Event Notification Report for November 01, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

"On November 1, 2016, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of RMA Group, contacted RHB ICE [State of California, Radiation Health Branch, Inspection, Compliance, and Enforcement Section] to report the theft of a moisture density gauge from the gauge user's pickup truck while he was home for lunch [in Grand Terrance, CA]. The nuclear gauge was inside a Type A transportation box was reportedly chained and secured properly but the chains were found cut. Troxler Labs model 3430, # 24568, contains 0.3 GBq of Cs-137 and 1.48 GBq of Am-241/Be. A power generator and other assorted equipment was also stolen.

"[The RSO] will notify the local newspaper to place a Reward Notice for information leading to the safe return of the gauge. [The RSO] was asked to obtain a detailed report from the authorized gauge user.

"The gauge's theft was reported to San Bernardino Police Dept. as well as the local calibration facilities were alerted of anyone bringing the gauge to them for service. [The State of California] RHB requested a copy of the police report and newspaper notice."

California State Report 5010 Number: 110116

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ALERT DECLARED AT FARLEY UNIT 1 DUE TO AMMONIA EXCEEDING IDLH LEVELS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING

"At 1743 CDT on 11/1/16, readings were obtained that indicated ammonia above IDLH [Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health] values in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building and an Alert was declared by the Emergency Director. The plant is stable with Unit 1 at 2% power. Unit 2 is at 100% power [and stable]. The site is currently investigating to determine the source and ventilate the area."

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).


* * * UPDATE FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO STEVEN VITTO ON 11/02/2016 AT 0443 EDT * * *

"The following is the Emergency Preparedness 8-hour report for the Plant Farley ALERT declaration. An ALERT was declared at 1743 CDT on November 1, 2016, based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA3 (Release of toxic, asphyxiant, or flammable gases within vital areas which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or establish or maintain safe shutdown) due to an ammonia discharge into the Auxiliary Building. Farley Unit 1 was in Mode 2 at 2 percent power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power throughout the event.

"Actions completed during and leading up to termination from the event included walkdown of the area to locate the ammonia source, and isolating the ammonia source while atmospheric monitoring was performed in all affected and adjacent areas. Installation of additional ventilation fans was completed. This event has been entered into the Farley Corrective Action Program under Condition Report 10293519 (Ammonia levels in 100 Feet Radside).

"A review of the Alert classification has determined that the classification was timely and accurate. All required notifications were completed accurately and in a timely manner. The ERO [Emergency Response Organization] notification system functioned as expected and all emergency response facilities were activated in a timely manner. There were no missing or injured personnel during the event. There is no evidence of tampering or sabotage of plant equipment leading to this event."

At 2202 CDT on 11/1/2016, the ammonia source was identified as Valve N1P20V913. At 2228 CDT, the ammonia source was isolated. Final assessment of the Auxiliary Building showed that the ammonia levels were less than 5 ppm. It was determined that a deficiency in the valve component was the cause of the ammonia leak.

The Alert was terminated on 11/1/2016 at 2340 CDT.

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO(Ernstes), IRD (Stapleton), NRR EO (Miller).

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE ON NUCLETRON MICROSELECTRON

The following is an excerpt of a report received from the Oregon Department of Health via email:

[The Oregon Department of Health] had a teleconference with the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). [The RSO] stated that during the morning QA check, the source would not retract. No patient was in the room and the QA check was performed with no one in the room. The RSO went inside the room just at the door and obtained an exposure [rate] reading of 2.6 mR/hr at approximately 15 feet from the HDR [high dose rate] unit, a Nucletron model microSelectron 106.990. The treatment room is secured at the current time until the Elekta FSE [Field Service Engineer] arrives. The RSO is working on treatment of another patient and will get more information as he gets time to do so.

During a phone call with the Elekta RSO, the Elekta RSO stated that the FSE found that the HDR unit [obstruction alarm] was being tested during QA by locking the HDR exit port [in order to block the source] and [cause an] alarm condition. The port was only partially locked so that the source was able to get out but not able to retract. The FSE was able to retract the source by opening the port fully and didn't have to manually do it. Total dose received was estimated at 10 mR maximum. The Elekta RSO mentioned that there could be shavings from the sealed source capsule around the port and that leak tests have been negative but that the entire HDR head, including source is now to be replaced.

Device: Nucletron
Model: microSelectron 106.990
Activity: Ir-192, 10 Ci.

Oregon Incident Number: OR160004

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED SEALED SOURCE LEAK TEST

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On November 1, 2016, Eastman Kodak Company informed the Department [New York State Department of Health] that an NRD Model A-2003 static eliminator sealed source leak test result indicated a measurable contamination of 0.00661 microCuries. The device was taken out of service and another leak test was performed on the unit. The second leak test results showed only 0.0003 microCuries."

New York Event Report ID No: NYDOH - NY-16-09