Event Notification Report for March 28, 2017

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL OF A SEALED SOURCE

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile:

"On 3/28/2017 the licensee left a Cs-137 brachytherapy sealed source at [address provided]. On 3/30/2017 the licensee discovered the source was not in its shielded container and immediately determined the location of the source and took steps to retrieve and secure it. This event is actively being investigated by the licensee."

Kentucky Event: KY170003

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENISTY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

"On March 28, 2017, the Agency [Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that a Troxler Model 3411 moisture/density gauge was stolen from one of its trucks. The gauge contains a 40 milliCurie americium-241 source and an eight milliCurie cesium-137 source. The gauge had been used at a job site the day before by a technician and taken to their home [located in Fort Worth] for the night, stored (locked) in the bed of the truck. Since the operating rod for the cesium source was locked in the shielded position and the case was also locked, the licensee does not believe a member of the general public would receive any significant exposure. The radiation safety officer stated he would provide additional information to the Agency as soon as he completed his interview with the technician. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

TX Incident #: I-9475

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ART TUCKER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1029 EDT ON 03/28/2017 * * *

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

The stolen moisture density gauge was actually a Troxler 3430 versus a Troxler 3411 as described in the above paragraph.

Notified R4DO (Hipschman), NMSS Events Notification group, ILTAB, and Mexico via email.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED MODERATE ENERGY LINE BREAK

"On March 28, 2017 at approximately 1957 CDT, a condition was discovered whereby a postulated moderate-energy line break (MELB) involving three fire protection (FP) pipe segments in the Safeguards Building did not contain MELB shielding. It was subsequently determined a postulated crack in one of the affected FP piping sections could adversely affect circuitry associated with the cooling support system for the train A RHR [Residual Heat Removal] pump room, potentially causing the ventilation system to be unavailable to support operation of the train A RHR pump. This condition is not consistent with the CPNPP licensing basis for the protection of essential safe shutdown RHR equipment.

"At approximately 1957 CDT train A RHR was declared inoperable but available and the unit entered a seventy-two hour LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] Action Statement per Technical Specification 3.5.2 B pending completion of mitigative actions.

"Since Unit 1 train B RHR system components and related supporting equipment have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, both trains of RHR and or support equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, train B RHR and support equipment were operable. Therefore, the identified condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Compensatory actions will include installing a spray shield on the affected cable trays.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN ALEXANDER TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/23/17 AT 1720 EDT * * *

"On 03/29/2017 Comanche Peak reported an ENS Report (no. 52646) related to the identification of potential moderate-energy line break (MELB) considerations in the Safeguards Building and the potential for adverse interaction with specified Unit 1 electrical equipment. The specific interactions of concern were related to ventilation equipment which would support operation of the Unit 1 A RHR train and several segments of fire protection piping.

"Subsequent investigations by Engineering have determined: (1) all but one of the suspected potential interactions were determined to not be credible, i.e., the potential MELB would not result in an adverse interaction with the 'target' equipment, and (2) for the remaining potential interaction, an assessment of piping stresses determined there was not a credible MELB source in the affected piping segment and therefore there was not a potential for adverse interaction with the ventilation support equipment.

"Based on the above, the condition described in ENS report no. 52646 is not considered to be an un-analyzed condition as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Groom).