Event Notification Report for May 31, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/30/2016 - 05/31/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
51997519785197551967
Agreement State
Event Number: 51997
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: QUAD CITY TESTING LAB, INC
Region: 3
City: DAVENPORT State: IA
County:
License #: 0186182IR1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: QUAD CITY TESTING LAB, INC
Region: 3
City: DAVENPORT State: IA
County:
License #: 0186182IR1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 06/09/2016
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2016
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following was received from Iowa via email:
"The licensee [Quad City Testing Lab] reported a source disconnect on a QSA Global 880 Delta radiography camera containing 66.3 curies of lr-192. The RSO was able to retrieve the source and return it to the shielded position. The time from disconnect to retrieval was less than two hours. During the RSO investigation, it was determined that the radiographer trainee did not properly connect the source pigtail to the drive cable and this action was not noticed by the radiographer trainer. Total doses during the event as indicated by pocket dosimeters were: RSO 130 mRem, radiographer trainer 55 mRem, and radiographer trainee 30 mRem. No member of the public received any dose from this event."
Incident Number IA160001
The following was received from Iowa via email:
"The licensee [Quad City Testing Lab] reported a source disconnect on a QSA Global 880 Delta radiography camera containing 66.3 curies of lr-192. The RSO was able to retrieve the source and return it to the shielded position. The time from disconnect to retrieval was less than two hours. During the RSO investigation, it was determined that the radiographer trainee did not properly connect the source pigtail to the drive cable and this action was not noticed by the radiographer trainer. Total doses during the event as indicated by pocket dosimeters were: RSO 130 mRem, radiographer trainer 55 mRem, and radiographer trainee 30 mRem. No member of the public received any dose from this event."
Incident Number IA160001
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State
Event Number: 51978
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FLOWER HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: SYLVANIA State: OH
County:
License #: 02120490004
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: FLOWER HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: SYLVANIA State: OH
County:
License #: 02120490004
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE
The following information was received by the State of Ohio via email:
"Leak test of sealed source indicated greater than 185 Bq (0.005 microCi) of removable contamination.
"Cs-137 vial source, 177 microCi, 44,000 cpm removable.
"Several wipes were performed as well as a measurement with a multi-channel analyzer to confirm the radioisotope. The source was placed in a lead pig, taped closed, labeled as a leaking sealed source, and placed in the main hot lab hot-waste storage container. Area wipes were performed to verify that no contamination was present in the vicinity. The source has been removed from service."
Serial Number: 1074-22-5
Ohio Item Number: OH160005
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/3/16 AT 1624 EDT FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO DONG PARK * * *
After further review, report OH160005 previously submitted to the Ops Center was not subject to 24-hour notification.
Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
The following information was received by the State of Ohio via email:
"Leak test of sealed source indicated greater than 185 Bq (0.005 microCi) of removable contamination.
"Cs-137 vial source, 177 microCi, 44,000 cpm removable.
"Several wipes were performed as well as a measurement with a multi-channel analyzer to confirm the radioisotope. The source was placed in a lead pig, taped closed, labeled as a leaking sealed source, and placed in the main hot lab hot-waste storage container. Area wipes were performed to verify that no contamination was present in the vicinity. The source has been removed from service."
Serial Number: 1074-22-5
Ohio Item Number: OH160005
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/3/16 AT 1624 EDT FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO DONG PARK * * *
After further review, report OH160005 previously submitted to the Ops Center was not subject to 24-hour notification.
Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
Part 21
Event Number: 51975
Rep Org: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 3
City: WELCH State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS A. CONBOY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 3
City: WELCH State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS A. CONBOY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - NOTIFICATION OF DEVIATION OF K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY TRIP LATCH
The following was received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant via fax:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:
Thomas A. Conboy
Director of Site Operations
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company - Minnesota
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
ABB Inc.
BREAKER, CIRCUIT, SWITCHGEAR, 480, 3, 600
Type: K-600S EO
"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Address on original purchase order:
ABB Power Distribution
455 Century Point
Lake Mary, FL 32772
Address on current Qualified Supplier List:
ABB, Inc. - Protective Relays & Switches
4300 Coral Ridge Dr.
Coral Springs, FL 33065
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
During surveillance testing of the D5 emergency diesel generator, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) observed the diesel room cooling fan (21 D5 DSL RM CLG FAN) did not start. The fan did not start because the supply breaker (BKR 211D) did not close to provide power to the fan. Visual inspection of the breaker identified the Secondary Trip Latch Assembly had an abnormal pin installation. The diesel room cooling fan assures operability of the emergency diesel generator that is necessary to assure the capability of shutting down the reactor and indefinitely maintaining it in cold shutdown.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained: May 31, 2016.
"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components In use at. supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
Eleven ABB K-600S EO breakers with 86 Lock Out are on the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) site:
BKR 211D, 21 D5 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 221D, 22 D6 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 112C, MCC 1S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 212C, MCC 2S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 122C, MCC 1R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
BKR 222C, MCC 2R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
Five spares not Installed in plant.
"The corrective action which has been. is being. or will be taken: the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action: and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
PINGP entered the breaker failure into the Corrective Action Program.
PINGP replaced the two diesel cooling room fan breakers with breakers having no abnormally positioned pins in the secondary trip latch assemblies. PINGP inspected BKR 221D and found a satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assembly.
PINGP performed extent of condition inspections on the four pressurizer heater circuit breakers and found satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assemblies.
PINGP will revise Electrical Maintenance Procedure PE 4824, Receipt Inspect 480 Volt Breaker, to visually inspect K-600S EO circuit breakers for Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pin alignment. The revised inspection procedure will prevent recurrence since PINGP performs the inspection prior to installing 480V circuit breakers in the plant. The procedure change is expected to be completed by end of August.
Site Transmission and Distribution Coordinator and lead breaker (relay) technician are informed on this issue.
PINGP performed a past operability review and determined that the D5 emergency diesel generator would have performed its specified safety function for the time period reviewed.
PINGP returned the failed breaker to the manufacturer for evaluation. Additional corrective actions will be taken as necessary.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been. is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
Verify alignment of Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pins on K-6008 EO circuit breakers with 86 Lock Out.
Contact the K-600S EO manufacturer for additional advice.
"In the case of an early site permit. the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred:
Not applicable."
HOO Note: See EN #51976 for Part 21 received from ABB, Inc.
The following was received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant via fax:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:
Thomas A. Conboy
Director of Site Operations
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company - Minnesota
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
ABB Inc.
BREAKER, CIRCUIT, SWITCHGEAR, 480, 3, 600
Type: K-600S EO
"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Address on original purchase order:
ABB Power Distribution
455 Century Point
Lake Mary, FL 32772
Address on current Qualified Supplier List:
ABB, Inc. - Protective Relays & Switches
4300 Coral Ridge Dr.
Coral Springs, FL 33065
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
During surveillance testing of the D5 emergency diesel generator, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) observed the diesel room cooling fan (21 D5 DSL RM CLG FAN) did not start. The fan did not start because the supply breaker (BKR 211D) did not close to provide power to the fan. Visual inspection of the breaker identified the Secondary Trip Latch Assembly had an abnormal pin installation. The diesel room cooling fan assures operability of the emergency diesel generator that is necessary to assure the capability of shutting down the reactor and indefinitely maintaining it in cold shutdown.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained: May 31, 2016.
"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components In use at. supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
Eleven ABB K-600S EO breakers with 86 Lock Out are on the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) site:
BKR 211D, 21 D5 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 221D, 22 D6 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 112C, MCC 1S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 212C, MCC 2S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 122C, MCC 1R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
BKR 222C, MCC 2R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
Five spares not Installed in plant.
"The corrective action which has been. is being. or will be taken: the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action: and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
PINGP entered the breaker failure into the Corrective Action Program.
PINGP replaced the two diesel cooling room fan breakers with breakers having no abnormally positioned pins in the secondary trip latch assemblies. PINGP inspected BKR 221D and found a satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assembly.
PINGP performed extent of condition inspections on the four pressurizer heater circuit breakers and found satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assemblies.
PINGP will revise Electrical Maintenance Procedure PE 4824, Receipt Inspect 480 Volt Breaker, to visually inspect K-600S EO circuit breakers for Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pin alignment. The revised inspection procedure will prevent recurrence since PINGP performs the inspection prior to installing 480V circuit breakers in the plant. The procedure change is expected to be completed by end of August.
Site Transmission and Distribution Coordinator and lead breaker (relay) technician are informed on this issue.
PINGP performed a past operability review and determined that the D5 emergency diesel generator would have performed its specified safety function for the time period reviewed.
PINGP returned the failed breaker to the manufacturer for evaluation. Additional corrective actions will be taken as necessary.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been. is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
Verify alignment of Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pins on K-6008 EO circuit breakers with 86 Lock Out.
Contact the K-600S EO manufacturer for additional advice.
"In the case of an early site permit. the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred:
Not applicable."
HOO Note: See EN #51976 for Part 21 received from ABB, Inc.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51967
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/31/2016
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 16:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2016
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: 16:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
CALVERT CLIFFS LOSS OF LOAD TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP FROM 100 PERCENT POWER
"On 05/31/2016 at 1626 [EDT], a Reactor Trip occurred on Loss of Load RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation. The Turbine Trip was apparently caused by a failed ESFAS [Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System] logic module. The failed NSR [Non Safety Related] logic module was associated with 11 Steam Generator High Level Turbine Trip. All systems responded as designed. Normal decay heat removal is to the condenser. All offsite power sources remained in service."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"On 05/31/2016 at 1626 [EDT], a Reactor Trip occurred on Loss of Load RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation. The Turbine Trip was apparently caused by a failed ESFAS [Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System] logic module. The failed NSR [Non Safety Related] logic module was associated with 11 Steam Generator High Level Turbine Trip. All systems responded as designed. Normal decay heat removal is to the condenser. All offsite power sources remained in service."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.