| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/15/2016 - 08/16/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 51030 | Rep Org: AZZ/NLI NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC
Licensee: ALLEN BRADLEY
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 05/01/2015
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text POTENTIALLY UNQUALIFIED COMPONENT IN CERTAIN ALLEN BRADLEY TIMING RELAYS
The following is an excerpt from a document received from the licensee via email:
"Report of potential 10 CFR Part 21, Allen Bradley Timing Relay Model 700RTC
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential failure to comply.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ/NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.
"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"As of 2009-2010, Allen Bradley relays base model 700RTC, contain an unevaluated CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device). This was an unpublished design change that was implemented to replace an obsolete integrated circuit chip. The undocumented design change did not result in a part number change from Allen-Bradley. There was no change to the appearance of the relay that would identify any design changes were made to the relay configuration. Therefore, NLI qualification/dedication of the relays after 2009 have not included additional testing for the new CPLD component.
"The timing relay model 700RTC has been dedicated/qualified for multiple applications for various plants.
"Between 2009-2010 Allen Bradley made a design change without changing the part number of the commercial relay or providing any documented evidence of a design change. The manufacturer specification data sheets maintain the classification that the relays are 'solid state', which would imply that there are no digital devices installed in the relay. However, after inspection of the internals of the timing relay (Figure 2), it has been identified that the unit does contain a CPLD which meets the definition of a digital device under the guidance of NEI 01-01."
Potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Ft. Calhoun, Perry, River Bend, South Texas Project, and St. Lucie.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY BOLT TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1744 EDT ON 4/8/16 * * *
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 1.
Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Nease), R3DO(Skokowski), R4DO (Kellar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM LES TAGGART TO BETHANY CECERE AT 0951 EDT ON 5/26/16 * * *
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided Revision 2 to Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015 to correct the referenced EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 3 to Rev. 4 and change 'timing' contacts to 'instantaneous' contacts as shown below:
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"The relays that are currently in stock at NLI have been placed on hold until after the units have been determined to be qualified for the specific application. NU has completed the EMC qualification testing per the requirements of EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 4 for the following tests, as applicable: CE101, CE102, RE101, RE102, RS101, RS103, CS101, CS114, CS115 and CS116.
"The results were satisfactory with exception of the following condition: During Conducted Susceptibility CS114 onto the power lines, with the timing circuit in operation, the instantaneous contacts exhibited chatter in the range of 2.6 MHz to 20.3 MHz. The unit requires a ferrite to be installed onto the input power lines of the relay with 3 turns through the ferrite core. In this modified configuration, the relay was not susceptible to Conducted Susceptibility and successfully passed the required test per CS114."
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO(Kunowski), R4DO (Werner), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY BOLT TO DONG PARK AT 1807 EDT ON 8/15/16 * * *
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 3, correcting the date the change occurred to October 2008.
Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Proulx), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52155 | Rep Org: NC DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: PENINSULA PACKAGING
Region: 1
City: WILSON State: NC
County:
License #: 2469-0G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEFECTIVE SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE
The following was received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"General Licensee discovered a defective shutter on one of its fixed gauges while performing leak tests. The shutter was discovered as being completely removed and the gauge remains in the open (source exposed) position. Per the licensee, during its previous leak test in May 2016, the shutter was intact on the gauge at that time. From the time of the previous leak test to present it is unknown how long the shutter was removed from the gauge. Per the licensee, the gauge is positioned with the radiation exposure pointing downward toward its product line where density measurements are determined.
"Currently, the licensee's operations are continuous and the gauge remains in the open position during operations to support business output.
"Discussions with the licensee were held concerning potential radiation exposures to members of the public and its employees. It was determined that due to the design of the licensee's manufacturing process it would be incredibly difficult for anyone to safely come within the immediate vicinity of the gauge with the defective shutter. An entire shut down of the licensee's manufacturing process would have to occur for anyone to gain any safe method of access to the defective gauge, in which the licensee stated, has not occurred since the most recent leak test when the defective gauge was discovered.
"This in an ongoing investigation and more details will be forthcoming."
Source Material: Am-241
North Carolina Item Number: NC160025 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52158 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS INC.
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 03461
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/06/2016
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2016
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On August 6, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was contacted by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) who reported one of their crews had lost a Troxler model 3440 moisture density gauge. The gauge contains an 8 millicurie cesium-137 and a 40 millicurie americium-241 source. The crew had returned to their office in Dallas and when they went to get the gauge to place it in storage they realized the gauge had been left on the tailgate of the truck and was no longer there. The RSO was notified and both the crew and the RSO drove the 20 mile route used by the technicians returning to the office in an attempt to find the gauge, but the gauge was not located. The RSO stated the cesium source was located in the fully shielded position, but the operating rod was not locked. Local Law Enforcement in the area where the gauge was being used was notified of the lost gauge. The gauge does have a label on it identifying the licensee and listing the licensee's contact number. This number is to an answering service. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
"Local law enforcement has been notified."
Texas Report #: I-9423
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1711 EDT ON 08/10/2016 * * *
The following was received from State of Texas via email:
"On August 10, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that it had recovered the missing gauge. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) stated they found the gauge listed on Craig's List web site and contacted the seller. The RSO stated they paid the seller a reward and gained custody of the gauge at 1445 hours on August 10, 2016. The RSO stated the gauge was not damaged and the cesium source was still fully shielded. The RSO stated he was sending the gauge to a service company for inspection. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe), ILTAB (English), NMSS_Events Resource, CNSNS (MEXICO) via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52160 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: GE HEALTHCARE
Region: 3
City: ARLINGTON HEIGHTS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01109-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 08/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: LOST IODINE-125 SEEDS
The following was received from the State of Illinois via email:
"The radiation safety officer, (RSO) at GE Health, called to advise that two identical packages of I-125 seeds which had been given to [common carrier] to deliver to Athens, Greece had not reached their destination by the desired date. The packages are the typical 'shoebox' size of 11x7x10 inches of 'excepted package - limited quantity'. Both contain 15 seeds with 6.5 milliCi (actual) in each box for a total of 13 milliCi calibrated for Friday 7/29/16 at noon. The RSO has been in touch with [common carrier] since the July 26, 2016 when GE's customer service became concerned while routinely performing package tracking. [Common carrier] last had positive tracking for these packages in Newark, NJ on the 23rd. [Common carrier] is still conducting visual surveys in Newark and Athens in an attempt to locate the boxes and has no evidence to indicate the materials have been delivered to an outside entity. Surveys conducted at O'Hare Airport in Chicago were negative. [Common carrier] reports that it is still conducting searches and has put a 'world wide tracer' into effect to locate the material as it still believes it is within their delivery system."
Illinois Report Number: IL16005
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52179 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MARIA ZAMBER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 08/15/2016
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2016
Event Time: 17:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF BOTH LOOPS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 12, 2016, at 1704 CDT, the shift operating crew entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both trains of Essential Services Chilled Water being inoperable. Essential Services Chilled Water Loop A had previously been declared inoperable for maintenance on August 11, 2016. On August 12, 2016, at 1704, the shift operating crew noted that Loop B Essential Services Chilled Water outlet temperature exceeded the allowed TS limit of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Essential Chiller AB was subsequently aligned to Loop B and TS 3.0.3 was exited on August 12, 2016 at 1802 when outlet temperature was verified less than or equal to 42 degrees Fahrenheit.
"On August 15, 2016, subsequent review of this event determined that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident' due to both Essential Services Chilled Water Loops being inoperable.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52180 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAXTON FAYSSOUX
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 08/15/2016
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO FACILITY UPGRADE
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service on 08/15/2016 at 1030 [EDT] for a scheduled facility upgrade project, which will improve the overall functionality of the facility. The duration of the upgrade is expected to be 26 days.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as the TSC will be unavailable for greater than 72 hours.
"In the event of an emergency, McGuire's alternate TSC will be used while the TSC is upgraded. During this period, the alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures.
"The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified that the TSC will be unavailable during the upgrade and to report to the alternate TSC in the event of an emergency. This upgrade does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52181 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GOODALL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 08/15/2016
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 15:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 70 | Power Operation | 62 | Power Operation | Event Text SALT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On Monday, August 15, 2016 at 1552 [EDT], with the reactor at [about] 70 percent core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) entered a 24-hour shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement (LCO-AS) for Salt Service Water (SSW) inlet temperature exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit in TS 3.5.B.4. The LCO-AS was subsequently exited at 1651 hours when the temperature of SSW trended to below the TS limit.
"Under certain design conditions, the SSW system is required to provide cooling water to various heat exchangers such as the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) and Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) systems. When the inlet temperature to these supplied loads exceeds the 75 degrees F limit established in the TS, the SSW system is conservatively declared inoperable until the temperature trends below this value. This condition existed for approximately 60 minutes.
"The SSW temperature is being closely monitored and trended on a continuous basis.
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"The licensee will be notifying the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency." | |