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Event Notification Report for November 9, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/08/2016 - 11/09/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52333 52337 52338 52339 52353 52354 52355 52356

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Agreement State Event Number: 52333
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DUPONT
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 09:09 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On October 26, 2016, the Agency was notified that two exit signs had been found missing during inventory. The licensee was contacted and asked to provide additional information including when the discovery was made and activity contained. The licensee's subsequent email revealed that the signs contained 0.426 TBq each of tritium. The signs had been discovered missing in April of 2016. The disposition of these signs is unknown. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Texas event : I-9436

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52337
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 11/01/2016
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 45 Power Operation 45 Power Operation

Event Text

SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING INOPERABLE DURING MOVEMENT OF DRY CASK STORAGE HI-TRACK TRANSFER CASK

This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75.

"On October 31, 2016, at 1100 [CDT], the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'.

"The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *

"On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported.

"10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. "

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52338
Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NORTHWEST INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR065-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 11/01/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER DOSIMETRY LEFT NEAR EXPOSURE DEVICE DURING RADIOGRAPHY SHOT

This report was received by the State of Washington via email:

"During preparation of a radiography exposure, the radiographer and another radiation worker from Bechtel, attempted to untangle their dosimetry from the camera apparatus. In doing so, they left their dosimetry next to the camera during a shot. The radiographer exposed his TLD [Thermo Luminescent Dosimetry] and pocket dosimeter, as well as a client's electronic dosimeter during the exposure. Their dosimetry minus the radiographer's rate alarm was left next to the camera during the exposure. The radiographer wears dosimetry issued by Northwest Inspection and their client, Bechtel, sub contractor of the US Department of Energy. The radiographer's pocket dosimeter was off scale. Bechtel's electronic dosimeter showed an exposure dose of 300 mrem. The radiographer reported the incident to the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer]. The radiographer's TLD was sent to the dosimetry processing facility. Additional training for the radiographer has already taken place. In view of the fact that no 'persons' were overexposed, a spare TLD will be issued to the radiographer and will be allowed to continue to work."

The radiography camera is a QSA Model Number A424-9, Serial Number 32886G, containing an Ir-192 34.5 Ci source.

Washington State Incident Number: WA-16-045

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Agreement State Event Number: 52339
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: RANCHO CUCAMONGA State: CA
County:
License #: 2700-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 11/01/2016
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

"On November 1, 2016, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of RMA Group, contacted RHB ICE [State of California, Radiation Health Branch, Inspection, Compliance, and Enforcement Section] to report the theft of a moisture density gauge from the gauge user's pickup truck while he was home for lunch [in Grand Terrance, CA]. The nuclear gauge was inside a Type A transportation box was reportedly chained and secured properly but the chains were found cut. Troxler Labs model 3430, # 24568, contains 0.3 GBq of Cs-137 and 1.48 GBq of Am-241/Be. A power generator and other assorted equipment was also stolen.

"[The RSO] will notify the local newspaper to place a Reward Notice for information leading to the safe return of the gauge. [The RSO] was asked to obtain a detailed report from the authorized gauge user.

"The gauge's theft was reported to San Bernardino Police Dept. as well as the local calibration facilities were alerted of anyone bringing the gauge to them for service. [The State of California] RHB requested a copy of the police report and newspaper notice."

California State Report 5010 Number: 110116

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52353
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY GNADT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/08/2016
Notification Time: 08:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2016
Event Time: 08:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
DAVID LEW (R1DR)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE CAUSING AN EXPLOSION IN THE PROTECTED AREA

"On November 8, 2016, at approximately 0840 EST, plant personnel reported an explosion within the Protected Area resulting in a fire with potential damage to plant structures or equipment. An Unusual Event was declared at 0851 EST. The onsite Fire Brigade was mobilized. The fire was extinguished at 0848 EST. The explosion was to the 138 kV power cross connect cable between the Unit 2 and 3 Station Auxiliary Transformers. Both Units are operating normally. There was no release of radioactive material. An investigation of the event is in progress."

Offsite assistance was not required. Unit 2 was in a normal electrical line-up and Unit 3 was not affected.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, Local, and Other Government Agencies. The licensee will issue a press release.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

* * * UPDATE FROM R.T. THOMAS TO BETHANY CECERE AT 0955 EST on 11/8/16 * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 0946 EST based on the fire being out.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (McKinley), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Miller). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52354
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: BRYAN BARWICK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/08/2016
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
VIC HALL (NRO)
BILL GlEAVES (NRO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction
3 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction

Event Text

SWITCHGEAR CABINET DESIGN MODIFICATION REQUIRED

"In accordance with 10CFR52.99(c)(2), V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (Seismic Qualification of Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on February 29, 2016 (reference ML16060A344 and ML16060A345).

"On November 2, 2016, it was determined that modifications to the RCP switchgear cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. The modification involved an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Switchgear cabinet which function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously seismically qualified for use in the RCP switchgear cabinet assembly. The additional components have now undergone seismic qualification testing for use in the RCP switchgear. The Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP switchgear will be revised based on the results of the testing to confirm the switchgear withstands seismic design basis loads. The revised testing report has been completed on November 8 2016."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52355
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/08/2016
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2016
Event Time: 05:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

REACTOR BUILDING TO ATMOSPHERE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OUT OF SPECIFICATIONS

"On 11/8/16, Operators were performing Division I Undervoltage Testing Surveillance on Unit 3, when a 2 [psi] drywell signal was inserted, Reactor Building Ventilation tripped and SBGT initiated as expected. At 0510 [CST], reactor building to atmosphere differential pressure dropped below the [negative] 0.25 inches water. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment becoming inoperable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. At 0532, the 2/3 Reactor Building material interlock inner door was closed and Reactor Building [differential pressure] was restored to greater than [negative].25 inches of water column. An issue report has been initiated. An investigation will be conducted and a 60 day Licensee Event report will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52356
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BLAKE MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/08/2016
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 32 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR REDUCED FEEDFLOW

"At 1331 [CST] on November 8, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 manually tripped from 32% reactor power. The plant was ramping down to remove the main generator from service due to an unrelated issue. 1A SGFP did not respond to control Steam Generator (SG) level as expected when the miniflow was opened per procedure. SG levels lowered due to lower feed flow and the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) auto started as expected. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to minimize the cool-down. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves.

"All other systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The failure of the 1A SGFP control is under investigation.

"Unit 2 was not affected.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

There is no primary to secondary leakage.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, November 09, 2016
Wednesday, November 09, 2016