United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2016 > September 1

Event Notification Report for September 1, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/31/2016 - 09/01/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52074 52197 52199 52210 52212 52213 52214

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 52074
Rep Org: TEAM CORPORATE
Licensee: FURMANITE
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWARD RICH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 07/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - MATERIALS NOT PROPERLY DEDICATED

The following information was excerpted from the email received from Team Corporate:

"It was discovered during an internal audit that a Line Stop Fitting manufactured at the Furmanite Dixie Drive location and ordered from the Furmanite Charlotte location for nuclear work at Browns Ferry did not have material properly dedicated.

"Completion of the [engineering] evaluation [to determine if safety is compromised] to be complete by August 31, 2016.

A review of all safety related nuclear orders was performed and only the ones listed below are affected:

Browns Ferry - Part number SF-0615-STD for TVA Job 256-MH-131067 (Tee fitting, blank flange, gasket, studs and nuts)

Turkey Point - Part number CUS1301044-DWG-01, CUS1304019-DWG-01and CUS1304073-DWG-01(Leak Sealing cup, restraints, and enclosures) for FL&P job numbers 101-LS-104669, 101-LS-401085, and 101-LS-401142 respectively

Catawba - Part number CUS1505165-DWG-01for Duke Energy Job 101-LS-403182 (Gamma plug enclosure, studs and nuts)

POC: Edward Rich - Director of Quality
Team Corporate
200 Herman Drive
Alvin, TX 77511
(281) 388-5567

* * * UPDATE AT 0950 EDT ON 08/31/16 FROM EDWARD RICH TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following is an excerpt from an email received from Team Corporate:

Team Corporate determined that the affected orders where the materials were not dedicated as required only applied to the TVA orders. All other orders it was determined material was purchased from a supplier that operated an approved 10 CFR 50 App B Quality Program.

Notified the R2DO (Bartley) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (via E-mail).

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52197
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: AT&T
Region: 4
City: VALLEJO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/24/2016
Notification Time: 15:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email:

"On August 23, 2016, NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] contacted RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] to inform of an incident involving missing Tritium signs. According to NRC report, the AT&T EH&S RSO [Environmental Health and Safety Radiation Safety Officer], Kim Kantner, contacted NRC to report six missing H-3 [Tritium] signs from one of their locations at 730 Carolina Street, Vallejo, CA. Each sign contained 2.7 Ci of H-3.

"These six signs were in a box to be returned to the vendor, stored inside a locked basement at the Vallejo AT&T facility. Some renovations were going on at this site. According to Kim, AT&T still believes that the box may have been misplaced by the workers. The investigation is still ongoing.

"RHB will be following up on this matter."

CA 5010 Number: 082316

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52199
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/24/2016
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"On August 24, 2016, the licensee reported a potential overexposure of an employee to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services]. The licensee reported one of its radiographers had received 5.5 rem on the July monthly monitoring report resulting in a total dose of 6.4 rem for the year. The radiation safety officer [RSO] is investigating the cause of the overexposure although believes the radiographer has not been following procedures. The RSO stated the radiographer is working in an enclosed area and not distancing himself from the source as required when the source is exposed. The RSO will provide a detailed report within the next few days. An update will be sent in accordance of SA300 guidelines."

Texas Incident #: I 9426

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52210
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/30/2016
Notification Time: 21:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2016
Event Time: 21:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 98 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT - FIRE IN A MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER

A fault occurred on the unit 2 "B" main bank transformer resulting in an oil fire. The main turbine tripped resulting in a reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser and feeding steam generators with auxiliary feedwater. Electrical power is through the normal shutdown electrical lineup.

Offsite assistance was requested from the county and off duty fire brigade members.

At 2228, the fire was reported as out. Spray is continuing and a reflash watch is being set.

Unit 1 continued to operate at 100% power throughout the event.

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 2352 EDT ON 08/30/2016 FROM MICHAEL BOTTORFF TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On August 30, 2016, at 2110 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 2B Main Bank Transformer, resulting in a fire in the transformer.

"Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

"All Control and Shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

"The fire was out at 2230 EDT. The cause of the fire is currently under investigation.

"The fire was reported at 2149 EDT. Local Fire Departments responded to the site as requested.

"The reactor trip and system actuation is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no effect on WBN Unit 1.

"The NOUE was exited at 2342.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

The Licensee notified the State of Tennessee.

Notified the R2DO (Bartley), IRD MOC (Stapleton), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 52212
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WADE SHEPHARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2016
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - FLOWSERVE SWING CHECK VALVES

The following is an excerpt of the part-21 notification:

"Susquehanna Nuclear reported two size 3 class 900 Anchor Darling swing check valves were not passing LLRT [local leak rate tests]. After disassembly there appeared to be wear between the hinge arm and seat ring of the valve body apparent on the hinge. The interference was not severe enough to stop hinge arm motion of the disk, but did affect ability of the valve to seal during LLRT."

Affected Serial Numbers: BQ752, BQ753, and BO809

Affected Sites: Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Brunswick, Davis Besse, Kewaunee, Conn Yankee, Monticello, Susquehanna, Framatome, Chin Shan, and Kuosheng

Engineering Evaluation 10CFR21 No. 91

POC: Wade Shephard: 919-832-0525

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52213
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2016
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2016
Event Time: 15:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW REACTOR COOLANT FLOW

"This 4-hour and 8-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 had an unplanned automatic reactor trip and automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. The trip occurred due to the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump [RCP] resulting in a reactor trip on low reactor coolant flow. The 21 RCP remains unavailable. The cause of the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump is unknown at this time.

"All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety feature systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feed pumps started as expected.

"Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees Fahrenheit with decay heat removal via the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active technical specification action statements in effect requiring a lower mode of operation due to the transient.

"The 21 and 22 containment fan coil units (CFCU) were out of service for surveillance testing prior to the event. There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.

"Normal offsite power is available to the site. There is no effect on Unit 1."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52214
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2016
Notification Time: 23:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2016
Event Time: 19:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 74 Power Operation 74 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION WITH A POTENTIAL TORNADO

"In Event Notification (EN) 52202 on August 25, 2016, Fermi 2 identified an unanalyzed condition related to the inoperability of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans due to nonfunctionality of the associated brakes that occurred on April 6, 2016. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) reservoir and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The EN noted that a past operability review was in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional resulted in additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the: three years prior to August 25, 2016.

"On August 31, 2016 at 1950 EDT, the past operability review identified five additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the past three years. These five instances are being reported in one EN since they are related and were all discovered and reported within 8 hours. Although these instances are related to the one previously reported in EN 52202, they are being reported in a new EN due to the time elapsed since EN 52202. The MDCT fans and fan brakes are currently operable.

"1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2.

"2) March 2015 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1000 EDT on March 23, 2015, until 1447 EDT on April 9, 2015. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 systems, structures, or components (SSCs) out of service during a forced outage.

"3) February 2014 - The Division 2 MDCT fan 'B' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1118 EST to 1529 EST on February 20, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'B' brake coincided with various Division 1 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage.

"4) February 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1747 EST on February 14, 2014, until 1514 EST on February 24, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage.

"5) January 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0915 EST on January 24, 2014, until 1537 EST on January 31, 2014. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with approximately 30 hours where various Division 2 safety-related SSCs were inoperable.

"The occurrences discussed above resulted in unanalyzed conditions because the plant configuration when equipment in one division was inoperable while a MCDT fan brake was nonfunctional in the opposite division would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, September 01, 2016
Thursday, September 01, 2016