| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/23/2017 - 02/24/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52549 | Rep Org: U.S. NAVY
Licensee: U.S. NAVY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY SANDERS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 02/15/2017
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2017
Event Time: 05:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received via email:
"1. The lost radioactive material consisted of one in flight blade inspection system (IBIS) pressure indicator which was installed on one CH-53E aircraft. The IBIS pressure indicator (P/N: 12210-1, S/N: 293) contained one 500 microCurie Strontium-90 source.
"2. The IBIS pressure indicator was last visually accounted for prior to an aircraft flight on January 18, 2017. Much of the flight was over water and maneuvers were conducted over unpopulated woodland adjacent to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, North Carolina. During the flight, nothing out of the ordinary was noted. After the flight, a post flight inspection was conducted and it was then discovered that an IBIS pressure indicator was missing.
"3. The IBIS pressure indicator was discovered missing at 0545 [EST] on January 18, 2017 during a post flight inspection when the crew chief went to reinstall the IBIS pressure indicator covers. The likely location of the IBIS pressure indicator is in the water or unpopulated wooded area beneath the aircraft flight path in the New River, North Carolina region.
"4. Exposure to individuals from radiation from the IBIS pressure indicator is unlikely due to its likely location in an uninhabited area.
"5. Upon discovery of the missing IBIS pressure indicator, the aircraft maintenance crew at MCAS New River immediately performed an inspection of the flight line in the vicinity of the aircraft. On January 18, 2017 at approximately 1500 [EST] an extensive foreign object detection walk was conducted on the aircraft parking line. No debris associated with the missing IBIS pressure indicator was found.
"6. An inspection was completed on all IBIS pressure indicators installed on aircraft associated with the MCAS New River in order to verify that the IBIS pressure indicators did not exhibit excessive wear indicating the potential for the displacement of an IBIS pressure indicator from the aircraft. MCAS New River aircraft operational and maintenance crew were re-briefed on the importance of vigilant pre-flight and post-flight aircraft inspections in order to identify potential material defects of aircraft components."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52550 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: PRODUCERS SERVICE CORP.
Region: 4
City: HENNESSEY State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 02/15/2017
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On February 14, 2017, we [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] were informed by Producers Service Corp. that a routine inspection of a generally-licensed Berthold Technologies Model LB 8010 (S/N 10456) fixed density gauge revealed a crack in the rod which operated the shutter. The shutter operated normally despite this. A leak test was performed and was negative. The device contains 20 mCi of Cs-137. The rod and source shield have been replaced, and the damaged parts will be returned to Berthold." |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52551 | Rep Org: WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Licensee: WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: MORGANTOWN State: WV
County:
License #: 47-23066-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NASSER RAZMIANFAR
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/15/2017
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2017
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST IODINE-125 IMPLANT SEED
"In compliance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a), this report serves as notification of the loss of licensed material under West Virginia University Hospital Broad Scope License 47-23066-02.
"On January 18, 2017, the Radiation Safety Department discovered that one Iodine-125 seed used in a Radioactive Seed Localization (RSL) procedure was missing. The seed in question had been implanted on November 8, 2016 and contained 241 microCuries of I-125. The patient had surgery to excise the specimen with the seed on the same day as implantation.
"The specimen went to the Breast Care Center for imaging and then to the Pathology gross room where the seeds are removed and placed into plastic vials to await pick up by Radiation Safety staff. Radiation Safety staff documented that the seed in question plus 3 others were picked up from the gross room on November 9, 2016 and taken to the radioactive waste storage area.
"The seed was discovered missing on January 18, 2017 during preparation of a return shipment of seeds to the manufacturer. WVU Radiation Safety promptly investigated the cause of the incident and performed thorough radiation surveys in the Pathology gross room, radioactive waste storage area, and specimen blocks in Pathology, however all surveys were indistinguishable from background. WVU Hospital feels it is likely that the seed was extracted from the specimen in the gross room but was never placed into the plastic vial and subsequently ended up discarded in the gross room waste.
"During pick up by Radiation Safety, the seed was falsely identified by a visual verification as being present in the plastic vial. A blue plastic spacer, which comes preloaded in the syringe with the seed, may have been mistakenly identified as the seed due to its similar size and shape. WVU Hospital has instituted corrective actions to include more intense radiation surveys and better documentation of those surveys to prevent a future occurrence. In compliance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b), please expect a written report within the next 30 days for more details regarding this incident."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52553 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ENVISION INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT CARSON State: CO
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 02/15/2017
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2017
Event Time: 10:09 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following information was received via e-mail from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment:
"The general license section of the Radioactive Materials Program sent out annual notifications requesting response regarding tritium exit signs reported in use at locations given by the manufacturer. Upon an audit of the annual mailing for non-responders, Envision Inc. was contacted. After a complete inspection of the base store they are reporting the store was remodeled approximately 8 years ago; at that time the 4 tritium exit signs were removed. It is unknown if the exit signs were lost, destroyed or placed into the dumpster with the debris from the demolition. No further information is available due to time of reporting loss and lack of response by Envision Inc.
"Number of Tritium exit signs were 4, Model #2040. Since Isolite Corporation did not report serial numbers on quarterly reports in 2001, no serial numbers are available. Each tritium exit sign contained 7500 mCi [milliCuries] of H-3, they were shipped from Isolite on 9/28/2001."
CO Event Report ID No.: CO17-0005
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52571 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM OLEARY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/23/2017
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2017
Event Time: 10:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL TORNADO MISSILE VULNERABILITIES
"In order to address the concerns outlined in RIS [Regulatory Information Summary] 2015-06 'TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION', an evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and their potential impact on Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment was conducted. This evaluation concluded that the following Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles:
"The BVPS Unit 1 (BV-1) and BVPS Unit 2 (BV-2) Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.1) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the MSSVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all MSSV's could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The BV-1 and BV-2 Atmospheric Steam Dumps (ADVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.4) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the ADVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all ADVs could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The BV-2 Auxiliary Building tornado missile shield door (A-35-5A), credited for tornado missile protection of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) system, was found to not be fully closed and latched. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the PCCW system with the missile door open rendering both trains of the PCCW system inoperable. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The BV-2 Spent Fuel Building tornado missile shield door (F-66-3), credited for tornado missile protection of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool including the Cask Pit, was found to not be fully closed and latched. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The potential tornado missile vulnerabilities for the MSSVs and ADVs (discussed above) are being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 Rev 1 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (NRC enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Immediate compensatory measures were taken to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the potential consequences of an onsite tornado generated missiles.
"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52573 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN WHISNANT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/23/2017
Notification Time: 22:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2017
Event Time: 19:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 33 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"On February 23, 2017, a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS [Reactor Coolant System] leakage. A leak was identified at the nozzle connection of the boron injection line to 2D RCS cold leg at 1922 [EST]. It was determined that the leak cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) (4 hours) for 'initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) (8 hours) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.'
"The unit will shutdown and repairs will be performed in Mode 5.
"This condition has no impact on public health and safety.
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
At the time of the event notification, Unit 2 was at 33 percent power. Unidentified RCS leakage is estimated at 0.28 gpm. Unit 2 is expected to be in Mode 3 by 0122 EST on 02/24/2017. Unit 1 is not affected by this event. | |