Event Notification Report for January 10, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/09/2017 - 01/10/2017
Agreement State
Event Number: 52489
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: EAGLE US 2, LLC
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2257-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: EAGLE US 2, LLC
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2257-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE WITH STUCK OPEN SHUTTER
The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event type: Level density gauge on a process had a shutter malfunction. Eagle was performing their annual operational checks when the malfunction was discovered. The malfunction is the gauge shutter is stuck in the open position on an active process. The gauge Service Company, BBP Sales will make the repair or replacement after the assessment of the device. They discovered the shutters would not close. The Gauge is a RONAN SA1-C-10 device/source holder, S/N 9527GG, loaded with a 200 mCi Cs-137 source.
"Notifications: LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Control] was notified by Eagle US 2 in a message on the voice mail system on 1/10/2017. The notice was sent to the Compliance Radiation Assessment Section of LDEQ. The notification was readdressed when Eagle was contacted on 1/12/2017, to get the preliminary information report. Eagle US 2 will send LDEQ a corrective action and a final report no later than 30 days of the corrective action. The Eagle US 2 preliminary written report was received 1/12/2017 at 1457 CST.
"Event description: On 1/10/2017, Eagle US 2 was performing their annual inventory and operational checks of their licensed devices. During their routine annual maintenance checks, the shutter malfunction was discovered. The gauge shutter would not close.
"Eagle US 2 called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. [The contractor] was unable to close the shutter and will determine the course of corrective action. The cause appears to be the corrosive environment where it [the gauge] is installed and used.
"The source and device with shutter stuck open will remain installed and utilized on the process until the repairs are made. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the Eagle US 2 employees or the general public.
"This event is considered closed by LDEQ. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by Regulatory Requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)."
Event Report ID No.: LA-17001.
The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event type: Level density gauge on a process had a shutter malfunction. Eagle was performing their annual operational checks when the malfunction was discovered. The malfunction is the gauge shutter is stuck in the open position on an active process. The gauge Service Company, BBP Sales will make the repair or replacement after the assessment of the device. They discovered the shutters would not close. The Gauge is a RONAN SA1-C-10 device/source holder, S/N 9527GG, loaded with a 200 mCi Cs-137 source.
"Notifications: LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Control] was notified by Eagle US 2 in a message on the voice mail system on 1/10/2017. The notice was sent to the Compliance Radiation Assessment Section of LDEQ. The notification was readdressed when Eagle was contacted on 1/12/2017, to get the preliminary information report. Eagle US 2 will send LDEQ a corrective action and a final report no later than 30 days of the corrective action. The Eagle US 2 preliminary written report was received 1/12/2017 at 1457 CST.
"Event description: On 1/10/2017, Eagle US 2 was performing their annual inventory and operational checks of their licensed devices. During their routine annual maintenance checks, the shutter malfunction was discovered. The gauge shutter would not close.
"Eagle US 2 called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. [The contractor] was unable to close the shutter and will determine the course of corrective action. The cause appears to be the corrosive environment where it [the gauge] is installed and used.
"The source and device with shutter stuck open will remain installed and utilized on the process until the repairs are made. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the Eagle US 2 employees or the general public.
"This event is considered closed by LDEQ. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by Regulatory Requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)."
Event Report ID No.: LA-17001.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52481
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 01/10/2017
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 20:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2017
Notification Time: 22:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 20:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
"On January 10, 2017, at approximately 2040 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned.
"The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 2040 EST. The quantity of the spill is estimated to be five gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On January 10, 2017, at approximately 2040 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned.
"The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 2040 EST. The quantity of the spill is estimated to be five gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53070
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WESLEY CONKLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WESLEY CONKLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/14/2017
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 03:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: 03:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On September 15, 2017, during a TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] review of Operations logs, it was determined that a reportable condition occurred in January 2017 but no NRC report had been made. On January 10, 2017, at 0300 Central Standard Time (CST), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The Group 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A.' At 0311 CST, Operations personnel discovered that the 3A1 RPS circuit protector had tripped on undervoltage.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywall Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywall Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"All affected equipment responded as designed. This condition was the result of an undervoltage condition on the 3A1 circuit protector. During trouble shooting, the undervoltage setpoints were found to be 116 VAC and 115 VAC, when the normal as left acceptance band is 109.7 VAC to 111.3 VAC. The 3A RPS protective relays had been previously replaced in September 2016. The most likely cause of the undervoltage condition in these relays is infant mortality.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On September 15, 2017, during a TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] review of Operations logs, it was determined that a reportable condition occurred in January 2017 but no NRC report had been made. On January 10, 2017, at 0300 Central Standard Time (CST), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The Group 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A.' At 0311 CST, Operations personnel discovered that the 3A1 RPS circuit protector had tripped on undervoltage.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywall Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywall Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"All affected equipment responded as designed. This condition was the result of an undervoltage condition on the 3A1 circuit protector. During trouble shooting, the undervoltage setpoints were found to be 116 VAC and 115 VAC, when the normal as left acceptance band is 109.7 VAC to 111.3 VAC. The 3A RPS protective relays had been previously replaced in September 2016. The most likely cause of the undervoltage condition in these relays is infant mortality.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."