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Event Notification Report for March 29, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/28/2017 - 03/29/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52383 52626 52645 52646

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Part 21 Event Number: 52383
Rep Org: SYSTEM ONE SOLUTIONS LLC
Licensee: SYSTEM ONE SOLUTIONS LLC
Region: 1
City: CHESWICK State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STUCKEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/21/2016
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)

Event Text

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - WILLFUL MISCONDUCT AND FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS

The following report was excerpted from an e-mail:

"On September 28th, System One received an email from Curtis Wright that a 'forged' VT-1, 2, 3 Level II training record was being circulated by [an individual], who was seeking employment with Applied Technical Services.

"On September 28th 2016, System One voided the certification of [the individual] and proceeded to address the condition under the nonconformance reporting process.

"On October 11th, 2016, System One determined that [the individual], who was certified in VT-1, 2, 3 by the System One Quality Assurance Manager, did not fully meet the certification requirements of the System One Written Practice under CP-199 (in effect at the time) due to lack of acceptable VT [visual testing] Training (40 hours of required class room training) to support the VT-1, VT-2 and VT-3 certification issued by System One. A review of the original certification record found/confirmed there was indication of alteration on a training record used for the original certification.

"On October 28th, 2016, System One notified stakeholders (AREVA NP). [The individual was deployed to Areva on two occasions] based upon holding VT-1, 2, 3 certification.
AREVA NP - deployed in 10/7/2012 to Cooper with VT-1, 2, 3 Certification
AREVA NP - deployed in 3/31/2013 to DC Cook with VT-1, 2, 3 Certification
Carolina Energy Services - deployed in 8/23/2013 - certification conducted by CES not System One LLC.
AREVA NP - deployed in 10/27/2013 to Palo Verde with PT Level II and QC Mechanical (not deployed for VT-1, 2, 3)

"AREVA NP has informed System One that they have conducted/completed their extent of condition review regarding work performed by [the individual], and confirmed to System One, that [the individual] did not perform any safety related VT-1, 2, 3 work at either the D. C. Cook or Cooper facilities.

"Our internal investigation has determined this matter does not represent a breakdown in the mechanics of the System One Quality Assurance Program or procedures in effect at the time. We have established the event represents willful misconduct and the falsification of a record by an individual, and use of such forged record, under 10 CFR references contained in US NRC Information Notice 2013-15."

* * * UPDATE ON 3/28/17 BY BETHANY CECERE * * *

System One determined that the individual who had been deployed to the various sites referenced, did not falsify the certification documents in question.

Notified R1DO (Cook), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Hipschman), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group by email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52626
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: JOHNSON, MIRMIRAN & THOMPSON, INC.
Region: 1
City: FORT LAUDERDALE State: FL
County:
License #: 4418-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/20/2017
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:

"[The licensee] called to inform the BRC [Bureau of Radiation Control] that a Troxler gauge, Model 3430, in use at a construction site on Midway Rd. in Ft. Pierce had been run over by a pick up truck. The gauge was not in the transport case. The source rod was retracted. The outer plastic case and the screen are damaged. Reading of unit taken with a TroxAlert, Model 3105B indicated source / shielding is intact. All reading around the meter were normal background. Gauge will be taken to Atlantic Drill Supply, Rivera Beach, FL for repairs.

"Florida Incident Number: FL17-089"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52645
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUSTIN SCURLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/28/2017
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2017
Event Time: 14:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILL COOK (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

60-DAY REPORT DUE TO INVALID ECCS ACTUATION SIGNAL

"The following report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to an unintended initiation signal that occurred on January 31, 2017 with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) in Mode 5 at zero (0) percent power.

"On January 31, 2017 at 1425 [EST] the control room received multiple annunciations associated with the following Systems / Trains:
Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) / Trains A and B
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) / Trains A and B
Core Spray (CS) / Trains A and B
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

"All four (4) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) auto-started with their associated Emergency Service Water pumps operating. RHR and CS both received initiation signals but were defeated per procedure. The HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] auxiliary oil pump was taken to Pull-to-Lock per procedure, and the RCIC steam isolation valve cycled until the breaker was opened to close the valve.

"An evaluation concluded that the [Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS] initiation signals were caused by the opening of a portable job box that was stored near sensitive equipment. Upon opening the job box, the lid bumped a reference leg resulting in the initiation signals. All initiation signals were reset and systems restored to normal shutdown lineups."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52646
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/29/2017
Notification Time: 03:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2017
Event Time: 19:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED MODERATE ENERGY LINE BREAK

"On March 28, 2017 at approximately 1957 CDT, a condition was discovered whereby a postulated moderate-energy line break (MELB) involving three fire protection (FP) pipe segments in the Safeguards Building did not contain MELB shielding. It was subsequently determined a postulated crack in one of the affected FP piping sections could adversely affect circuitry associated with the cooling support system for the train A RHR [Residual Heat Removal] pump room, potentially causing the ventilation system to be unavailable to support operation of the train A RHR pump. This condition is not consistent with the CPNPP licensing basis for the protection of essential safe shutdown RHR equipment.

"At approximately 1957 CDT train A RHR was declared inoperable but available and the unit entered a seventy-two hour LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] Action Statement per Technical Specification 3.5.2 B pending completion of mitigative actions.

"Since Unit 1 train B RHR system components and related supporting equipment have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, both trains of RHR and or support equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, train B RHR and support equipment were operable. Therefore, the identified condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Compensatory actions will include installing a spray shield on the affected cable trays.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 29, 2017
Wednesday, March 29, 2017