Event Notification Report for June 28, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/27/2016 - 06/28/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52048
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 04:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 04:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION SIGNAL
"This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal.
"Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods [fully] inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Emergency Safety Features] systems functioned as expected.
"No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event."
The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event.
Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
"This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal.
"Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods [fully] inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Emergency Safety Features] systems functioned as expected.
"No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event."
The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event.
Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52049
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CRADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CRADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/28/2016
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 10:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2016
Event Time: 10:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH A & B TRAINS HPI INOPERABLE DUE TO VOID IN COMMON SUCTION LINE RESULTING IN LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION
"At 1055 [EDT] on 06/28/16 a gas void was found during the monthly surveillance inspection located in the common suction line to the High Pressure Injection / Makeup (HPI / MU) pumps. At 1150 on 06/28/16 the HPI suction line cross-connect valves were closed to isolate and separate the 'A' & 'B' Trains of HPI. The 'A' train of HPI was declared degraded and initiated a 72 hour LCO [Limiting Condition of Operation] under TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.2. Investigation and analysis by Engineering determined that the size of the void did not meet the acceptance criteria for system operability. Due to the size of the void and location at time of discovery, both trains of HPI were determined to be inoperable until the suction cross connect valves were closed.
"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The void is being vented to restore a water-solid condition. The last successful surveillance was conducted on 05/31/16. The cause of the void is being investigated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM CRAIG SMITH TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1056 EDT ON 08/22/16 * * *
"Following the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 06/28/16 (EN 52049), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found void size was insufficient to cause the high pressure injection pumps to become inoperable or unable to fulfill their safety function. The cause for the void continues to be under investigation including the development of actions to prevent recurrence. Void checks are being performed at an increased frequency until cause is determined, and actions to prevent recurrence are in place. As determined through analysis, both trains of HPl were operable and available such that the safety function was never lost. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).
"At 1055 [EDT] on 06/28/16 a gas void was found during the monthly surveillance inspection located in the common suction line to the High Pressure Injection / Makeup (HPI / MU) pumps. At 1150 on 06/28/16 the HPI suction line cross-connect valves were closed to isolate and separate the 'A' & 'B' Trains of HPI. The 'A' train of HPI was declared degraded and initiated a 72 hour LCO [Limiting Condition of Operation] under TS [Technical Specification] 3.3.2. Investigation and analysis by Engineering determined that the size of the void did not meet the acceptance criteria for system operability. Due to the size of the void and location at time of discovery, both trains of HPI were determined to be inoperable until the suction cross connect valves were closed.
"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The void is being vented to restore a water-solid condition. The last successful surveillance was conducted on 05/31/16. The cause of the void is being investigated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM CRAIG SMITH TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1056 EDT ON 08/22/16 * * *
"Following the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 06/28/16 (EN 52049), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found void size was insufficient to cause the high pressure injection pumps to become inoperable or unable to fulfill their safety function. The cause for the void continues to be under investigation including the development of actions to prevent recurrence. Void checks are being performed at an increased frequency until cause is determined, and actions to prevent recurrence are in place. As determined through analysis, both trains of HPl were operable and available such that the safety function was never lost. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).