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Event Notification Report for December 23, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/22/2016 - 12/23/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52239 52428 52429 52431 52439 52456 52458

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52239
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2016
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING STATION SERVICE WATER TRAINS

"Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.

"Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).

"Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8.

"Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."


* * * UPDATE ON 10/6/2016 AT 2009 EDT FROM DAMON SCHROEDER TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps.

"On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours CDT, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.

"Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

Notified R4DO (Werner).


* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT DANIELS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2233 EDT ON 10/10/2016 * * *

"This is an additional update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT and again on October 6, 2016 at 2009 EDT, Comanche Peak reported unanalyzed conditions involving Station Service Water System trains and a 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The reported conditions involved sections of piping that were not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded piping, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of safety-related equipment in the Service Water Intake Structure and the Unit 2 Safeguards Building.

"On October 10, 2016 at 1708 CDT, as a result of ongoing extent of condition walkdowns, a section of fire protection pipe in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building was identified that was not adequately shielded for a MELB. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B Switchgear 1EA2, Unit 1 Train B 480V MCC 1EB4-2, and Unit 1 Train B Distribution Panel 1ED2-2. Only one of these power supplies at a time would be affected. 1EA2 provides 6.9KV electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, panels, sequencer, and transformers. 1EB4-2 provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, panels, and transformers. 1ED2-2 provides 125VDC electrical power to EDG 1-02 channel 1 starting circuit. The affected fire protection pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.

"Since Unit 1 Train A Switchgear 1EA1, Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-2, and Unit 1 Train A Distribution Panel 1ED1-2 have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then both trains of Unit 1 6.9KV power (1EA2 and 1EA1), both trains of Unit 1 480V power (1EB4-2 and 1EB3-2), and both trains of Unit 1 125VDC power (1ED2-2 and 1ED1-2) along with the safety-related equipment they supply could potentially have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, none of the affected Train A equipment was inoperable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

Notified R4DO (Werner).


* * * UPDATE FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1457 EST ON 11/7/2016 * * *

"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On November 17, 2016 at 0730 CST, during ongoing extent of condition walkdowns in the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Area of the Auxiliary Building, two pressurized fire protection pipe segments were identified that did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1 EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.

"At 0743 CST, Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1021 CST, MCC 1 EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection lines.

"Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1 EB4-1, 1 EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

Notified R4DO (Azua).


* * * UPDATE ON 12/05/2016 AT 1730 EST FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On December 5, 2016 during ongoing extent of condition walk downs in the Auxiliary Building, pressurized fire protection pipe segments (a flange and a pipe elbow) were identified which did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the un-shielded portion of the pipes, a MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 2 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.

"At approximately 1355 CST Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1459 CST, MCC 2EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection line locations.

"Since Unit 2 Train A 480V MCC 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 2EB4-1 , 2EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an un-analyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

* * * UPDATE ON 12/22/2016 AT 1649 EST FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On December 22, 2016 at approximately 1046 [CST] during ongoing extent of condition walk downs in the common Auxiliary Building (AB) corridor room (X-179), several normally pressurized Waste Processing (WP) pipe segments and one Vent & Drain (VD) segment which are greater than 1" nominal pipe diameter, did not contain MELB shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, a MELB could have had the potential to impact Unit 1, Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.

"Prior to the field walkdown, the subject WP and VD line segments were either isolated and depressurized (WP lines) and/or the AB sump discharges realigned (VD) such that the subject lines would pose no threat to the MCC 1EB4-1 if confirmed that shielding is required. As such, the identified condition does not adversely affect operability of 1EB4-1 and entry into a Technical Specification action statement was not required. Field activities continue to install MELB shielding in the affected locations.

"Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1EB4-1, 1EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

Notified R4DO (Hay).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52428
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: DOANE COLLEGE
Region: 4
City: CRETE State: NE
County:
License #: GL0258
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MALISA McCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 09:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following report was received via e-mail:

"Doan College contacted our office [Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] by phone on November 23, 2016 to notify our office of two lost exit signs. Licensee was notified they would need to send in written notification. In a letter dated November 29, 2016, the licensee indicated that multiple renovations were made to the building housing the exit signs between 2006 and 2016. The exit signs were likely removed during one of these renovations. They also estimate that the incident was not caught prior to this due to personnel changes."

Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp.
Model: 880-12-6-10
Source Activity: 7.5 Ci

Nebraska Event: NE160002

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 52429
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: GATEWAY MALL
Region: 4
City: LINCOLN State: NE
County:
License #: GL0457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MALISA McCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following report was received via e-mail:

"During an annual inventory review, the licensee discovered a tritium exit sign was missing/lost. The licensee notified our office [Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] via phone call on 12/8/16 and followed it up with an e-mail the same day. The licensee stated there has been new construction in the area and assumes the sign went missing during this time."

Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp
Model: 880-12-6R-20
Source Activity: 11.5 Ci

Nebraska Event: NE160003

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 52431
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CAL LAND ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #: 6951-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2016
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

On December 13, 2016, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Cal Land Engineering, contacted the RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] at the Brea, CA office about a gauge that had been run over. The gauge was a CPN MC-3, S/N M310706239 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241). The gauge operator had removed the gauge from it's transport case, but had not set up or used the gauge at the site (the Cs-137 source was still in the shielded position). The operator then stepped away from the gauge to answer his cell phone. While the operator was on the phone, a pickup truck backed into the gauge. The gauge body remained intact, but the guide tube and source rod had been sheared off the body of the gauge. After the incident, the area was isolated and the operator contacted the RSO, who then contacted RHB. Pictures were provided by the gauge operator and forwarded to RHB for review. After the pictures confirmed that the gauge body was intact, the RHB inspector authorized the operator to place the gauge in the storage case, secure it for transport, and then return the gauge to their [licensee's] office.

An RHB inspector met the operator at their office to inspect the gauge. A Canberra Inspector 1000 with the LaBr (IPROL-1) and neutron (IPRON-N) probes was used to verify the sources remained in the gauge. The Cs-137 source was identified by the Inspector 1000 and a neutron dose of 20 counts per second (with a background of 0 counts per second) confirmed the Am:Be-241 source was present. A Victoreen 450 CHP was used to survey the gauge. The contact dose rate was 20 mR/hr (background 0.01 mR/hr), which is consistent for an MC-3 gauge. The gauge will remain in storage until disposal can be arranged. Maurer Technical Services will be used to assist in the disposal.

California 5010 number: 121316

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Agreement State Event Number: 52439
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: US NDI LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: L06597
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/15/2016
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On December 15, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that the licensee had retrieved a source disconnected via a broken drive cable. The camera was an 880 Delta with a 135 curie iridium-192 source. The retrieval agent received an estimated 113 mRem to the whole body and 1 Rem to the hands for the procedure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I - 9450

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52456
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BUD HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 12/22/2016
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"With D.C. Cook Unit 1 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the following emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving some of the diesel fuel pumps/injectors in each of the following EDGs:

"Unit 1 CD (Train A) EDG, Unit 2 AB (Train B) EDG, and Unit 2 CD (Train A) EDG

"Due to both Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, Unit 2 is required to be in Mode 5 by 1300 [EST] on 12/23/16. Unit 1 is required to restore its emergency diesel generator within 14 days (by 2300 [EST] on 1/04/17).

"In connection with both trains of Unit 2 EDGs being inoperable, this is being reported as an 8-hour report pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as loss of safety function in connection with mitigating the consequences of an accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

Unit 1 maintenance will be prioritized over Unit 2 and Unit 2 will most likely proceed to Mode 5.

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Part 21 Event Number: 52458
Rep Org: ITT ENIDINE INC.
Licensee: ITT ENIDINE INC.
Region: 1
City: WESTMINSTER State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/22/2016
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
PART 21 MATERIALS ()
PART 21/50.55 REACTO ()

Event Text

PART 21 - POTENTIAL TRANSDUCER COMPONENT DEFECT

The following information was received via fax:

"The ITT Conoflow models GT25CA1826 and GT25CD1826 current to pressure (l/P) transducers produce a calibrated 3.0 to 15.0 psi output pressure from a 4.0 to 20.0 mA DC (input) signal. On November 2, 2016, a discovery was made of unqualified electrical component substitutions on the internal circuit board. Supplier and internal record reviews indicate these unqualified components were used as early as May 10, 2013, as the previously qualified PCB components are no longer available. Environmental qualification of the suspect circuit boards is planned for early 2017. If any component falls to meet requirements, nuclear facilities which use this product will be advised to examine their product for unqualified printed circuit boards via notification and visual references. Qualified replacement components will be provided to all affected customers.

"Customer Name / Item Number / No.: Units
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear / GT25CD1826 / 30
Control Components Inc. / GT2SCD 1826 / 3
Duke Energy Carolinas LLC / GT25CA1826 / 8
Duke Energy Carolinas LLC / GTI:SCD1826 / 4
Enertech Curtiss-Wright / GT25CA1816 / 19
Enertech Curtiss-Wright / GT25CD1826 / 4
Ergytech Inc. / GT25CA1826 / 3
Ergytech Inc. / GT25CD1826 / 3
Gefran Benelux NV / GT25CD1826 / 2
Ontario Power Generation / GT25CD1826 / 31
SPX Flow Technology / GT25CA1826 / 2
Weir Valves & Controls UK / GT25CA1826 / 78"

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, December 23, 2016
Friday, December 23, 2016