Event Notification Report for December 16, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/15/2016 - 12/16/2016
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 52440
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/16/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2016
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2016
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY INCIDENT
"On December 15, 2016, a grid area employee was moving containers in the plating room, where his finger was pinched between two containers. He was taken to the emergency room where he was treated for an injury to the tip of his left ring finger. The event did not involve special nuclear material or contamination and is classified as an industrial safety incident.
"This concurrent report is being made under Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A because a 24 hour report was made to the South Carolina Department of Labor [at 0700 EST on 12/16/16] per 29CFR1904.39."
The employee was not admitted to a hospital and was sent home after treatment.
The licensee has notified NRC Region II.
"On December 15, 2016, a grid area employee was moving containers in the plating room, where his finger was pinched between two containers. He was taken to the emergency room where he was treated for an injury to the tip of his left ring finger. The event did not involve special nuclear material or contamination and is classified as an industrial safety incident.
"This concurrent report is being made under Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A because a 24 hour report was made to the South Carolina Department of Labor [at 0700 EST on 12/16/16] per 29CFR1904.39."
The employee was not admitted to a hospital and was sent home after treatment.
The licensee has notified NRC Region II.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52441
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KIRSHBERGER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KIRSHBERGER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 12/17/2016
Notification Time: 05:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2017
Notification Time: 05:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 33 | Power Operation | 33 | Power Operation |
VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At approximately 1400 CST on 12/16/16, during the performance of VEF-38A Lead Penetration Room Ventilation System (PRVS) Exhaust Fan Monthly Test, flow was found to be at 2000 SCFM with an operability limit of 1620 to 1980 SCFM. VEF-38A was declared inoperable. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11 Condition C for both trains of PRVS inoperable. With VEF-38A aligned as the lead fan and capable of auto-start, the operable standby fan (VEF-38B) would not have started.
"During the time that VEF-38A was inoperable and capable of auto-starting, the Unit 1 PRVS was in a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material.
"At 1546 CST on 12/16/16, Unit 1 rendered VEF-38A incapable of auto starting by placing its hand switch in PULL-TO-LOCK. Unit 1 Entered LCO 3.7.11 condition A for one PRVS train inoperable and Exited LCO 3.7.11 Condition C.
"This is a notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/7/17 AT 1528 EST FROM BUCHANON DICKSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"EN 52441 was initiated on December 16, 2016, when the VEF-38A fan flow was found to be in excess of the procedurally defined operability limit during the monthly lead penetration room ventilation system test.
"The revision of the procedure in use at the time had inadvertently included acceptance criterion for fan air flow in the monthly supplements. The monthly tests demonstrate the flow paths for the two trains are functional and open, but they are not performed in the designed Engineered Safeguards (ES) configuration. The monthly tests do not secure the normal supply and exhaust ventilation within the penetration room boundaries; therefore, flow may be outside limits required during the ES configuration. The 18 month surveillance, which measures the flowrate of the system while in the ES configuration, was completed in April 2016. The surveillance verified the system's operability. The systems have not been modified or altered since this surveillance; therefore the measured flowrate remains the same.
"The procedure has been revised subsequent to this event to remove the flowrate as an 'acceptance criterion' for the monthly test.
"Because the VEF-38A flow did not result in fan inoperability, both fan trains remained operable; therefore, ANO-1 did not lose a safety function to control a radioactive release. Based on that, conclusion EN 52441 is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).
"At approximately 1400 CST on 12/16/16, during the performance of VEF-38A Lead Penetration Room Ventilation System (PRVS) Exhaust Fan Monthly Test, flow was found to be at 2000 SCFM with an operability limit of 1620 to 1980 SCFM. VEF-38A was declared inoperable. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11 Condition C for both trains of PRVS inoperable. With VEF-38A aligned as the lead fan and capable of auto-start, the operable standby fan (VEF-38B) would not have started.
"During the time that VEF-38A was inoperable and capable of auto-starting, the Unit 1 PRVS was in a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material.
"At 1546 CST on 12/16/16, Unit 1 rendered VEF-38A incapable of auto starting by placing its hand switch in PULL-TO-LOCK. Unit 1 Entered LCO 3.7.11 condition A for one PRVS train inoperable and Exited LCO 3.7.11 Condition C.
"This is a notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/7/17 AT 1528 EST FROM BUCHANON DICKSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"EN 52441 was initiated on December 16, 2016, when the VEF-38A fan flow was found to be in excess of the procedurally defined operability limit during the monthly lead penetration room ventilation system test.
"The revision of the procedure in use at the time had inadvertently included acceptance criterion for fan air flow in the monthly supplements. The monthly tests demonstrate the flow paths for the two trains are functional and open, but they are not performed in the designed Engineered Safeguards (ES) configuration. The monthly tests do not secure the normal supply and exhaust ventilation within the penetration room boundaries; therefore, flow may be outside limits required during the ES configuration. The 18 month surveillance, which measures the flowrate of the system while in the ES configuration, was completed in April 2016. The surveillance verified the system's operability. The systems have not been modified or altered since this surveillance; therefore the measured flowrate remains the same.
"The procedure has been revised subsequent to this event to remove the flowrate as an 'acceptance criterion' for the monthly test.
"Because the VEF-38A flow did not result in fan inoperability, both fan trains remained operable; therefore, ANO-1 did not lose a safety function to control a radioactive release. Based on that, conclusion EN 52441 is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).