| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/23/2016 - 09/26/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52138 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: THOMAS PLOWER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 08/01/2016
Notification Time: 06:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2016
Event Time: 03:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE GREATER THAN ALLOWABLE LIMIT
"On August 1, 2016 at 0342 EDT St. Lucie Unit 1 commenced a unit shutdown required by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage in excess of the allowable limit of zero leakage. The leak was initially identified on July 31, 2016 at 2115 EDT as not Pressure Boundary leakage. After further analysis, the leak was determined to be Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary leakage at 0123 on August 1, 2016. The leakage is estimated as less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and is not impacting the ability to shut down the unit. Additional impact of the leak is under evaluation.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.'
"The location of the leak is on the Instrumentation piping welded connection at Flow Element FE-3311 attached to [the] Emergency Core Cooling System Injection header to Reactor Coolant System Loop 1A2. The leak activity is 0.167 microCuries per ml."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1335 EDT ON 09/23/16 FROM RICHARD SCISCENTE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on EN 52138. NRC notification was initially made as a result of a plant shutdown required by technical specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage.
"Subsequent to the initial report, St. Lucie has determined that the RCS leakage was from a seal weld on a threaded connection that was not pressure boundary leakage. However, the leak was non-isolable and required RCS depressurization to allow immediate investigation to ensure there were no faults in a RCS component body or pipe wall.
"The leakage was estimated to be less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and did not impact the ability to shut down the unit. No TS limits were exceeded during this event.
"Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage past the seal weld of a threaded connection does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified the R2DO (Blamey). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52224 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIK SILKO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/07/2016
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2016
Event Time: 13:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER HEADER DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1347 EDT on September 6, 2016, the non-essential service water header was declared inoperable due to what appeared to be a leak on a filet weld on a slip-on flange upstream of the 23 service water pump discharge valve SWN-2-2. [Operators] entered LCO 3.0.3 based on Engineering input with no code case to support an immediate determination of operability. The 23 service water pump was secured and the discharge valve SWN-2-2 was closed isolating the leak and restoring the non-essential SW header to operable status. With the discharge valve closed, LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1417 EDT on September 6, 2016. The declaration of the inoperability of the non-essential service water header is considered a loss of safety function for purposes of reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Further investigation of the leak revealed [that the leak had occurred at] a pipe flaw rather than at the weld location. An operability evaluation is ongoing. There was no reduction in power while in LCO 3.0.3 and no other issues arose."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES ROKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0839 EDT ON 9/23/16 * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on September 7, 2016, at 1647 hours EDT (EN #52224). The notification on September 7, 2016, reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of declaring the non-essential service water (SW) header inoperable due to discovery of a through wall leak on the discharge line from the 23 SW Pump. The leak appeared to be on the downstream fillet weld on the north side of the pipe spool piece. At the time the exact location of the leak could not be established due to the geometry of the area and its carbon fiber coating. Because there is no qualified NDE inspection technique for fillet welds and the analytical methods provided in ASME code Case N-513-3 are not applicable to fillet welds, operability of the effected section of the SW System could not be demonstrated and the SW piping was conservatively considered inoperable.
"Further investigation of the leak determined the leak occurred mid-pipe 1/2 inch upstream from a slip-on flange socket weld and not on the weld itself. The weld location is ASME Section XI Class 3, nuclear safety-related, Seismic Class 1. An engineering evaluation was performed of the pipe defect and concluded the identified through-wall defect on the pipe spool piece did not result in any structural, flooding, spraying condition or SW system capacity issues which would adversely impact any normal or accident design functions of the SW system or any other nuclear safety-related equipment or component to perform their design safety functions from the time of the leak occurrence to the isolation of the pipe. The structural portion of the evaluation was performed using the ASME CC N-513-3 methodology but the code case was not invoked because the flaw was isolated and a code repair was made. The 23 SW Pump discharge line spool piece is a 14 inch NPS schedule STD cement-lined carbon steel pipe having a nominal wall thickness of 0.375 inches with slip-on flanges welded on both sides with fillet welds on the exterior. The function of this spool piece is to connect the 23 Zurn Strainer outlet to the isolation valve SWN-2-2. The degradation mechanism was likely due to corrosion of the carbon steel on the underside of the cement lining due to a lining defect."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Krohn). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52241 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: CHEVRON
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/15/2016
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2016 | Emergency Class:
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGN
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On September 15, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by an Operation Specialist (OS) at the Chevron corporate office in Houston, Texas, that during an inventory of a storage room in their building, an 'EXIT' sign containing 7 curies of tritium was not located. The sign was manufactured by Isolite in October of 2002. The OS stated they have search the building and interview all their personnel who had accessed the room since the last inventory. He stated that it is possible that the sign may have been disposed of in their waste, but he does not believe that happened. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9429
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52243 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #: OK-15794-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/15/2016
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2016
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:
"On 9/12/2016 at approximately 1500 CDT, a portable gauge was struck by a private vehicle at a jobsite. This is preliminary information, and [The Oklahoma Environmental Agency] has not received a full report yet from the licensee. There does not appear to be any leakage or exposures from this incident.
Licensee: Oklahoma Department of Transportation (OK-15794-01)
Reported by: Larry Hawkins, ODOT RSO
Device: Troxler Model 4640
Isotope: 8 mCi Cesium-137
Location: Intersection of Highways 183 & 152, Cordell, OK
"Description: Licensee reports that worker was using the gauge to take surface density measurements on an asphalt highway. The gauge shield was open, but the rod was not extended. A vehicle travelling approximately 25 mph ignored warnings, 'straddled' the highway centerline, and struck the gauge. The driver who struck the gauge left the scene after discovering what had happened.
"The licensee reports that there was no contamination found on the highway or the gauge. The gauge sustained damage to the case and circuit board. The licensee stated that debris was cleared from the shield area and then the shield was closed. The gauge was shipped to Troxler. The licensee is waiting on leak test results, and will submit an incident report to the DEQ [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality]."
NMED Item Number: OK160005 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52246 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: INEOS MELAMINES, LLC
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: MA
County:
License #: 48-0644
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SZYMON MUDREWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/16/2016
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION
The following information was received by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"The licensee called the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] to report a fixed fill level gauge stuck in the open position. The gauge is a Berthold LB7400 Series gauge, Model LB7440, and contains a 150 mCi Cs-137 source [S/N:1476].
"The gauge is mounted to a liquid holding tank which was emptied and was scheduled for routine cleaning. Before cleaning of the tank could begin, the gauge shutter was attempted to be put into the closed position. When attempting to close the shutter, the handle broke off and left the gauge stuck in the open position. Cleaning was not able to be performed and no one was able to enter the tank. The gauge remains in the installed position and is in an inaccessible area with safety controls in place to prevent access. The manufacturer was contacted and will be servicing the gauge 09/27/16 thru 09/28/16 by either repairing or replacing the shielding as necessary.
"The Agency continues to investigate and considers this event to be open.
"Manufacturer of gauge notified and will respond to assess the device; repair or replacement as necessary." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52260 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRYAN GALVAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/23/2016
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2016
Event Time: 20:47 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text STEAM LINE PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT COUPLING SLEEVE FOUND NOT ENGAGED
"On 9/20/2016, a coupling sleeve on a pipe whip restraint located on the 119 foot elevation of the turbine building associated with Unit 2 main steam line 4 was found to be not engaged. As a result of the detached coupling, the restraint was not capable of performing its restraint function for a postulated pipe whip event on the main steam line. The coupling was reconnected on 9/20/2016, restoring its functionality. An extent of condition walkdown was subsequently performed for the other Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam line restraints and no similar issues were identified.
"This concern did not result in any adverse effect on the radiological health and safety of the public.
"The purpose of this whip restraint is to restrain the steam line for a postulated loss at the G-line anchor (east side of Turbine Building above the 104 foot elevation). The restraint protects the floor slab at the 104 foot elevation, which extends over the Unit 2 component cooling water heat exchangers.
"With the detached coupling, equipment in the area may have been vulnerable to damage if a pipe whip event occurred. Further analysis is needed to conclude whether the heat exchangers and other equipment would have remained protected in such an event and whether this would have significantly affected the designed plant response to a pipe event.
"Based on the need for further analysis, this event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that may have significantly degraded plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52261 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KYLE SAYLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/25/2016
Notification Time: 04:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2016
Event Time: 01:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text ACTUATION OF GROUP 1 ISOLATION SIGNAL
"At 0103 CDT a Group 1 Isolation signal was received on Main Steam Line (MSL) A High Flow while attempting to un-isolate MSL A.
"During plant cooldown for refueling outage, all inboard MSIV's were closed to minimize steam flow to control cooldown rate. With all inboard MSIV's closed and all outboard MSIV's open, MSL drains in-service, and reactor pressure at approximately 330 psig, an attempt was made to un-isolate MSL A by opening A inboard MSIV. This resulted in a MSL high flow signal on MSL A as the valve was being opened, resulting in a Group I Isolation and closure of all MSIV's and MSL Drain Valves. Pressure was equalized to less than 200 psid across MSIV A prior to attempting to open the valve in accordance with plant procedures. All valves actuated as expected and the cause of the event is under investigation. There are no indications of a leak. The Group I Isolation has been reset."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52262 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STANDER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 09/25/2016
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2016
Event Time: 09:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text COOPER NUCLEAR STATION LOSS OF TONE ALERT RADIOS
"At 0915 CDT on 9/25/2016, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Nemaha, NE, Richardson, NE, and Atchison, MO county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize the backup notification method making this condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies.
"Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is unknown.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition." | |