Event Notification Report for February 17, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/16/2017 - 02/17/2017
EVENT NUMBERS
52563525645256552685
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52563
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 14:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 14:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE
"On 2/17/2017 at 1414 EST, secondary containment was declared inoperable due to the discovery of an 18-inch open pipe penetration in the secondary containment boundary. During walkdown activities, it was discovered that a blind flange installed to support removal of a Unit 2 secondary containment isolation valve had been installed on the wrong flange to provide isolation for secondary containment. At 1503 EST, the blind flange was moved to the correct side of the flange and secondary containment was declared operable.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystems, secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations. Therefore, the lack of a qualified isolation device to limit the release of radioactive material constitutes a loss of safety function due to a loss of secondary containment integrity.
"CR 10332592
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
"On 2/17/2017 at 1414 EST, secondary containment was declared inoperable due to the discovery of an 18-inch open pipe penetration in the secondary containment boundary. During walkdown activities, it was discovered that a blind flange installed to support removal of a Unit 2 secondary containment isolation valve had been installed on the wrong flange to provide isolation for secondary containment. At 1503 EST, the blind flange was moved to the correct side of the flange and secondary containment was declared operable.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystems, secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations. Therefore, the lack of a qualified isolation device to limit the release of radioactive material constitutes a loss of safety function due to a loss of secondary containment integrity.
"CR 10332592
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52564
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WAYNE CLAYTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WAYNE CLAYTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/18/2017
Notification Time: 02:58 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 23:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017
Notification Time: 02:58 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 23:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 30 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM RESULTING FROM FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILURE
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"On February 17, 2017 at 2353 CST, Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram signal was received due to Turbine Control Valves Fast Closure. The turbine trip was due to receipt of Level 8 Trip due to a failure of the Feedwater Regulating Valve to Full open. Plant is in a stable condition with reactor pressure being maintained by the Turbine Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with Feedwater thru the Low Flow Feedwater Regulating Valve. Further investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
All control rods fully inserted, and decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM BROCK POLLMANN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1721 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *
"Upon further review of the event data, it was determined that the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) had initiated a manual scram, which was followed by a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure automatic scram when the turbine tripped."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Jeffers).
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"On February 17, 2017 at 2353 CST, Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram signal was received due to Turbine Control Valves Fast Closure. The turbine trip was due to receipt of Level 8 Trip due to a failure of the Feedwater Regulating Valve to Full open. Plant is in a stable condition with reactor pressure being maintained by the Turbine Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with Feedwater thru the Low Flow Feedwater Regulating Valve. Further investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
All control rods fully inserted, and decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM BROCK POLLMANN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1721 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *
"Upon further review of the event data, it was determined that the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) had initiated a manual scram, which was followed by a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure automatic scram when the turbine tripped."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Jeffers).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52565
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: 025-1323-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: 025-1323-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/18/2017
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 17:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2017
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 17:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM SOURCE AND DEPLETED URANIUM DISKS
"The Wisconsin Department of Health was notified by phone at 5:30 PM on February 17, 2017 that the licensee has lost components of a radio-synthesis device containing approximately 70 Ci of Hydrogen-3 and 20 grams of Depleted Uranium in the form of uranium tritide (UT3) discs. More than three years ago, the licensee had packaged the material and placed it into a metal drum while a disposal option was to be determined. The drum was stored in a restricted area near the licensee's incineration facility. A week ago the licensee was preparing to repackage the material in order to transfer it for final disposal. The drum was found to be empty when opened. The licensee has search all facilities used for radioactive material storage and reviewed disposal records; but has been unable to account for the material. At this time the licensee suspects that the material was incorrectly disposed of in either a non-hazardous waste stream or incinerated within the last three years. The department has started an investigation to determine the most likely disposal pathway and the exposure impact. Site visits and updates will [be] perform[ed].
"Event Report ID No.: WI170003"
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KYLE WALTON TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1331 EST ON 02/23/2017 * * *
"The licensee has performed a preliminary investigation and concluded that it is unlikely the loss of material was malicious. The licensee has already begun an impact assessment for the potential incineration of material, and Wisconsin DHS has coordinated with the licensee on what actions need to take place going forward. Inspectors will be performing an on-site inspection to further gather information."
Notified R3DO (Jeffers) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"The Wisconsin Department of Health was notified by phone at 5:30 PM on February 17, 2017 that the licensee has lost components of a radio-synthesis device containing approximately 70 Ci of Hydrogen-3 and 20 grams of Depleted Uranium in the form of uranium tritide (UT3) discs. More than three years ago, the licensee had packaged the material and placed it into a metal drum while a disposal option was to be determined. The drum was stored in a restricted area near the licensee's incineration facility. A week ago the licensee was preparing to repackage the material in order to transfer it for final disposal. The drum was found to be empty when opened. The licensee has search all facilities used for radioactive material storage and reviewed disposal records; but has been unable to account for the material. At this time the licensee suspects that the material was incorrectly disposed of in either a non-hazardous waste stream or incinerated within the last three years. The department has started an investigation to determine the most likely disposal pathway and the exposure impact. Site visits and updates will [be] perform[ed].
"Event Report ID No.: WI170003"
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KYLE WALTON TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1331 EST ON 02/23/2017 * * *
"The licensee has performed a preliminary investigation and concluded that it is unlikely the loss of material was malicious. The licensee has already begun an impact assessment for the potential incineration of material, and Wisconsin DHS has coordinated with the licensee on what actions need to take place going forward. Inspectors will be performing an on-site inspection to further gather information."
Notified R3DO (Jeffers) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52685
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODGER LOWER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODGER LOWER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/17/2017
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2017
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2017
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On February 17, 2017 at 1021 EST, secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 during a maintenance activity to replace a relay in the Unit 2 primary containment isolation system. The work was being conducted as part of planned maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Poor work instruction led to a jumper not being installed as required, thus causing relays to de-energize, resulting in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 outboard primary and secondary containment isolation valves and auto-start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"All primary and secondary containment isolation valves and SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated wires were re-landed and secondary containment was returned to normal service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On February 17, 2017 at 1021 EST, secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 during a maintenance activity to replace a relay in the Unit 2 primary containment isolation system. The work was being conducted as part of planned maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Poor work instruction led to a jumper not being installed as required, thus causing relays to de-energize, resulting in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 outboard primary and secondary containment isolation valves and auto-start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"All primary and secondary containment isolation valves and SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated wires were re-landed and secondary containment was returned to normal service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."