Event Notification Report for August 03, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/02/2016 - 08/03/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52150
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/03/2016
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2016
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION BASED ON REVIEW OF NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION REQUIREMENTS
"On August 3, 2016 at approximately 1300 CDT during review of NFPA 805 requirements, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown (FSS) procedures do not consider the potential for fire-induced failure of the 4kV Shutdown Board under-voltage trip functions for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) power supply alignments. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where a required EDG's 4kV loads would not trip on an undervoltage condition. Current procedures and timeline analysis do not consider operator actions that could be necessary to manually strip the 4kV Safe Shutdown (S/D) board prior to subsequent EDG restart. As such, a subsequent restart, manual or automatic, of the EDG under these conditions, with its associated loads still connected to the 4kV S/D board, could potentially over load the EDG on restart.
"This notification is to report a condition involving a deficiency in FSS procedures affecting restoration of power to safe shutdown busses under certain postulated fire scenarios. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to implement FSS procedures in response to a postulated fire in 6 fire areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas and this deficiency has been added to the current fire protection impairment plan.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On August 3, 2016 at approximately 1300 CDT during review of NFPA 805 requirements, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown (FSS) procedures do not consider the potential for fire-induced failure of the 4kV Shutdown Board under-voltage trip functions for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) power supply alignments. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where a required EDG's 4kV loads would not trip on an undervoltage condition. Current procedures and timeline analysis do not consider operator actions that could be necessary to manually strip the 4kV Safe Shutdown (S/D) board prior to subsequent EDG restart. As such, a subsequent restart, manual or automatic, of the EDG under these conditions, with its associated loads still connected to the 4kV S/D board, could potentially over load the EDG on restart.
"This notification is to report a condition involving a deficiency in FSS procedures affecting restoration of power to safe shutdown busses under certain postulated fire scenarios. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to implement FSS procedures in response to a postulated fire in 6 fire areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas and this deficiency has been added to the current fire protection impairment plan.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 52155
Rep Org: NC DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: PENINSULA PACKAGING
Region: 1
City: WILSON State: NC
County:
License #: 2469-0G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: PENINSULA PACKAGING
Region: 1
City: WILSON State: NC
County:
License #: 2469-0G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEFECTIVE SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE
The following was received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"General Licensee discovered a defective shutter on one of its fixed gauges while performing leak tests. The shutter was discovered as being completely removed and the gauge remains in the open (source exposed) position. Per the licensee, during its previous leak test in May 2016, the shutter was intact on the gauge at that time. From the time of the previous leak test to present it is unknown how long the shutter was removed from the gauge. Per the licensee, the gauge is positioned with the radiation exposure pointing downward toward its product line where density measurements are determined.
"Currently, the licensee's operations are continuous and the gauge remains in the open position during operations to support business output.
"Discussions with the licensee were held concerning potential radiation exposures to members of the public and its employees. It was determined that due to the design of the licensee's manufacturing process it would be incredibly difficult for anyone to safely come within the immediate vicinity of the gauge with the defective shutter. An entire shut down of the licensee's manufacturing process would have to occur for anyone to gain any safe method of access to the defective gauge, in which the licensee stated, has not occurred since the most recent leak test when the defective gauge was discovered.
"This in an ongoing investigation and more details will be forthcoming."
Source Material: Am-241
North Carolina Item Number: NC160025
The following was received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"General Licensee discovered a defective shutter on one of its fixed gauges while performing leak tests. The shutter was discovered as being completely removed and the gauge remains in the open (source exposed) position. Per the licensee, during its previous leak test in May 2016, the shutter was intact on the gauge at that time. From the time of the previous leak test to present it is unknown how long the shutter was removed from the gauge. Per the licensee, the gauge is positioned with the radiation exposure pointing downward toward its product line where density measurements are determined.
"Currently, the licensee's operations are continuous and the gauge remains in the open position during operations to support business output.
"Discussions with the licensee were held concerning potential radiation exposures to members of the public and its employees. It was determined that due to the design of the licensee's manufacturing process it would be incredibly difficult for anyone to safely come within the immediate vicinity of the gauge with the defective shutter. An entire shut down of the licensee's manufacturing process would have to occur for anyone to gain any safe method of access to the defective gauge, in which the licensee stated, has not occurred since the most recent leak test when the defective gauge was discovered.
"This in an ongoing investigation and more details will be forthcoming."
Source Material: Am-241
North Carolina Item Number: NC160025
Part 21
Event Number: 52204
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BURT ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BURT ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/26/2016
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - SAFETY RELATED COMPONENT WELDING BY AN UNQUALIFIED WELDER
The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:
"Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) with F-5 filler metal was welded on safety related components by an unqualified welder.
"Crane Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, 12th Edition Rev. 2, dated 8/8/16 requires that welder performance qualification shall conform to the requirements of ASME Section IX for processing ASME B&PV Section Ill and safety related valve and valve part orders. During processing of a safety related order, it was identified that one welder was missing the required qualification documentation to perform weld repairs with F-5 filler metals (as defined in ASME Section IX) using the shielded metal arc welding process (SMAW). The safety hazard which could be created by such a defect could be a potential weld failure.
"Crane Nuclear has completed a review of all applicable welding records based on the welder hire date of September, 2011. We identified a total of 10 orders that were supplied with welding performed by an unqualified welder. Notification has been made to the purchasers of the affected safety related orders on the same date as this notification.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953."
The following facilities received these safety related orders: Duke-McGuire, Exelon-Byron, Duke-Brunswick, Entergy-ANO, Exelon-TMI, Exelon-Quad Cities, Exelon-Dresden.
* * * UPDATE AT 2004 EDT ON 9/30/2016 FROM ROSALIE NAVA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"This letter is intended to inform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of actions taken to complete the Part 21 evaluation on the above referenced item. All of the following actions have been completed:
1) The welder has been qualified on the SMAW process utilizing F-5 filler metal and documented in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements.
2) The affected purchasers were provided with an initial 10CFR21 notification on August 26, 2016.
3) The affected purchasers were provided with the documentation detailing the scope of the welding performed on the affected components.
4) The affected purchasers were provided an investigation summary closure letter.
5) Crane Nuclear, Inc. Corrective Action Report 16-35 generated to determine root cause and implement appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence was completed and closed on September 30, 2016.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact, Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Burt Anderson, Site Leader. at (630) 226-4990."
Notified R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Groom), and the Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:
"Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) with F-5 filler metal was welded on safety related components by an unqualified welder.
"Crane Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, 12th Edition Rev. 2, dated 8/8/16 requires that welder performance qualification shall conform to the requirements of ASME Section IX for processing ASME B&PV Section Ill and safety related valve and valve part orders. During processing of a safety related order, it was identified that one welder was missing the required qualification documentation to perform weld repairs with F-5 filler metals (as defined in ASME Section IX) using the shielded metal arc welding process (SMAW). The safety hazard which could be created by such a defect could be a potential weld failure.
"Crane Nuclear has completed a review of all applicable welding records based on the welder hire date of September, 2011. We identified a total of 10 orders that were supplied with welding performed by an unqualified welder. Notification has been made to the purchasers of the affected safety related orders on the same date as this notification.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953."
The following facilities received these safety related orders: Duke-McGuire, Exelon-Byron, Duke-Brunswick, Entergy-ANO, Exelon-TMI, Exelon-Quad Cities, Exelon-Dresden.
* * * UPDATE AT 2004 EDT ON 9/30/2016 FROM ROSALIE NAVA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"This letter is intended to inform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of actions taken to complete the Part 21 evaluation on the above referenced item. All of the following actions have been completed:
1) The welder has been qualified on the SMAW process utilizing F-5 filler metal and documented in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements.
2) The affected purchasers were provided with an initial 10CFR21 notification on August 26, 2016.
3) The affected purchasers were provided with the documentation detailing the scope of the welding performed on the affected components.
4) The affected purchasers were provided an investigation summary closure letter.
5) Crane Nuclear, Inc. Corrective Action Report 16-35 generated to determine root cause and implement appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence was completed and closed on September 30, 2016.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact, Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Burt Anderson, Site Leader. at (630) 226-4990."
Notified R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Groom), and the Part 21 Group (via e-mail).