Event Notification Report for July 01, 2016

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS

"On 7/1/16, the Houston County Dispatch (911 Center) was conducting a monthly weather siren test. At approximately 1205 CDT, there was an inadvertent actuation of 41 emergency sirens in Houston County. The emergency sirens were deactivated at approximately 1208 CDT. Houston Country EMA issued a press release to notify the public of the inadvertent actuation. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the inadvertent actuation and subsequent press release. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

USGS RESEARCH REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ONE OF THREE POWER INSTRUMENTS NOT FUNCTIONING

"At 0914 MDT on 7/1/16, a routine GSTR [Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor] startup and ascent to 900 kW was initiated after successful completion of the daily prestart checks and an excess reactivity check. At 0919 as power was passing through approximately 50 kW, it was clear to the operator that one of the three power instruments (the NP1000) was not functioning since it was still reading 0 percent when it should have been reading >5 percent. The reactor was scrammed, Reactor Supervisor notified, and troubleshooting commenced. Shortly after this, the NP1000 signal cable was found to have an intermittent connection through a tee connector that was installed at the instrument box. The connector was replaced to resolve the problem and tested satisfactorily. At 1050 the reactor was started up again. All power instrumentation operated correctly and the daily power operation was performed without further problems.

"The NP1000 is a required safety instrument for operation of the reactor, so malfunction of the instrument is a violation of the facility's Technical Specifications.

"Specifically, Specification E.7 states: 'The type and minimum number of safety systems which shall be operable for reactor operation are shown in Table I.' Table I requires the NP1000 to provide a high power scram at 110 percent power, but the connector problem would have prevented a high power scram from occurring in that instrument."

The licensee notified the NRC Project Manager and the NRC SME (Subject Matter Expert) for Research and Test Reactors.

FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"At 2342 [EDT], June 30, 2016, the Control Room received panel alarms associated with Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2. Subsequent investigation revealed the alarms were due to a loss of supplied power caused, in part, by a level permissive in the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to be inoperable. With SFAS Channel 1 BWST level transmitter previously declared inoperable for maintenance, the on-shift operating crew did not correctly identify that technical specification (TS) 3.3.5, Condition B applied which is a 6-hour shutdown required action. At 0245, following a duty team call when the condition was re-assessed, the crew entered the proper additional Condition B and correctly identified they were approximately 3 hours into a 6-hour shutdown specification. At 0330 the condition was inappropriately exited on the premise that an operable but degraded situation could be justified. The plant did not initiate a shutdown required by technical specification but, in retrospect, should have initiated and completed a shutdown within 6 hours of 2342.

" On July 1 at 1351, the BWST level transmitter for SFAS Channel 1 was repaired and declared operable [and exited TS 3.3.5 Condition B], however, the total time exceeded the 6-hour shutdown action. The plant remained stable throughout this event. On July 9, 2016, while internally discussing the event among FENOC senior leadership, it was determined that a 4-hour report would have been made if the shutdown was initiated. Hence, this report is retrospective in that a 10 CFR 50.72(h)(2)(i) required report should have been made upon the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by plant's technical specification.

"A Licensee Event Report will be provided pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition that was prohibited by the plant's technical specification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

[At 1325 EDT on July 1, it was determined that the justification for SFAS channel 2 BWST level permissive to be operable but degraded could not be supported and reentered TS 3.3.5 Condition B.]