Event Notification Report for March 24, 2017

VIRGINIA DEQ NOTIFIED OF SMALL GLYCOL RELEASE TO JAMES RIVER

"On 03/24/2017 at approximately 1500 hours [EDT], a hydraulic line on vendor supplied cleaning equipment failed and leaked approximately 8 gallons of 65% glycol solution into the Surry Power Station Unit 2 D intake bay. Since the intake bay communicates with the James River, the State of Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was notified of the discharge at 2000 hours.

"The glycol solution is water soluble and dispersed quickly. All work stopped while the issue is being investigated and corrective actions implemented. No sheen was observed and no impact to state waters is expected to result from this issue.

"This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made."

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TESTING

"On March 24, 2017, at 1425 EDT, while performing Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) quarterly High Pressure Injection/Low Pressure Injection Logic and Component testing, an unintended test signal was generated when a test switch was moved to the OFF position but went slightly past this position and engaged contacts for the Test no. 1 position. When examined, the test switch was found to be degraded which allowed the switch to move past the center position and engage the test no. 1 contacts. This resulted In a partial actuation of 'B'- train ESAS components. It also resulted in an injection to the reactor coolant system (RCS). The test signal was immediately removed by operators and the inadvertently started equipment secured.

"The plant was operating at 100% power when the event occurred. There were no valid signals or plant conditions present to warrant the safety system actuation. The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator rolled on air start but did not get up to full speed. Decay Heat Removal Pump 'B' started and the Decay Heat Removal Injection valve 4B opened, Make-Up Pump 'C' started, Make-Up Pump suction valve 14B opened, Make-Up pump discharge valves 16C and 16D opened, Spent Fuel Pump 1B tripped off, Air Handling Fan 18 tripped off and Air Handling Fan 1C trip tripped off. These components properly functioned from the inadvertent test signal and were secured prior to any adverse impact to plant operation. There was a small injection of borated water into the RCS. The plant remained stable at 100% power operation.

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid partial actuation of the 'B' train of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) as it was not part of a pre-planned sequence.

"The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TESTING

"This telephone notification, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/24/2017, at approximately 1548 EDT, when synchronizing an emergency diesel generator (EDG) to the grid during testing, an electrical perturbation occurred. Further investigation found that the EDG was slightly out of phase when it was attempted to be synchronized to the grid. The electrical perturbation resulted in an unexpected half-scram of Reactor Protection System (RPS) A and actuation (closure) of some containment isolation valves. The actuations were invalid as they were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Fermi 2 was shut down for a refueling outage at the time, and therefore, the half-scram of RPS A occurred after the safety function had already been completed. Containment isolation valves actuated (closed) in Division 1 of the Torus Water Management, Drywell Pneumatics, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps systems. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this perturbation, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE TO PROPERLY LABEL A SHIPMENT

The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:

"On 03/16/18, the Site Manager at Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) contacted RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] licensing unit to notify of an incident related to a shipment from their facility. The incident occurred a year ago on 03/24/17, where a shipment of Cf-252 sources with a TI [Transportation Index] of 19 was inadvertently not flagged as exclusive use. This was identified by CHP [California Highway Patrol] at a weigh station approximately 10 miles from VNC [in Livermore, CA] and the shipment was returned to the facility. VNC corrected the paperwork, calling the shipment out as exclusive use. VNC was cited by CHP. VNC has recently received a letter from Alameda County District Attorney's Office referencing a Vehicle Code and a Professional Code. RHB will be following up on this investigation regarding failure to immediately notify RHB and for failure to label the shipment as exclusive use.

"Note: Inspection unit at RHB was notified of this incident on 06/18/18."

California Report No: 5010-031618