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Event Notification Report for September 9, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/08/2016 - 09/09/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52040 52192 52211 52215 52225 52226 52227 52228 52229

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52040
Rep Org: ROMEO RIM INC.
Licensee: ROMEO RIM INC.
Region: 3
City: ROMEO State: MI
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WADE SPURLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 07:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

SCRAPPED EQUIPMENT CONTAINED A CS-137 SOURCE

During the last month, Romeo Rim had been scrapping older equipment. They received a call from a steel recycler (Steel Dynamics Inc. in Columbia City, Indiana) that their scrap material contained a cesium source. The equipment had been used to measure the amount of nucleation in the plastic manufacturing process. Romeo Rim is currently contacting a company to dispose of the cesium source which is at Steel Dynamics.

Source: Cesuim-137 (originally 200 mCi in April 1986, currently 100 mCi)
Equipment Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear (now Thermo Fisher Scientific)
Equipment Model: 5202
Serial Number: B425

* * * UPDATE AT 0830 EDT ON 7/11/16 FROM WADE SPURLIN TO S. SANDIN * * *

The device was recovered by a licensed hauler RAM Services. A wipe test was performed which indicated that the source was not leaking. The device will be transported to Texas for disposal.

Notified R3DO (Pelke) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1006 EDT ON 09/08/2016 FROM WADE SPURLIN TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

The device was disposed of by Waste Control Specialists, LLC at the Compact Waste Facility in Andrews, TX on August 26, 2016.

Notified R3DO(Stoedter) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52192
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK BELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/22/2016
Notification Time: 06:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 22:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HVAC

"At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE AT 1355 EDT ON 09/08/16 FROM CHUCK YARLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

"Event notification 52192 is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, Harris determined that the 'A' train of Control Room Emergency Filtration was Operable at the time 'B' train became Inoperable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction."

Notified R2DO (Rose).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52211
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: MEADWESTVACO
Region: 1
City: COVINGTON State: VA
County:
License #: 580-375-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2016
Notification Time: 13:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PROCESS NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following report was received via fax:

"On August 30, 2016, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer reported that two cap screws used to secure the shutter handle on a fixed gauge (Ohmart Model SH-F2-C; serial number 70929; 1000 milliCuries cesium-137) had sheared off during a routine test of the on-off mechanism earlier in the day. The failure left the shutter in the on or open position. The gauge is used to provide density measurements of product traveling through a stainless steel pipe and is normally left in the on position. Personnel entry into the pipe is not possible, eliminating potential personnel exposure to radiation. The licensee has contacted a licensed service company to repair the gauge."

Virginia Report: VA-16-013

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52215
Rep Org: INTEGRITY TESTLAB
Licensee: INTEGRITY TESTLAB
Region: 1
City: NEW CASTLE State: DE
County:
License #: 07-30791-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BATTING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/01/2016
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2016
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE INTO SHIELDED POSITION

"At 1122 [EDT], the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] for Integrity Testlabs [ITL], LLC, received a telephone notification from the field radiographer at the client's location that he was unable to retract the source fully into the shielded position. The radiographer attempted to retract the source twice. The radiographer realized the source was not going to get shielded because he noticed that the control cable housing was laying on equipment which was later determined to be approximately 500 degrees F. This melted the control cable housing and in turn prevented the complete retraction of the source into the shielded position. The radiographer kept the source to the fully exposed position within the 4HVL collimator and proceeded to extended the posted radiation area boundaries to 2mR/hr or less, then contacted the RSO at 1122 [EDT]. The RSO was approximately 50 miles away and stated he was on his way to assist in the recovery process. The company and RSO are authorized to perform recovery of sources.

"The radiographer then contacted his supervisor, who was the senior radiographer onsite. The supervisor also attempted to retract the source into the shielded position. The supervisor contacted the RSO and explained the situation. By direction from the RSO via telephone communication, the supervisor was able to disconnect the control housing at the remote control crank and pull the control cable so that the source was retracted into the shielded position. The radiography operations were terminated for the day. Surveys were performed after the source was shielded with no unusual readings. All equipment was returned to ITL's facility.

"The following self-reading pocket dosimeter readings were recorded at the conclusion of this event. The radiographer and assistant radiographer had performed 6 exposures for the day. The 6 exposures included the event.
Radiographer 100mR
Assistant 20mR
Supervisor 23mR during the recovery process
No radiographic personnel or member of the pubic was overexposed during the entire event.

"The affected equipment will be inspected, repaired or replaced, as needed.

"A follow report will be submitted to Region I as soon as practical.

"Equipment: QSA Global Model 880s #S1667 w/ IR-192 #32053G - 56.5Curies
25Ft Extreme Control Cables with two extreme guide tubes, each guide tube 7ft long and the outer most guide stop having a source stop.
One - 4HVL Tungsten collimator"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52225
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: SEAN DUNFEE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2016
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 82 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP

"On September 4, 2016 at 0258 [CDT], Grand Gulf Nuclear Station entered three [Technical Specification] Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) due to residual heat removal pump 'A' (RHR 'A') being declared inoperable.

"LCOs entered:
1) 3.5.1 for one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem,
2) 3.6.1.7 for one RHR containment spray subsystem, and
3) 3.6.2.3 for one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem.

"Station management has made the decision to shutdown the plant to repair the RHR 'A' pump prior to the end of the 7 day LCO completion time based on troubleshooting and testing performed on the RHR 'A' pump.

"Grand Gulf Nuclear Station initiated plant shutdown required by Tech Spec Actions 3.5.1, 3.6.1.7, and 3.6.2.3, at 0300 CDT on 09/08/2016 due to expected inability to restore RHR 'A' to operable status prior to exceeding the LCO time of 7 days."

The unit is currently at 82 percent power. There are no other systems out of service that would complicate the orderly shutdown to Mode 4.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52226
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE JONES
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2016
Event Time: 21:31 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STUCK OPEN PRESSURIZER MAIN SPRAY VALVE

"On September 7th, 2016 at approximately 2131 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Unit 1 was manually tripped due to a stuck open main spray valve. Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the event. A 120 VAC non-class instrument distribution panel was being transferred to its alternate power supply to establish maintenance conditions. The distribution panel failed to transfer. The panel remained energized from its normal power supply; however, multiple components powered from the distribution panel began to exhibit uncharacteristic behavior. At this time, it was noted that a reactor coolant system main spray valve was open. The alarm response procedure was followed; however, the actions taken were unsuccessful at closing the main spray valve. The plant was then manually tripped due to pressurizer pressure continuing to lower. The reactor coolant pumps were turned off to terminate main pressurizer spray flow to control pressurizer pressure due to the inability to close the main spray valve. No ESF [Engineered Safety Features] actuations occurred and none were required. No emergency classification was required per the emergency plan. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The emergency diesel generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. Limiting condition for operation 3.4.1 was entered due to low pressurizer pressure. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.

"Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. Reactor coolant pumps are secured and natural circulation has been verified. Primary pressure is being maintained at its normal operating pressure manually with pressurizer heaters and auxiliary spray, from the charging system. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The minimum RCS pressure was approximately 2070 psia (normal 2250). The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."

All rods inserted and the trip was uncomplicated. Units 2 and 3 were not affected and continue to run at full power.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52227
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUDY CAPUTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 04:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE

"On July 11, 2016, at approximately 0430 CDT, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% power, the 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (M/G) set tripped causing a loss of the A RPS bus. This caused the complete actuation of the Division 1 (outboard) primary containment isolation logic. The isolation logic actuation resulted in successful closure of the Division 1 primary containment isolation valves. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip set-point), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.

"In response to the trip of the 1A RPS M/G Set, operators swapped the A RPS bus to the alternate power supply using the applicable response procedure. The containment isolation signal was reset and the systems were restored to their normal lineup. Reactor power was not affected by this event. All safety related equipment controlled by the affected primary containment isolation circuits operated as designed.

"The 1A RPS M/G Set trip was due to a blown power fuse for the 1A RPS M/G Set. This was the result of worn insulation on one of the generator output leads. The generator output leads were repaired and rerouted to prevent future problems on 07/15/16. Restoration of the normal power supply to the 1A RPS function was completed on 7/19/16."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52228
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JORGE RODRIQUEZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2016
Event Time: 05:50 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF BOTH TRAINS ESSENTIAL SPRAY POND SYSTEM

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of both trains of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 essential spray pond (SP) system. The SP system serves as an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9).

"On July 12, 2016, at approximately 0550, Mountain Standard Time, Unit 2 experienced a manual actuation of both trains of the SP system. Approximately 20 minutes earlier, the failure of a +15VDC power supply on the containment purge isolation actuation signal (CPIAS) module resulted in a trip of the B train CPIAS and a momentary cross trip of the A train CPIAS, and both trains of the control room essential filtration actuation system (CREFAS). These brief actuation signals resulted in starting of some but not all essential equipment because the actuation signals cleared before most of the equipment received a start signal. Both trains of the SP system were started manually in accordance with the alarm response procedure. The A train CPIAS and both trains of CREFAS were reset. The B train CPIAS remained in a partially tripped state because of the failed power supply.

"The manual actuation of both A and B trains of the SP system was complete. Both trains of the SP system started and functioned successfully. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a failed +15VDC power supply on the B train CPIAS module which resulted in momentary trips of both trains of CPIAS and CREFAS. The containment building radiation monitors that actuate CPIAS exhibited normal radiation levels which would not have required CPIAS actuation. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There was no adverse impact
to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52229
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ANTON PESTKA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/09/2016
Notification Time: 03:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2016
Event Time: 18:56 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF THE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM COMPUTER

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On September 8, 2016 at 1856 [MST], seismic monitoring (SM) system computer AJSMNXYQI0001**INSTRU was determined to be non-functional due to a power spike which caused a temporary loss of power to the seismic instrumentation and resulted in a locked in the Control Room alarm. At 2305, I&C technicians re-booted the computer and verified the SM system was functioning.

"On September 8, 2016, at approximately 2353, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability during the period between 1856 and 2305.

"This specific SM functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with the SM out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition has been completed.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, September 09, 2016
Friday, September 09, 2016