovery action was lost due to a Turbine Building fire. This was determined to not be a significant impact to plant safety due to the availability of an alternate offsite 4kV power supply that was not impacted by this fire. Emergency Operating Procedures already contain guidance that directs operators to align the 4kV busses to this offsite power circuit and that can be accomplished within the time necessary to perform the recovery action. During periods when this offsite power circuit was removed from service over the past three years, risk was managed using the online risk management process and no additional actions would have been required for its use as the credited power source in the Fire Safety Analysis.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified the R3DO (Skokowski). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52644 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: L-05843
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/28/2017
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2017
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENISTY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On March 28, 2017, the Agency [Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that a Troxler Model 3411 moisture/density gauge was stolen from one of its trucks. The gauge contains a 40 milliCurie americium-241 source and an eight milliCurie cesium-137 source. The gauge had been used at a job site the day before by a technician and taken to their home [located in Fort Worth] for the night, stored (locked) in the bed of the truck. Since the operating rod for the cesium source was locked in the shielded position and the case was also locked, the licensee does not believe a member of the general public would receive any significant exposure. The radiation safety officer stated he would provide additional information to the Agency as soon as he completed his interview with the technician. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
TX Incident #: I-9475
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ART TUCKER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1029 EDT ON 03/28/2017 * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
The stolen moisture density gauge was actually a Troxler 3430 versus a Troxler 3411 as described in the above paragraph.
Notified R4DO (Hipschman), NMSS Events Notification group, ILTAB, and Mexico via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52662 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: VINCENT LEETH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/04/2017
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2017
Event Time: 21:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"At 2155 hours EDT on 04/03/2017, with the unit in Mode 3 at 0 [percent] power, an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during surveillance testing. The cause of the AFW system auto-start was an improperly performed procedure step to bypass the auto-start logic of the AFW pumps during performance of the surveillance test. The 'A' and 'B' AFW pumps automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received.
"Due to the valid actuation of the AFW system, this event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(B)(6). At no time did this occurrence pose undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52663 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/04/2017
Notification Time: 06:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2017
Event Time: 00:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO CONDENSATE LEAK
"At 0010 [CDT], 04/04/2017, the reactor was manually scrammed from approximately 75 [percent] core thermal power due Condensate Storage tank level lowering to 24 feet. All control rods fully inserted and all systems actuated and operated as designed. No safety relief valves actuated. Reactor level and pressure are currently being controlled within normal bands. RCIC [reactor core isolation cooling] was manually initiated for level control.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the manual start of the reactor core isolation cooling system."
The cause of lowering level was a condensate pipe leak. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant loads.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52664 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENDRIK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/04/2017
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2017
Event Time: 07:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INADVERTENTLY ISOLATED DURING CONDUCT OF MAINTENANCE SURVEILLANCE
"On April 4, 2017, at 0735 [EDT], the HPCI System was inadvertently isolated during the performance of l&C [Instrument and Control] testing.
"Technicians were in the process of performing instrument surveillance tests for the HPCI [high pressure coolant injection] System (using Allowed Out of Service Times) when a trip signal was applied to the incorrect instrument. This caused a HPCI System isolation signal on High Area Temperature, resulting in the closure of the HPCI steam isolation valves and rendering the system inoperable and unavailable. RCIC was immediately verified to be operable.
"The surveillance testing was aborted and system restoration is in progress.
"This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
This placed the plant in a 14-day LCO action statement under Technical Specification 3.5.1.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |