| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/17/2016 - 06/20/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51997 | Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: QUAD CITY TESTING LAB, INC
Region: 3
City: DAVENPORT State: IA
County:
License #: 0186182IR1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/09/2016
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following was received from Iowa via email:
"The licensee [Quad City Testing Lab] reported a source disconnect on a QSA Global 880 Delta radiography camera containing 66.3 curies of lr-192. The RSO was able to retrieve the source and return it to the shielded position. The time from disconnect to retrieval was less than two hours. During the RSO investigation, it was determined that the radiographer trainee did not properly connect the source pigtail to the drive cable and this action was not noticed by the radiographer trainer. Total doses during the event as indicated by pocket dosimeters were: RSO 130 mRem, radiographer trainer 55 mRem, and radiographer trainee 30 mRem. No member of the public received any dose from this event."
Incident Number IA160001 |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 51998 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPANGLER
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 06/10/2016
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2016
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A CHEMICAL PROCESSING MALFUNCTION
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: High enriched scrap fuel material is processed in BWXT NOG-Lynchburg's Uranium Recovery facility to reclaim as much of the uranium as possible. The material is dissolved in acid and transferred to a series of horizontal columns where the acid is neutralized. The solution may be transferred to a set of accountability weigh columns for measurement prior to entering the uranium extraction process. The solution is subsequently transferred to a series of horizontal feed columns. Process water is used to periodically flush the horizontal columns during cleanup for materials accountability.
"On June 9, 2016, a BWXT Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer was notified that a bluish tint had been observed in the favorable geometry process water connection to the horizontal columns. By procedure, a blue dye is added to the acid to aid in its identification in the event of a spill. Further evaluation determined that the favorable geometry process water line was directly connected to the horizontal column system and the presence of the blue dye indicated a potential backflow of uranium bearing solution into the water line. The favorable geometry water line is under constant water pressure. The valves controlling the water flow are normally closed. There is also a check valve in the line to prevent backflow. The line is supplied from a favorable geometry header on the mezzanine above. The header supplies water to other processes in Uranium Recovery, including an unfavorable geometry hot water heater.
"The Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) was reviewed and an accident sequence for this potential backflow could not be identified. On June 9, 2016 at 1330 [EDT] it was the determined the accident sequence was unanalyzed and not properly documented in the ISA. Although IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] listed for other accident sequences were applicable to the backflow scenario, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were not maintained. As documented in the ISA, criticality was not 'highly unlikely.'
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: Backflow into the favorable geometry water line can only be achieved by a forced flow to overcome the water pressure in the line. The only source for this pressurized flow is during the transfer from the accountability weigh columns to the horizontal column system. The solution is transferred using an air diaphragm pump. A trained and qualified operator opens the valve to initiate the transfer of solution from the accountability weigh columns to the horizontal columns (an uncredited control). The transfer of solution to the horizontal columns is monitored by a trained and qualified operator (an uncredited control). The water heater is substantially upstream of the supply line to the horizontal columns. The direction of flow of the process water in the supply header is away from unfavorable geometry hot water heater. The process water header is a favorable geometry (a credited IROFS). An operator checks the process water pressure on a daily basis (a credited IROFS). If the above existing IROFS and uncredited controls were considered in an ISA accident sequence, the likelihood of a criticality could be demonstrated to be highly unlikely. However, these uncredited controls are not designated as IROFS. Although the as-found condition presented no safety concern, the scenarios as documented in the ISA did not demonstrate that the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.'
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A section of the piping from the process water supply header was removed to physically isolate the process water supply from the horizontal columns. Criticality is no longer credible. The hot water heater is the only unfavorable geometry connected to the process water system in the Uranium Recovery facility. The hot water heater was assayed with a gamma survey instrument in several locations along the bottom and up the sides. No counts above background were detected. In addition, multiple liquid samples were taken from the bottom of the water heater and a cartridge filter housing prior to the hot water heater. All samples were well counted and determined to be below the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA). An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Region II personnel. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51999 | Rep Org: GRACE PACIFIC LLC
Licensee: GRACE PACIFIC LLC
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County:
License #: 53-21273-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FELICIA SOUZA
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/10/2016
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2016
Event Time: 03:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED BY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
A Troxler Model 4640B gauge was run over by a steam roller and damaged at a jobsite at the Kona, HI airport. The licensee established a perimeter around the damaged gauge and the RSO approached using a radiation survey meter. The RSO placed the damaged gauge in its case and will transfer it to a secure location until it can be returned to the manufacturer. The gauge contains 0.8 mCi of Cesium-137. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52012 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: SEAN DUNFEE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/17/2016
Notification Time: 06:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2016
Event Time: 02:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 56 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING TESTING
"During planned stop and control valve testing, two main turbine high pressure stop valves closed instead of the expected one (stop valve 'B'). This caused the main turbine control valves, power, reactor pressure to swing and a division 2 half SCRAM. Control rods were inserted to reduce power and the power swings. At 0257 [CDT] the reactor automatically SCRAMMED. Reactor SCRAM, Turbine Trip [procedures] ONEPs and EP-2 were entered. Reactor water level was stabilized at 34 inches narrow range on startup level control and reactor pressure stabilized at 884 psig using main turbine bypass valves. No other safety related systems actuated and all systems performed as expected."
The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup using normal feedwater and turbine bypass valves for decay heat removal. Reactor pressure is slowly trending down. The licensee is investigating the cause of the second stop valve shutting.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52019 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 06/18/2016
Notification Time: 05:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2016
Event Time: 21:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM RENDERED INOPERABLE
"On 6/17/2016, 2-SR-3.3.6.1.6(3) HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system time delay relay calibration periodic surveillance was being performed. During a section in the procedure a fuse cleared for the logic bus B power at 2135 [CDT]. This rendered the HPCI system unable to be manually or automatically initiated. At 2239 the fuse was replaced and the HPCI system was restored to a standby lineup.
"HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52020 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/18/2016
Notification Time: 06:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2016
Event Time: 02:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SPURIOUS EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION
"On 6/18/16 at approximately 0259 CDT, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant was notified by the Wright County Sheriffs Office of a spurious actuation of one emergency siren in the city of Monticello. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other off site government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Wright County Sheriff's Office. The source of the siren activation has not been determined. Wright County Sheriff's Office successfully deactivated the siren at 0322 CDT. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a single siren failure. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota concerning this event. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52021 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILANY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/18/2016
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2016
Event Time: 11:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 33 | Power Operation | 33 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS TO USCG NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER AND TEMA
"On 6/18/16 at 1106 EDT, TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] notified the National Response Center that Watts Bar Nuclear Plant has an oil sheen on the Cooling Tower Basin.
"1. Oil sheen was observed within the Cooling Tower basin at WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear]. Sheen was light brown to red and did not cover the entire Cooling Tower basin. Estimate of oil released into the Cooling Tower basin is less than 1 quart.
"2. No oil sheen was visible in the Tennessee River from the bank above the diffuser pipes.
"3. Notifications were also made to TEMA [Tennessee Emergency Management Agency].
"4. Follow-up observations within one hour of the sheen being reported indicated that the oil sheen had dissipated and was no longer visible. Oil levels from the suspected source did not indicate any change in oil reservoir levels.
"Unit 1 remains in Mode 1 at 92% power - reduced power due to main condenser back pressure limits
"Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 33% power - initial startup testing
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition that was reported to an outside Government Agency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52022 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/19/2016
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2016
Event Time: 15:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE
"At 1533 CDT on 06/19/2016, while performing Tech Spec Secondary Containment Airlock verification testing, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were reported to be open simultaneously. The identified condition caused Secondary Containment to be considered inoperable. Upon discovery, immediate action was taken to close the doors restoring Secondary Containment. Airlock doors were under control of plant personnel throughout the event.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |