Event Notification Report for June 17, 2016

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM RENDERED INOPERABLE

"On 6/17/2016, 2-SR-3.3.6.1.6(3) HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system time delay relay calibration periodic surveillance was being performed. During a section in the procedure a fuse cleared for the logic bus B power at 2135 [CDT]. This rendered the HPCI system unable to be manually or automatically initiated. At 2239 the fuse was replaced and the HPCI system was restored to a standby lineup.

"HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELEVATED TRITIUM DETECTED ONSITE

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is in the process of informing the Alabama Radiological Protection Department, Alabama Department of Environmental Management, Limestone County Emergency Management Department, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) of recent groundwater monitoring results at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.

"There are no indications of any impacts to any off-site drinking water source as indicated by Browns Ferry's off-site groundwater monitoring well samples.

"TVA has taken immediate action to address the apparent leak following the detection of elevated tritium levels from on-site groundwater monitoring wells and will be monitoring affected wells on an increased frequency. No elevated tritium levels have been detected from off-site monitoring locations, and the public is not at risk.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION OF BRACHYTHERAPY PATIENT

The following was received from Wisconsin via email:

"On Friday, June 17, 2016, a licensee discovered contamination on a package that was used to ship I-125 prostate brachytherapy seeds. The post procedure survey of the packaging revealed elevated levels of radiation. After wipes were taken, the licensee determined that there was I-125 contamination on the inside of the packaging. There was no other contamination in the operating room. The licensee had the patient return to the facility to perform a urine bioassay. The bioassay revealed elevated levels of I-125 in the patient's urine. However further analysis will be required to determine activity concentrations. The licensee has also administered Lugols solution to the patient to block the thyroid. The department and the licensee are still collecting data to determine if this is a medical event. Site visits and updates will be performed as needed."

Wisconsin Report ID # WI160004

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED BY VEHICLE AT WORKSITE IN ALASKA

The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:

"At about 1230 Pacific time an AECOM employee and authorized user of the nuclear density gauge backed a pickup truck into the gauge. The gauge was not in operation at the time and the rod was in the up and shielded position. The rod was not bent however the outside case of the gauge was damaged. Observation of the gauge indicated that the damage appeared to be confined to the outer casing and the electronic controls. The sealed sources did not have any visible signs of damage.

"The incident occurred at the Red Dog Mine in Alaska where [AECOM] was using the gauge under a reciprocity agreement with the NRC.

"A radiation detection instrument was used to confirm that the sources were not leaking and to check the area of the incident for any radiation. This survey indicated that the gauge was not leaking and that the area of the incident did not show any indication that the sources had leaked."

Nuclear Density Gauge involved: CPN, MC Series containing two (2) sources; 0.01 Ci or 0.37 GBq Cs-137 and 0.05 Ci or 1.85 GBq Am-241.

Incident Number: WA-16-028.

* * * UPDATE FROM FRED MERRILL (AECOM) TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1810 EDT ON 06/20/2016 * * *

The licensee, AECOM, contacted NRC to report that the damaged device was being securely stored onsite at the mine until it can be shipped back to the manufacturer. The licensee also corrected the license number.

Notified R4DO (Rollins) and NMSS (via email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE NEEDLE FOUND

The following was received via email:

"On June 17, 2016, RSO, Inc., contacted Virginia Radioactive Material Program (RMP) to arrange an investigation on a lead pig found at Hollins University, Roanoke, Virginia. On June 22, 2016, two inspectors from the RMP went to the University to observe the investigation performed by Health Physicist from the RSO, Inc. The lead pig was found inside the drawer in Dana Science Building Chemistry Lab. A radiation level of 12 mR/hr was measured at about one foot from the pig. The Health Physicist used a hand-held gamma spectrometer (Bicron Identifier) to identify the radionuclide as Ra-226. The health physicist performed calculation and also opened the pig carefully to identify the type of Ra-226. He developed and followed safety procedures to open the pig. Leak tests were performed and no removable contamination was detected.

"Based on the Health Physicist's investigation and activity calculation, the pig contains a one millicurie (1 mCi) Ra-226 needle.

"RSO, Inc., is currently working with the University to arrange for the disposal of the source. This report will be updated when the RMP received the final disposal report.

"Event Report ID: VA-16-11"


* * * UPDATE FROM ASFAW FENTA TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1632 EDT ON 08/08/16 * * *

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"The source in the lead pig was found in a desk drawer of a fume hood located in a small room (10' x 10') of the main chemistry lab. The door to the room is only accessed through the chemistry lab. Based on discussions with Hollins University, the professor who used the source left the university 15 years ago. The room and source have not been used since his departure. The pig was kept inside the drawer shielded with lead brick. The drawer and room were labeled 'Caution Radioactive Material' and the room remained locked.

"The hired consultant performed radiation surveys while the pig was shielded by the lead brick as found, and confirmed it was less than the unrestricted area limit of 2 mrem in any 1 hour, and would not result in a dose to member of the public of 100 mrem per year. Exposure rates taken by the consultant with the source unshielded indicated a reading of 8.5 mR/hr at 30 cm, and 0.8 mR/hr at 1 m. This corresponds to an activity of approximately 1 millicurie (mCi) using a gamma ray constant of 0.825 (mR m2)/(mCi hr).

"Other non-licensable material was found in the desk.

"On 07/27/2016, the hired consultant packaged all of the radioactive materials and transferred them for disposal.

"This case is considered closed by the [Virginia Radioactive Material Program] VRMP."

Notified R1DO (Burritt) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING TESTING

"During planned stop and control valve testing, two main turbine high pressure stop valves closed instead of the expected one (stop valve 'B'). This caused the main turbine control valves, power, reactor pressure to swing and a division 2 half SCRAM. Control rods were inserted to reduce power and the power swings. At 0257 [CDT] the reactor automatically SCRAMMED. Reactor SCRAM, Turbine Trip [procedures] ONEPs and EP-2 were entered. Reactor water level was stabilized at 34 inches narrow range on startup level control and reactor pressure stabilized at 884 psig using main turbine bypass valves. No other safety related systems actuated and all systems performed as expected."

The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup using normal feedwater and turbine bypass valves for decay heat removal. Reactor pressure is slowly trending down. The licensee is investigating the cause of the second stop valve shutting.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOST NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

During the process of license renewal of a nuclear density gauge, the owner of King Company, Inc. could not find the density gauge in the storage location in the company warehouse. The time frame the density gauge was lost could not be determined and is currently being investigated.

The gauge model, activity and quantity of sources could not be provided by the licensee when the report was made.

"We [the licensee] have searched file archives, and were unable to find the original purchase documents for Device Key 497158, however, we did find the purchase documents for the Device Key 497157. We believe these devices with purchase dates of 5/15/1993 and 8/27/1995, contained identical components." The "identical" equipment was a digital density gauge with a 2 Ci Cs-137 source.

Whereabouts of the Device Key 497158, Serial No. B880, are unknown.

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/21/16 AT 0723 EDT FROM RANDY KING TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via a telephone conversation.

When this condition was initially reported, the database for the original supplier of the gauge, TN Technologies, was unavailable. Following a review of the database, when it became available, it was discovered that this gauge (Device Key 497158) was never sold to the licensee and was never in their possession. According to the TN Technologies database, Device Key 497158 had been sold to another company outside the United States.

Notified R1DO (Dentel) and R3DO (Orlikowski). Notified NMSS Event Notification Group and CNSC (Canada) by email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf