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Event Notification Report for June 29, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/28/2016 - 06/29/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51971 52024 52027 52028 52048 52049

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Agreement State Event Number: 51971
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 02048
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 06/01/2016
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGES NOT LOCATED AFTER CARRIER ACCIDENT

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via facsimile:

"On June 1, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its shipments was involved in a transportation accident. A carrier was transporting two type A packages, each containing a vial of fluorodeoxyglucose (F-18), 10 mCi, when it was involved in an accident on an unreported freeway. Emergency responders arrived at the scene, the driver was taken to a hospital. The vehicle was cleared from the roadway. It is uncertain at this time where the vehicle or the packages are located. The licensee is obtaining information to recover the radioactive materials. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I 9408

* * * UPDATE AT 1703 EDT ON 6/1/16 FROM ART TUCKER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received call 1529 CDT from licensee. He informed us [Texas] that the packages were intact, not damaged, and recovered from the accident vehicle. The packages are currently located at the original pharmacy location in Dallas. The vial activity amount was 15 mCi each instead of the reported 10 mCi. The licensee stated that since the driver was not his employee he could not obtain information on the driver.

"The packages were intact and no exposures occurred."

Notified the R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events, and Mexico (via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1023 EDT ON 6/28/2016 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"On June 23, 2016, the licensee provided updated information to the Agency [Texas Department of Health Services]. This information stated the activity of the radionuclide was 62 and 56 millicuries instead of the 15 millicuries previously reported."

Notified the R4DO (Hipschman), NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail) and Mexico (via e-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 52024
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: DENNIS HALLS BODY SHOP
Region: 1
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: GL 860
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CROSSLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 06/20/2016
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN STATIC ELIMINATOR GUN

The following report was received by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"During an inspection [by Tennessee Division of Radiological Health] on 06/07/16 the device could not be located, inspector called [Dennis Hall's Body Shop owner] back on 06/13/16 to find out if they had found the device. At that time she stated that she had been told that a painting contractor had taken the device by a former employee. They had several painting contractors and could not remember which one had taken the device."

The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health stated that the device owner did not know when the device had been taken.

Device:
Static Eliminator Gun
NRD Model P-20510AB
Serial Number: 156990
Activity: 10mCi Po-210

TN Event Report ID No.: TN-16-091

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 52027
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC
Region: 3
City: ALBERTVILLE State: MN
County:
License #: 1186-89
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TYLER KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 06/21/2016
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2016
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following was received from Minnesota via email:

"On June 20, 2016 at 0930 [CDT] Midwest Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (License number 1086-89) had a source disconnect event. Their Radiation Safety Officer notified the Minnesota Department of Health [MDH] of the event at 0925 [CDT] on June 21, 2016.

"Initial details:
- The event happened on a jobsite in Lakeville, MN.
- The Camera was a QSA 880 Delta.
- Source was 47.5 curies of I-192.
- The cause has been initially determined to be a worn drive cable. The licensee stated that the drive cable passed the go-no-go test prior to hooking up.
- They were able to retrieve the source and get it back in the shielded position.
- All equipment was inspected after the retrieval.
- The faulty drive cables were brought back to the licensee's corporate office in Fargo, ND for repair.
- Pocket dosimeter readings following the retrieval were: 41 mrem, 20 mrem, 11 mrem, and 10 mrem.

"The licensee is in the process of preparing a written report that will be submitted within 30 days as required. MDH will continue to investigate this event. MDH Inspectors will be on-site at the licensee's office in Albertville MN on June 23, 2016 to perform a follow-up inspection."

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Agreement State Event Number: 52028
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NOVA ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 7732-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 06/21/2016
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/21/2016
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from California via email:

"The RSO of Nova Engineering and Environmental notified RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] in Brea that a Troxler yellow transport case containing a Troxler model 3411B # 18840 moisture density gauge containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be was stolen from a technician's pickup truck today. The technician stated that he had loaded and secured the Type A case into his pick-up truck from a storage facility in Irvine, CA then stopped at a coffee shop before traveling to his work location. He went to unlock the gauge case and found that it had been stolen. He returned to the coffee shop, but was unable to find his gauge. He is contacting the Irvine Police Dept. to make a theft report. The RSO indicated that they lock and chain each side of the case to the truck independently and once again around the top of the case to prevent it from opening. Nova E&E does have contact information on the gauge and the case and they use a small padlock on the Cs-137 source rod handle to prevent accidental deployment."

CA 5010 # 062116

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52048
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 04:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION SIGNAL

"This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal.

"Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods [fully] inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Emergency Safety Features] systems functioned as expected.

"No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event."

The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event.

Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52049
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CRADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 10:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH A & B TRAINS HPI INOPERABLE DUE TO VOID IN COMMON SUCTION LINE RESULTING IN LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION

"At 1055 [EDT] on 06/28/16 a gas void was found during the monthly surveillance inspection located in the common suction line to the High Pressure Injection / Makeup (HPI / MU) pumps. At 1150 on 06/28/16 the HPI suction line cross-connect valves were closed to isolate and separate the 'A' & 'B' Trains of HPI. The 'A' train of HPI was declared degraded and initiated a 72 hour LCO [Limiting Condition of Operation] under TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.2. Investigation and analysis by Engineering determined that the size of the void did not meet the acceptance criteria for system operability. Due to the size of the void and location at time of discovery, both trains of HPI were determined to be inoperable until the suction cross connect valves were closed.

"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The void is being vented to restore a water-solid condition. The last successful surveillance was conducted on 05/31/16. The cause of the void is being investigated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021