Event Notification Report for February 15, 2017

LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

"On February 15, 2017 at 1337 [EST], Secondary Containment Zone 1 (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 inches WG [Water Gauge] due to a trip of the running Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan. Required differential pressure per SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 1 differential pressure recovered to greater than 0.25 inches WG less than one minute later after start of the standby Zone 1 Filtered Exhaust Fan. Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and Zone 3 (Common Areas of Unit 1&2 Reactor Buildings) ventilation remained in service and stable.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."

Post-maintenance testing was underway when the fan tripped. While the investigation is on-going to determine the cause, the licensee does not believe the maintenance or testing caused the fan to trip

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD FRY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0833 EDT ON 4/12/2017 * * *

"The Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan trip that resulted in loss of secondary containment differential pressure occurred during post maintenance testing (PMT). The PMT was being performed following replacement of a flow controller associated with the Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan. In support of the PMT, Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 Condition A had been entered and was in effect at the time of the fan trip. The maintenance and the associated PMT were performed in accordance with approved work instructions/procedure. Subsequent to the initial report, Susquehanna troubleshooting determined that the fan trip was the result of an internal leak in the newly installed controller that prevented the new controller from functioning properly. The condition was therefore determined to have been the result of the completed maintenance.

"NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, includes the following guidance:
'...reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'

"Following completion of the troubleshooting, Susquehanna determined that, per NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, the event was not reportable. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable as a part of a planned evolution for maintenance which was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the Susquehanna TS. The discovered condition was not a pre-existing condition that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the planned maintenance activity."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Jackson).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was received via e-mail from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment:

"The general license section of the Radioactive Materials Program sent out annual notifications requesting response regarding tritium exit signs reported in use at locations given by the manufacturer. Upon an audit of the annual mailing for non-responders, Envision Inc. was contacted. After a complete inspection of the base store they are reporting the store was remodeled approximately 8 years ago; at that time the 4 tritium exit signs were removed. It is unknown if the exit signs were lost, destroyed or placed into the dumpster with the debris from the demolition. No further information is available due to time of reporting loss and lack of response by Envision Inc.

"Number of Tritium exit signs were 4, Model #2040. Since Isolite Corporation did not report serial numbers on quarterly reports in 2001, no serial numbers are available. Each tritium exit sign contained 7500 mCi [milliCuries] of H-3, they were shipped from Isolite on 9/28/2001."

CO Event Report ID No.: CO17-0005

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

FAILURE OF SECURITY DATABASE TO INCLUDE ALL PERSONNEL IN THE FFD POOL FOR RANDOM TESTING

"On February 15, 2017 at 1515, it was discovered by corporate Fitness for Duty (FFD) personnel that an unescorted access reactivation feature in the security database (Illuminate) does not reset the flag to include an individual in the random FFD pool due to a database coding error. The Illuminate database was implemented fleet-wide 1/3/17.

"Review by corporate FFD personnel found one individual currently badged at Clinton Power Station was affected by the coding error. The individual was not in the FFD random pool from 1/3/17 until 2/15/17. Corporate security personnel found no other individuals to be affected by this issue.

"Affected individual was added to the FFD random pool. Corporate security personnel notified all Exelon sites of the issue. Sites were notified that the ability to use the re-activation feature in Illuminate would be removed from use by site personnel. Pending removal, a daily query would be run in the database to assure the re-activation feature had not been used by site personnel."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 REPORT - VENDOR SUPPLIED INCORRECT RELAYS FOR CLASS 1E APPLICATION

In 1993, ABB Switchgear Division supplied 12 ABB Ground-Shield ground fault relays to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant that did not meet the seismic qualifications required of Class 1E rated relays.

This deviation is for GKT relay model 202L.

If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at 954-752-6700 or 1-800-222-1946.