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Event Notification Report for August 23, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/22/2016 - 08/23/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52049 52176 52182 52191 52192

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52049
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CRADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 10:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH A & B TRAINS HPI INOPERABLE DUE TO VOID IN COMMON SUCTION LINE RESULTING IN LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION

"At 1055 [EDT] on 06/28/16 a gas void was found during the monthly surveillance inspection located in the common suction line to the High Pressure Injection / Makeup (HPI / MU) pumps. At 1150 on 06/28/16 the HPI suction line cross-connect valves were closed to isolate and separate the 'A' & 'B' Trains of HPI. The 'A' train of HPI was declared degraded and initiated a 72 hour LCO [Limiting Condition of Operation] under TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.2. Investigation and analysis by Engineering determined that the size of the void did not meet the acceptance criteria for system operability. Due to the size of the void and location at time of discovery, both trains of HPI were determined to be inoperable until the suction cross connect valves were closed.

"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The void is being vented to restore a water-solid condition. The last successful surveillance was conducted on 05/31/16. The cause of the void is being investigated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * RETRACTION FROM CRAIG SMITH TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1056 EDT ON 08/22/16 * * *

"Following the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 06/28/16 (EN 52049), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found void size was insufficient to cause the high pressure injection pumps to become inoperable or unable to fulfill their safety function. The cause for the void continues to be under investigation including the development of actions to prevent recurrence. Void checks are being performed at an increased frequency until cause is determined, and actions to prevent recurrence are in place. As determined through analysis, both trains of HPl were operable and available such that the safety function was never lost. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52176
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: 07-014-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/12/2016
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2016
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERADMINISTRATION OF Y-90 MICROSPHERES

The following was received from State of Maryland via email:

"Greater than 20 percent underadministration of the prescribed activity was administered to the left lobe of the patient's liver. Underadministration may have been up to 60 percent less than the prescribed written activity (preliminary estimate). Prescribed written directive activity to left lobe of liver was 25 mCi. Preliminary assessment of administered activity is 14 mCi. Radioactive material ended up in the patient catheter, chucks, and on the floor. All areas were cleaned and evaluated by the licensee. The licensee states that both the patient and referring doctor have been notified of the event. The licensee has history of many successful therapies of this type. The licensee is investigating the event, but has not yet determined a root cause. The licensee is sending a detailed written report to the State."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52182
Rep Org: KNIK CONSTRUCTION
Licensee: KNIK CONSTRUCTION
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-35114-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERYN JONES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/15/2016
Notification Time: 21:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 16:30 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

While at a construction jobsite at Kenai Airport, a technician using a Troxler moisture density gauge observed a large equipment grader approaching in reverse mode. The technician retreated from the area and the gauge was run over by the grader. Personnel roped off the damaged gauge area and proceeded to monitor for any contamination. The gauge is a Troxler, Model 3440; S/N 37310; Sources: Cs-137 (8 mCi) and Am-241/Be (44 mCi).

* * * UPDATE FROM ERYN JONES TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/16/2016 AT 1348 EDT * * *

The licensee placed the damaged gauge into an over pack container loaded with sand and transported the damaged gauge to a local office permanent storage facility. The storage area is barricaded and is being monitored. The licensee is consulting with the manufacturer for final damaged gauge disposition.

Notified the R4DO (Proulx) and NMSS Events via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52191
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GREG KAUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/21/2016
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 19:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BILL DEAN (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 35 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses.

During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling.

The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F.

"St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.

"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

"On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service.

"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52192
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK BELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/22/2016
Notification Time: 06:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 22:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HVAC

"At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, August 23, 2016
Tuesday, August 23, 2016