Event Notification Report for October 31, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/30/2016 - 10/31/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52336
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 45 | Power Operation | 45 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR TRITIUM CONTAMINATED WATER SPILLED TO STORM DRAIN
"On October 31, 2016, an informal, voluntary communication was made to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) and the Saint Charles Parish Emergency Operating Center concerning a spill of greater than 100 gallons (estimated 150 gallons total) of tritium contaminated water to the storm drains located within the protected area. Tritium activity was 8.201E-06 micro Ci/ml and no detectable gamma activity. The spill lasted approximately 5 minutes before the pump moving the tritium contaminated water was secured. The contaminated water came from the Condensate Polisher Backwash Storage Tank and discharged from a [loose] hose connection going to a baker tank located within the protected area."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 31, 2016, an informal, voluntary communication was made to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) and the Saint Charles Parish Emergency Operating Center concerning a spill of greater than 100 gallons (estimated 150 gallons total) of tritium contaminated water to the storm drains located within the protected area. Tritium activity was 8.201E-06 micro Ci/ml and no detectable gamma activity. The spill lasted approximately 5 minutes before the pump moving the tritium contaminated water was secured. The contaminated water came from the Condensate Polisher Backwash Storage Tank and discharged from a [loose] hose connection going to a baker tank located within the protected area."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52337
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 11/01/2016
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 45 | Power Operation | 45 | Power Operation |
SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING INOPERABLE DURING MOVEMENT OF DRY CASK STORAGE HI-TRACK TRANSFER CASK
This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75.
"On October 31, 2016, at 1100 [CDT], the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'.
"The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *
"On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported.
"10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. "
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).
This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75.
"On October 31, 2016, at 1100 [CDT], the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'.
"The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *
"On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported.
"10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. "
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52334
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE BOWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE BOWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 02:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 02:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE
"On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours [CDT], a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available [but not operable]. The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping.
"HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/05/2016 AT 1505 EST FROM MARK BRIDGES TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334).
"Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection.
"A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted.
"Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Stone).
"On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours [CDT], a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available [but not operable]. The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping.
"HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/05/2016 AT 1505 EST FROM MARK BRIDGES TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334).
"Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection.
"A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted.
"Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Stone).