| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/06/2016 - 10/07/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52239 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2016
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING STATION SERVICE WATER TRAINS
"Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.
"Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8.
"Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/6/2016 AT 2009 EDT FROM DAMON SCHROEDER TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EST, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps.
"On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours CST, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR
50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52268 | Rep Org: MONSANTO
Licensee: MONSANTO
Region: 4
City: SODA SPRINGS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27361-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE MATYUS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text SAFETY EQUIPMENT POTENTIALLY FAILS TO FUNCTION
Maintenance was being performed on a Berthold moisture analyzer in a coke bin vessel because a moisture tube inside of the vessel was damaged. Two maintenance technicians took the source holder off the vessel and then proceeded to work on the vessel. The source holder was placed nearby the work area and the source was not able to be fully retracted back into the gauge during the maintenance evolution. Maintenance then re-mounted the source holder back onto the vessel. The licensee contacted the manufacturer in order to investigate the maintenance evolution and assist estimating dosage to the two technicians. The licensee contacted Region 4 (Janine Katanic). The licensee investigation continues.
* * * UPDATE AT 1115 EDT ON 09/30/16 FROM DAVE MATYUS TO S. SANDIN * * *
On 09/29/16 Berthold Technologies was onsite to assist in the investigation. A leak test was performed and the contractors involved were interviewed. The information will be provided to the Berthold RSO in order to estimate the dose received. NRC R4 (Dykert) was also present to observe the investigation. The licensee does not anticipate receiving the results until next week.
Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events Notification by email. | |