| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/07/2016 - 10/11/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52239 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2016
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING STATION SERVICE WATER TRAINS
"Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.
"Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8.
"Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/6/2016 AT 2009 EDT FROM DAMON SCHROEDER TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps.
"On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours CDT, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR
50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT DANIELS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2233 EDT ON 10/10/2016 * * *
"This is an additional update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT and again on October 6, 2016 at 2009 EDT, Comanche Peak reported unanalyzed conditions involving Station Service Water System trains and a 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The reported conditions involved sections of piping that were not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded piping, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of safety-related equipment in the Service Water Intake Structure and the Unit 2 Safeguards Building.
"On October 10, 2016 at 1708 CDT, as a result of ongoing extent of condition walkdowns, a section of fire protection pipe in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building was identified that was not adequately shielded for a MELB. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B Switchgear 1EA2, Unit 1 Train B 480V MCC 1EB4-2, and Unit 1 Train B Distribution Panel 1ED2-2. Only one of these power supplies at a time would be affected. 1EA2 provides 6.9KV electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, panels, sequencer, and transformers. 1EB4-2 provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, panels, and transformers. 1ED2-2 provides 125VDC electrical power to EDG 1-02 channel 1 starting circuit. The affected fire protection pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since Unit 1 Train A Switchgear 1EA1, Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-2, and Unit 1 Train A Distribution Panel 1ED1-2 have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then both trains of Unit 1 6.9KV power (1EA2 and 1EA1), both trains of Unit 1 480V power (1EB4-2 and 1EB3-2), and both trains of Unit 1 125VDC power (1ED2-2 and 1ED1-2) along with the safety-related equipment they supply could potentially have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, none of the affected Train A equipment was inoperable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52272 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: TELEPHONICS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: HUNTINGTON State: NY
County:
License #: G14221
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/30/2016
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2016
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR
The following report was received via fax:
"Telephonics Corporation reported that an NRD static eliminator, Model P-2031, S/N A2GM255 containing 20 milliCuries of Polonium-210 was missing. Loss of the device was discovered while double checking an inventory sheet provided by NRD for purchases and returned devices. Telephonics has been instructed to submit a written report within 30 days of the telephone report, requesting a description of the circumstances under which loss or theft of the NRD device occurred and what actions will be taken to recover the missing device and what measures will be taken to prevent further loss of licensed material."
Event Report ID: NYDOH-NY-16-06
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52280 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JACK BREEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/04/2016
Notification Time: 23:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2016
Event Time: 22:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2016 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A HURRICANE WARNING
"A Hurricane Warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. A Hurricane Warning was issued by the National Weather Service at 2250 [EDT]. St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event Classification for the Hurricane Warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the Offsite Notification."
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDY TEREZAKIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/7/16 AT 1112 EDT * * *
"The Hurricane Warning was downgraded to a Tropical Storm Warning by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1044 [EDT] on 10/7/16, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities.
Notified R2 (Jones) NRR EO (King), IRD (Grant), R2DO (Bonser), DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52288 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/07/2016
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2016
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - DISCOVERY OF PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b).
"At 1620 EDT today, a prohibited substance [marijuana] was identified inside the protected area. The substance was obviously very old, so is surmised to be from a preoperational period.
"The item [a small remainder, or butt, of a marijuana joint] is currently under the control of the site security department and will be turned over to local law enforcement for disposal.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52289 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CAVES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/08/2016
Notification Time: 05:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2016
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 7 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION DUE TO TURBINE CONTROL VALVE TRANSIENT
"On October 8, 2016, while reducing power for a planned refueling outage, the unit was taken offline by opening the main generator output breakers. With the reactor at approximately 7 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 0150 [EDT], an unexpected steam valve transient occurred while main turbine valve control was being transferred from throttle valve to governor valves during main turbine overspeed testing. This resulted in an automatic low steamline pressure Safety Injection and Reactor Trip. All safety systems functioned as expected. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and pressure following the reactor trip, with decay heat being removed using steam generator power operated relief valves. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. All emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment is available.
"The cause of the steam valve transient is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an ECCS discharge to RCS, an unplanned reactor protection system actuation, and a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Safety Injection occurred for approximately 6 minutes and Pressurizer level increased to approximately 71%. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed as a result of the Safety Injection and Decay Heat is being removed using the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52290 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MARTIN BOWSKILL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 10/08/2016
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2016
Event Time: 13:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2016 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"UE SU1.1 declared due to momentary loss of power from the qualified off-site source. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded to supply power to both of the Emergency Buses.
"'A' Service Water Pump did not start on Blackout sequencer. Sufficient Service Water flow is available from the other three operating pumps. All other systems operated as designed."
At 1304 EDT Robinson Unit 2 experienced a momentary grid voltage drop that lowered the 4kV bus voltage and initiated an automatic reactor trip. All rods inserted and decay heat is being removed by steam generator PORVs. In response to the reduced bus voltage, the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) automatically started and loaded onto the emergency busses. At 1317 EDT, the licensee declared an Unusual Event (EAL SU1.1) due to the loss of offsite power. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the grid voltage instability. The emergency busses will continue to be powered by the EDGs until the licensee has determined the cause for the voltage drop. All offsite power sources and all equipment is available. The licensee has notified the state government and Darlington County. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
* * * UPDATE FROM ALEX CURLINGTON TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1658 EDT on 10/08/16 * * *
"At 1303 EDT on 10/08/2016, a reactor trip occurred. The cause was under voltage to the plant 4kV buses due to an offsite grid disturbance. The cause of the disturbance is under investigation. Following the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as expected on low steam generator level. At the time of the trip, the plant was in Mode 1. Currently, the Plant is in Mode 3. The current RCS Temperature is 550 degrees F (Average), and the Steam Generator Levels are in the range of 42 to 53% (normal range) with levels controlled by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Decay heat removal is being controlled by the steam generator PORVs. 'A' Service Water Pump did not start on Blackout sequencer. Sufficient Service Water flow is available from the other three operating service water pumps 'B', 'C', and 'D'. All other systems operated as designed.
"Due to the Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System, this event is being reported as a 4-hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System, this event is also being reported as an 8-hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(B)(6). At no time during this occurrence was the public or plant staff at risk as a result of this event.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM BOBBY STUCKEY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2347 EDT on 10/08/16 * * *
"At 2323 [EDT] Emergency Bus E-2 powered from off-site power."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), NRR EO (Miller).
* * * UPDATE FROM BOBBY STUCKEY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0028 EDT ON 10/09/16 * * *
"At 0011 [EDT] Robinson Nuclear Plant has terminated the Unusual Event."
Basis for the Unusual Event termination was restoration of power to Emergency Bus E-2 from off-site power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Bonser), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
* * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE CURTIS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0253 EDT ON 10/09/16 * * *
"At approximately 2323 EDT on 10/08/2016, an auto-start of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Motor-Driven pumps occurred during the transfer of Emergency Bus power from the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to offsite power. AFW system auto-start logic associated with Main Feed Pump (MFP) breakers being open is defeated when the EDG output breaker is closed. As such, when the EDG output breaker was opened during the power transfer while the MFP breakers were open, the auto-start logic was thereby met causing the AFW auto-start.
"Due to the valid actuation of the AFW System, this event is being reported as an 8-hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). At no time did this occurrence pose undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
H.B. Robinson Unit 2 was in Mode 3 during this event. Notified R2DO (Bonser). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52291 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL DUHON
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 10/08/2016
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2016
Event Time: 13:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2016 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"Loss of all offsite power capability, Table S-5, to 6.9kV emergency buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB for greater than or equal to 15 minutes."
At 1328 EDT, while shutdown in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Harris declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. Following the loss of offsite power (LOOP), the Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded onto their respective emergency buses. The reactor remains stable and shutdown in Mode 4. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the LOOP and the emergency buses will continue to be powered by the EDGs until the licensee has determined the cause for the LOOP. Offsite power is currently available into the switchyard. The licensee notified the state government, the local government, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
* * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1658 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *
"The cause [of the LOOP] is not known. Duke Energy Control Center has evaluated the grid and is comfortable with Harris connecting emergency buses back to the grid. Harris Plant is evaluating restoration. Faults were validated on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard.
"This notification also addresses various valid actuations of safety systems, including the Emergency Diesel Generators, as well as, potential loss of Emergency Assessment Capabilities due to the LOOP impacting Emergency Planning equipment."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).
* * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1755 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *
The cause of the LOOP has been determined to be a momentary electricity loss on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard.
"This event notification also addresses the loss of safety function of the offsite power system which occurred as a result of grid perturbations."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).
* * * UPDATE FROM DUSTIN MARTIN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2055 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *
Based on the grid being stable and the 115kV Cape Fear North and South lines being available, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2049 EDT on 10/8/16.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
* * * UPDATE FROM SARAH McDANIEL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1330 EDT ON 10/9/16 * * *
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(XI) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
"At approximately 1305 EDT on October 9, 2016, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of untreated sanitary wastewater. During a significant rainfall event associated with Hurricane Matthew, wastewater was released from the overflow of a lift station that did not function as a result of a power outage. The untreated sanitary wastewater entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the lift station power is restored. An investigation is in progress to further determine the cause and additional corrective actions.
"There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Bonser). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52292 | Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALAN BIALOWAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/09/2016
Notification Time: 06:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2016
Event Time: 02:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING MAIN GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT TURBINE TRIP
"Surry Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped at 0254 hours on 10/09/2016, due to a Main Generator Differential Lockout Turbine Trip. The cause of the generator differential lockout is under investigation at this time. Reactor Coolant System temperature is currently being maintained at 547 degrees Fahrenheit on the main steam dump valves. All three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as designed on Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level following the trip. Auxiliary feedwater pumps have since been secured and Main Feedwater is in use.
"All systems operated as required. The source range nuclear instruments had to be manually reinstated following the reactor trip due to indications of undercompensation on Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument channel N-36. Off site power remains available. There is no impact on Surry Unit 1.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is responding to the site.
"There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event."
All control rods fully inserted. Secondary reliefs lifted and reseated as expected following a reactor trip from 100% power. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52293 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY GATES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/10/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2016
Event Time: 10:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A SPILL OF A REPORTABLE QUANTITY OF HYDRAULIC OIL ONSITE
"At 1032 [CDT] on October 10, 2016, it was determined that a spill of hydraulic oil that occurred earlier in the morning on the site was of sufficient quantity (approximately 60 gallons) to warrant a notification to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. This report will be made within 24 hours of the determination. The spill was the result of a hydraulic system failure on a truck that was on site to pick up non-radioactive trash. The truck was on company property but outside the Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA). There are no radiological or off-site impacts arising from this event. The spill did not reach surface water and is now contained.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition requiring the notification to State environmental authorities.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |