United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2016 > September 2

Event Notification Report for September 2, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/01/2016 - 09/02/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52197 52199 52200 52216 52217

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52197
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: AT&T
Region: 4
City: VALLEJO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/24/2016
Notification Time: 15:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email:

"On August 23, 2016, NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] contacted RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] to inform of an incident involving missing Tritium signs. According to NRC report, the AT&T EH&S RSO [Environmental Health and Safety Radiation Safety Officer], Kim Kantner, contacted NRC to report six missing H-3 [Tritium] signs from one of their locations at 730 Carolina Street, Vallejo, CA. Each sign contained 2.7 Ci of H-3.

"These six signs were in a box to be returned to the vendor, stored inside a locked basement at the Vallejo AT&T facility. Some renovations were going on at this site. According to Kim, AT&T still believes that the box may have been misplaced by the workers. The investigation is still ongoing.

"RHB will be following up on this matter."

CA 5010 Number: 082316

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52199
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/24/2016
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"On August 24, 2016, the licensee reported a potential overexposure of an employee to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services]. The licensee reported one of its radiographers had received 5.5 rem on the July monthly monitoring report resulting in a total dose of 6.4 rem for the year. The radiation safety officer [RSO] is investigating the cause of the overexposure although believes the radiographer has not been following procedures. The RSO stated the radiographer is working in an enclosed area and not distancing himself from the source as required when the source is exposed. The RSO will provide a detailed report within the next few days. An update will be sent in accordance of SA300 guidelines."

Texas Incident #: I 9426

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52200
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LANCASTER GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: LANCASTER State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0233
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN CHIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/25/2016
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2016
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTED PACKAGE EXCEEDED CONTAMINATION LIMITS

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:

"On August 25, 2016, the Department [Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] was notified by Lancaster General Hospital that a package was received in which 5 of the 6 sides exceeded the contamination limits in 10 CFR 71.47. This is reportable per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).

"A package containing a vial of 5 milliCuries of iodine-123 in liquid form was received from GE Healthcare at approximately 0830 [EDT] this morning. The package was undamaged. The receipt survey was performed and noted removable contamination as follows: Front and handle 10,108 dpm; Right side 2,131 dpm; Front handle 4,977 dpm; Front 4,426 dpm; Top background; Top strap 4,577 dpm; Back/bottom 1,997 dpm.

"After completing wipe testing, the technologist performed an area survey. The area background was found to be 0.04 mR/hr. At 1 meter, the package was found to be 0.05 mR/hr. At the package surface the reading was found to be 0.4 mR/hr. The contamination identified as technetium-99m. Given this finding, package [was] opened to verify it was I-123. The contamination is believed to have been transferred from somewhere else. Upon return to the originator (GE) pharmacy, a survey of the delivery driver's hands, vehicle, and all packages in the vehicle was performed. None showed contamination. All hospital personnel involved and surrounding areas were surveyed and found to be contamination free. No one received a dose above regulatory limits."

Cause of the event is unknown at this time. The Department has an inspector onsite. More information will be provided when available.

Event Report ID No: PA160023

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 52216
Rep Org: ENERSYS
Licensee: ENERSYS
Region: 1
City: READING State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM ROSS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/01/2016
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF BATTERY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

"This letter will serve as notification from EnerSys to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission of an identified deviation in published literature information. The literature defines requirements for resistance in both cell to cell and cell to terminal connections in supplied battery systems. High connection resistance causes increased cell voltage drop and a potential failure to meet run time requirements.

"Internal investigation by EnerSys confirms that no defects exist in systems tested before shipment to customer utilities as internal documented procedures define correct parameters. However, the potential of less than desired performance exists if the values noted in the literature are used during installation and test at utility sites.

"EnerSys does not have the ability to evaluate if a defect exists at customer utilities so per the provisions of Part 21, notification is being made to both the Commission and affected EnerSys customers."

POC: 800-538-3627 ext. 1974

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52217
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/01/2016
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2016
Event Time: 10:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION ON TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"During a review of ongoing analyses related to postulated tornado missiles, a question was raised about the sentinel valve on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFW). The sentinel valve is designed as a warning system on steam equipment to warn personnel of increased back pressure. The valve is not an ASME component and its operation is not required to support TDAFW operation.

"The draft analysis predicts the TDAFW exhaust stack could be partially crimped by a tornado missile and the resultant back pressure on the turbine would increase to approximately 40 psi. This is higher than the set point for the sentinel valve (nominally 27 and 29 psi for Units 1 and 2, respectively). Therefore, in a design basis tornado with a design basis tornado missile striking the TDAFW exhaust stack, and in a condition where the TDAFW is demanded to run, the sentinel valve is expected to lift and allow steam to flow into the room.

"Vendor correspondence indicates that at approximately 40 psi the sentinel valve will conservatively pass 600 lbm/hr. Thus, it is conservatively considered operation of the TDAFW under such conditions would create an adverse steam environment which would be beyond that which the TDAFW pump has been analyzed to operate. Actions planned to alleviate the above condition would eliminate the potential for adverse environmental conditions.

"The steam supplies to the TDAFW have been isolated to affect repairs, which are expected to be limited to removal of the sentinel valve from each Unit and installation of a plug. Said activities are expected to be completed within the Allowed Out-of-Service Time (AOT) of the TDAFW of seventy-two hours per Technical Specification 3.7.5."

NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, September 02, 2016
Friday, September 02, 2016