| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/07/2016 - 12/08/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 52401 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PROTEX THE PT X-PERTS, LLC
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-588
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN D. GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received from the State of Arizona via email:
"During a routine and unannounced inspection, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency discovered a Troxler 3400 series portable density gauge (Serial# 6666) was in storage with a shutter that was stuck open. The gauge contains approximately 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Americium-241. The licensee was informed of the malfunction and will have a service company come and repair the gauge.
"The [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] Agency is continuing to investigate the event.
"First Notice: 16-026" |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52402 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PROTEX THE PT X-PERTS, LLC
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-588
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN D. GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (NSIR)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
The following was received from the State of Arizona via email:
"During a routine and unannounced inspection, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency found an incident while reviewing personnel dosimetry reports. In quarterly reports covering dates 4/1/14-6/30/14, 7/1/14-9/30/14, 10/1/14-12/31/14, a single worker received a dose of 3017 mrem, 3497 mrem, and 853 mrem respectively. This resulted in a yearly total of 7367 mrem, above the 5000 mrem yearly limit for radiation workers. The overexposure was not reported to the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency.
"The [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] Agency is continuing to investigate the event.
"First Notice: 16-027" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52412 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: KARA STACY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/07/2016
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2016
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction | | 4 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction | Event Text REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BREAKER CABINET MODIFICATION - ITAAC POSTCLOSURE NOTIFICATION
"In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030).
"On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly.
"Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52413 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT CHU
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/07/2016
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2016
Event Time: 15:19 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) SIGNAL
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 train A emergency diesel generator (EDG), train A high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, and train A essential spray pond (SP) pump. These components are portions of the emergency ac electrical power system, the emergency core cooling system, and the emergency service water system, respectively, as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"On October 17, 2016 at approximately 1519, Mountain Standard Time, a portion of the Unit 1 train A engineered safety features equipment was automatically started by the balance-of-plant (BOP) engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) while the plant was at steady state conditions. Initiation of the train A ESFAS actuation signal was momentary, and the ESFAS actuation signal cleared 0.2 seconds after being initiated. The invalid ESFAS signal initiated a test-mode start signal for the train A EDG and started the train A HPSI pump. The train A essential SP pump started in support of the train A EDG.
"All actuated components started and functioned successfully. No systems started in response to actual plant conditions, and no actuation was required to mitigate the consequences of an event. The invalid HPSI actuation neither resulted in an emergency core cooling system discharge, nor should it have. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a spurious momentary signal into the BOP-ESFAS control panel due to an intermittent high resistance electrical connection. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52414 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/07/2016
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2016
Event Time: 13:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF NON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS DURING TORNADO HAZARDS ANALYSIS
"During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs [systems, structures, and components] were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles.
"The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, located on the roof of the SWIS, are not adequately protected from missiles generated by a tornado. Should a tornado-generated missile strike the SWIS intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, the hoods could crimp thus reducing air flow and challenging the performance of their heating and cooling safety functions. If the intake hoods were damaged or removed due to a missile strike, entry of rainwater could occur due to severe weather high wind velocity, and could affect safety related electrical equipment in the rooms directly below the hoods. These potential conditions could render Service Water trains inoperable on either or both units.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Required actions have been taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow up licensee event report.
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."
The licensee is evaluating the operability of the service water system. Should one train be declared inoperable, the licensee would be in a 72 hr. LCO action statement. If both trains are inoperable, then the licensee would enter T.S. 3.0.3. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52415 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MASCHUCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/07/2016
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2016
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNISOLABLE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"While TMI [Three Mile Island] Unit 1 was in a hot shutdown condition, leakage was identified coming from an RCS [reactor coolant system] pressure boundary on a welded connection on the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump. The leakage is unisolable from the RCS and is less than 0.5 gpm. Planned actions are to cooldown Unit 1 to cold shutdown conditions in order to repair the leakage."
The licensee will be notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52416 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRED SCHIZAS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 12/08/2016
Notification Time: 02:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2016
Event Time: 22:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM FAN SWITCH MIS-POSITIONED
"At 2240 [CST], 07DEC16, it was identified that HV-SW-(SF-C-1A)(CS), control switch for supply fan SF-C-1A for HV-FAN-(SF-C-1A), main control room A/C unit supply fan had been inadvertently been placed to OFF, leaving no supply fan running as required to maintain CREFS [Control Room Emergency Filtration System] operable. This was discovered following the performance of 6.1HV.302 Essential Control Building Ventilation Functional Test (DIV 1).
"It is estimated that the control switch was placed in OFF at approximately 2220 during preparation of 6.1HV.302 per S.O.P. 2.2.38. Time of discovery was 2240. This resulted in an unplanned LCO entry for the CREFS. CREFS was subsequently declared inoperable and LCO 3.7.4 Condition A was entered, with required action A.1 to restore CREFS to operable status within 7 days. The switch was restored to its required position at 2247, 07DEC16, and CREFS was subsequently declared operable and the referenced LCO was exited.
"CR-CNS-2016-08744 was written to document the unplanned inoperability."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |