Event Notification Report for May 25, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/24/2016 - 05/25/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5195651958519595196051993
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51956
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT FRECK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT FRECK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 04:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 02:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 04:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 02:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"At 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG [Steam Generator] #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] and FWI [Feedwater Isolation] actuated as expected.
"Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater."
Prior to the trip, I & C [Instrumentation & Calibration] was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG [Steam Generator] #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] and FWI [Feedwater Isolation] actuated as expected.
"Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater."
Prior to the trip, I & C [Instrumentation & Calibration] was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51958
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM LYNDE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM LYNDE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF NON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS DURING TORNADO HAZARDS ANALYSIS
"On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Byron Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building:
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets.
"The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening.
"This condition creates a potential LOSF [loss of safety function] with the Byron Essential Service Water Cooling Towers (UHS) [ultimate heat sink] with the discovery that the power and control cables to four of eight cooling tower fans can be damaged by tornado missiles penetrating through wall openings.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Byron Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building:
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets.
"The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening.
"This condition creates a potential LOSF [loss of safety function] with the Byron Essential Service Water Cooling Towers (UHS) [ultimate heat sink] with the discovery that the power and control cables to four of eight cooling tower fans can be damaged by tornado missiles penetrating through wall openings.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51959
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN WITCOFSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN WITCOFSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF NON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS DURING TORNADO HAZARDS ANALYSIS
"On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Braidwood Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building:
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets.
"The Auxiliary Feed Diesel exterior exhaust stacks (which extend from the roofline) could be impacted by tornado missiles. While we have analyses on these impacts, they do not use a NRC accepted methodology to evaluate the impact and effects.
"The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
. :ú.
"On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Braidwood Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building:
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus.
"The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets.
"The Auxiliary Feed Diesel exterior exhaust stacks (which extend from the roofline) could be impacted by tornado missiles. While we have analyses on these impacts, they do not use a NRC accepted methodology to evaluate the impact and effects.
"The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
. :ú.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51960
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: ADVANCED INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: SAND SPRINGS State: OK
County:
License #: OK-27588-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: ADVANCED INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: SAND SPRINGS State: OK
County:
License #: OK-27588-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 11:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 11:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK ACCIDENT
The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma by email:
"Approximately [1300 CDT] today, [Oklahoma was] notified by Advanced Inspection Technologies [AIT] (OK-27588-02) that a radiography truck belonging to them had been involved in a collision with a tractor/trailer truck at [1118 CDT] today at mile marker 178 on I-44 near Stroud, OK. The driver of the radiography truck was killed and the truck partially burned. At the time it was carrying a 30 Ci Ir-192 source and a 25 Ci Ir-192 source. The truck was taken to the Oklahoma Highway Patrol facility in Stroud where [Oklahoma personnel] arrived at about [1400 CDT]. The darkroom, where the cameras were stored (QSA Model 880s), was partially burned but had not been opened. Initial surveys of the exterior indicated the cameras, which were normally secured near the darkroom door, had been thrown forward and come to rest just behind the cab. Shortly after [Oklahoma personnel] arrived, the AIT RSO arrived and the darkroom door was forced open. The cameras were recovered and surveys indicated the shielding was intact. Wipe tests of each were also collected. One camera was damaged but the sources were secure inside each [camera]. The cameras have been returned to the AIT facility in Sand Springs, OK and will be returned to QSA for repair or disposal."
The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma by email:
"Approximately [1300 CDT] today, [Oklahoma was] notified by Advanced Inspection Technologies [AIT] (OK-27588-02) that a radiography truck belonging to them had been involved in a collision with a tractor/trailer truck at [1118 CDT] today at mile marker 178 on I-44 near Stroud, OK. The driver of the radiography truck was killed and the truck partially burned. At the time it was carrying a 30 Ci Ir-192 source and a 25 Ci Ir-192 source. The truck was taken to the Oklahoma Highway Patrol facility in Stroud where [Oklahoma personnel] arrived at about [1400 CDT]. The darkroom, where the cameras were stored (QSA Model 880s), was partially burned but had not been opened. Initial surveys of the exterior indicated the cameras, which were normally secured near the darkroom door, had been thrown forward and come to rest just behind the cab. Shortly after [Oklahoma personnel] arrived, the AIT RSO arrived and the darkroom door was forced open. The cameras were recovered and surveys indicated the shielding was intact. Wipe tests of each were also collected. One camera was damaged but the sources were secure inside each [camera]. The cameras have been returned to the AIT facility in Sand Springs, OK and will be returned to QSA for repair or disposal."
Agreement State
Event Number: 51993
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC
Region: 1
City: WILLIAMSBURG State: VA
County:
License #: GL 1385
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC
Region: 1
City: WILLIAMSBURG State: VA
County:
License #: GL 1385
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER WILL NOT FULLY OPEN
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On May 27, 2016 the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) received a reciprocity notification from Heuft USA, Inc., to perform maintenance on a fixed gauge which was not properly functioning. The gauge is a Heuft Model 45US, serial number 1254AR containing 45 mCi of Am-241.
"On May 31, 2016 the Heuft service engineer arrived at the Anheuser-Busch facility to investigate the gauge not functioning. The shutter was able to be fully closed but would not fully open. The engineer determined this to be due to a thin piece of material present in the shutter assembly which is not normal, and which interfered with the shutter opening fully. The engineer reported that the root cause of the problem appears that a cylindrical portion of the liner has broken off, perhaps as a result of cyclical thermal stress.
"The shutter assembly was replaced and is working properly. There was no public health exposure or environmental release from this event."
Virginia report: VA-16-006
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On May 27, 2016 the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) received a reciprocity notification from Heuft USA, Inc., to perform maintenance on a fixed gauge which was not properly functioning. The gauge is a Heuft Model 45US, serial number 1254AR containing 45 mCi of Am-241.
"On May 31, 2016 the Heuft service engineer arrived at the Anheuser-Busch facility to investigate the gauge not functioning. The shutter was able to be fully closed but would not fully open. The engineer determined this to be due to a thin piece of material present in the shutter assembly which is not normal, and which interfered with the shutter opening fully. The engineer reported that the root cause of the problem appears that a cylindrical portion of the liner has broken off, perhaps as a result of cyclical thermal stress.
"The shutter assembly was replaced and is working properly. There was no public health exposure or environmental release from this event."
Virginia report: VA-16-006