| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/23/2016 - 11/25/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52266 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/27/2016
Notification Time: 22:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2016
Event Time: 16:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE EXCEEDING REQUIREMENTS
"On September 27, 2016 at 1644 [EDT], damaged ductwork was identified in the secondary containment boundary associated with reactor building zone 3 (Units 1 and 2) recirculation plenum. The size of the hole in the secondary containment boundary was determined to be 22.5 square inches. Due to exceeding allowable total leakage in the current secondary containment isolation configuration, a violation of SR 3.6.4.1.5 [occurred].
Action to establish a tested configuration with sufficient inleakage margin to restore compliance with SR 3.6.4.1.5 was completed September 27, 2016 at 2115 hrs.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1444 EST ON 11/23/2016 FROM MANU SIVARAMAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Following the 8 hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on September 27, 2016 (EN 52266), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found tear in the Zone 3 ductwork did not impact the ability of Secondary Containment to perform its safety function and that Secondary Containment was not inoperable as a result of the condition. To support the determination, a drawdown test was conducted in a limiting configuration (i.e. least inleakage margin). No substantial change in drawdown testing results were observed over the last three tests. These tests spanned over seven years. Additionally, repairs were promptly made to the affected area. As a result, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Dwyer). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52321 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text LOSS OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN SYSTEMS FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
"At 0021 [CDT] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16.
"The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022.
"WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST.
"At 0021 [EST] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed.
"Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves.
"A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Taylor). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52324 | Rep Org: EMERSON FISHER CONTROLS INTL LLC
Licensee: EMERSON FISHER CONTROLS INTL LLC
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KIM SAGAR
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - POTENTIAL ISSUE WITH SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF TYPE 546NS ELECTRO-PNEUMATIC TRANSDUCERS
The following was received via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a potential failure to comply concerning Type 546NS Electro-Pneumatic Transducer Qualification Reports.
"On August 30, 2016, Fisher became aware of a potential issue with the past qualification of the Type 546NS Transducers. Fisher's published seismic literature and certifications, based on testing by a 3rd party laboratory, exhibit inconsistencies when compared to more recent testing completed by Fisher. Regardless of these discrepancies, the Type 546NS Transducer remains qualified to perform before and after seismic loading. The scope of this investigation pertains only to operability during seismic events.
"An extent-of-condition investigation is underway and 546NS testing data is being evaluated to determine if further testing is required. Fisher will complete the investigation by November 27, 2016 and, if necessary, will complete additional testing by February 10, 2017.
"Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249."
* * * UPDATE AT 0919 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM KIM SAGAR TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following was received via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ("Fisher") is providing an update to a previous written interim notification of a potential failure to comply concerning Type 546NS Electro-Pneumatic Transducer Qualification Reports.
"On August 30, 2016, Fisher became aware of inconsistencies exhibited by prior qualification reports of the 546NS. A review of all previous Type 546 qualifications has been completed to reaffirm the qualification of the device for operation during seismic events. Based on this review, the 546NS remains qualified to perform before and after seismic loading. Additional testing is required to confirm if the device is capable of operating during an event. This additional testing is scheduled to be completed by February 10, 2017.
"Once this additional testing has been completed and operability status determined, an appropriate announcement will be made pursuant to 10CFR21 reporting requirements.
"Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249."
Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (McCraw), R4DO (Taylor), Part 21/50.55 Reactors (via email) and Part 21 Materials (via email). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52366 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: CARDELLA WASTE SERVICES
Region: 1
City: NORTH BERGEN State: NJ
County:
License #: UNLICENSED FA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCCULLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/15/2016
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MULTIPLE RADIUM PAINTED DIALS FOUND IN MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
The following information was reported by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On November 15, 2016 a specifically licensed waste broker company reported the discovery of multiple (estimated 85) radium-painted dials within two loads of municipal solid waste. The items appear to be dials for U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard deck clocks. A few items appeared within clock housings, while most were loose. The waste broker indicated the items were all found contained within garbage bags and no further contamination was identified outside the bags. The items were placed inside two 5-gallon pails and will be secured on-site pending proper disposal. The estimated total activity was reported as 240 microCuries. This is a reportable incident under N.J.A.C. 7:28-6.1 (10 CFR 20.2201(a)(i)). NJDEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] is tracking this incident internally as incident ID# C621791 and C622346 (one for each waste load)."
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES McCULLOUGH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1550 EST ON 11/18/2016 * * *
"One truck which had been screened by the waste broker consultant was again rejected at a PA [Pennsylvania] landfill and returned to the facility. The consultant returned to the facility on 11/17/2016 and 11/18/2016 to more thoroughly scan the contents of both truck loads. NJDEP was present on 11/17/2016 to observe. Additional radium dials, movements and associated waste contents were isolated in three 30-gallon waste drums. The three drums and two pails will be secured at the waste facility in a seavan container with lock. An estimated total activity has not yet been provided by the consultant.
"Paperwork, dated in 1980s and mixed into the load, identified a possible responsible party in New York, which appears may no longer be in business. New York State Department of Health Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection was informed of this by telephone on 11/18/2016.
"NJDEP has received responses from U.S. military contacts who are looking into the possibility of assisting with disposal of the materials."
Notified R1DO (Bickett) and via E-mail NMSS Events Notification group.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52367 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTION SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: TONAWANDA State: NY
County:
License #: C5567
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DESMOND C. GORDON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2016
Event Time: 15:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following report was received from the New York State Department of Health via email:
"On 11/15/2016, an employee of Applied Inspection reported that an Industrial Radiography camera is missing/lost in transport. There was no source in the camera. The camera was being shipped by [a common carrier] to Industrial Nuclear Company in La Porte, TX to be resourced. According to the tracking number the last known location is Memphis, TN.
"The camera is a Sentinel (QSA Global), model Delta 880, serial number D11011. The camera contains 50 kilograms of depleted uranium.
"According to the licensee, the package was picked up from their Tonawanda, NY location on November 1, 2016. Tracking showed it arriving in Memphis, TN, on November 2, 2016. [The common carrier] has not been able to locate the package. The Corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] for [the common carrier] was notified about the missing package on November 15, 2016.
"Although it was reported to the department that there was no source, the camera still contains depleted uranium, which is listed on the license. The Department [New York State Department of Health] will continue the investigation."
NY Event ID No: NYDOH-NY-16-08
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/16 AT 0921 EST FROM DESMOND C. GORDON TO DONG PARK * * *
The following report was received from the New York State Department of Health via email:
"On 11/17/2016, the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) of [a common carrier], reported (via email) that the camera was found and was delivered to its final destination. According to [CRSO] note, he was contacted by the [a common carrier] Spill Clean-up office about a shipment marked with a Radioactive Material Excepted Package UN2909 handling label. He had them open the package, verify it as a QSA Global Model 880 and they confirmed the D11011 serial number. The package was an orphan package without paperwork and had been there since the first of the month. He gave them the tracking number and instructed them to move the package that morning. Industrial Nuclear received the package in La Porte, Texas. Although the orphan package had been 'written-up' when it arrived, there had been no follow up."
Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52372 | Rep Org: U.S. NAVY
Licensee: U.S. NAVY
Region: 1
City: WEST BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CAPTAIN DOUG FLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - NOTIFICATION OF DEFECT - IRRADIATOR MALFUNCTION
The following is excerpted from an email/fax received from the U.S. Navy, Radiological Controls Office:
An irradiator located as Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock on 16 November [2016] at approximately 1500 [EST] malfunctioned.
During routine use of the JLS 81-20 self-shielded irradiator (Co-60 source with all attenuators 1000, 100, 10, 1, 2, in place) the device did not terminate the shot at the end of the exposure period. The end-user attempted to use the emergency stop at the control panel, which did not work as intended. The panel displayed the source was in "MOVEMENT" status for approximately 70 minutes.
No injuries or overexposures occurred, there seems to be an operational issue with the irradiator source moving from an exposed position to the shielded position, which Carderock is taking steps to correct. They have verified the source returned to the shielded position and have placed the calibrator out of commission until maintenance can be performed.
The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Seeley). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52373 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: INEOS USA LLC
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L01422
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following was excerpted from information received from the Texas Department of State Health Services by email:
"On November 17, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on November 16, 2016 at approximately 1400 CST, during its semi-annual fixed nuclear gauge inspection [at Chocolate Bayou Works], it had discovered that the shutter mechanism on an Ohmart Model SHLM-BR-2, which contains a 1,000 millicurie cesium-137 source (SN: 2807CG), had become inoperable. The licensee's radiation safety officer reported the source could be moved up/down inside the source tube, but it could not be retracted into the housing. He suspects there is an issue with the positioning of the pin that holds the 2-piece source rod together. Repairs are scheduled to be completed during an operations shut-down in January/February 2017. The source is in its normal operating position and there is no risk of exposure to any individual due to its location."
Texas Incident #: I-9441 |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52384 | Rep Org: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/21/2016
Notification Time: 12:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART-21 - INCORRECT CAPACITOR USED ON CIRCUIT BOARDS
The following report was excerpted from an e-mail:
"Product: Ametek Solidstate Controls Analog Oscillator, printed circuit board part number 80-9230404-90
"A single unit, Ametek part number 80-9230404-90, was shipped to Exelon Dresden Station on the reference purchase order has an incorrect capacitor installed. This error was identified during testing of a subsequent identical part. Ametek reviewed all printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016. Ametek contacted Exelon Dresden immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from their inventory. Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting this notification as a precaution under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, but considers it a limited incident as the single defective part was isolated and the board is in the process of being returned. No further action is required and this notification does not affect any other installation, client, inventory, or equipment provided by Ametek."
* * * UPDATE AT 0921 ON 11/23/16 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following report is an excerpt from an email received:
"Ametek reviewed all the printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. The single affected board was shipped to Exelon Generation Company, Byron warehouse on purchase order # 00588294 and Ametek sales order #46001912. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016.
"Ametek contacted Exelon Byron immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from the inventory."
Notified R3DO (McCraw) and Part 21/50.55 (via email). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52394 | Rep Org: ENERCON
Licensee: ENERCON
Region: 1
City: KENNESAW State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICK EGGEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/23/2016
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART-21 NOTIFICATION - DESIGN BASIS ERRORS USING FLO-2D SOFTWARE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"This letter serves as an Interim Report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent to delivering this calculation, FLO-2D software errors were identified which resulted in erroneous outputs that affect the local intense precipitation calculation. These errors were discovered on September 28, 2016, at which time, ENERCON generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to address the issue. ENERCON has initiated a reevaluation of the calculation using the latest version of the software that will correct the errors in the calculation.
"An evaluation of the reportability of this issue in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 is not able to be completed within the 60-day evaluation period due the need to verify and validate the latest version of the software and then complete all the analysis required for updating the calculation. This evaluation is being tracked by CAR 2016-0335 and will be completed no later than February 10, 2017.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031." | |