Event Notification Report for May 16, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/15/2016 - 05/16/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5193251933519345193551936
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51932
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW LARRABEE
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW LARRABEE
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 02:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2016
Notification Time: 02:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED UPGRADE
"At 0300 EDT on May 16, 2016, Seabrook Station's seismic monitoring instrumentation will be removed from service for a planned upgrade to the Seismic Monitoring Control Panel and its accelerometers. Modifications are expected to be complete on May 27, 2016. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place and have been communicated to applicable emergency response decision makers. This preplanned action is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/26/16 AT 2049 EDT FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
At 2045 EDT on 5/26/16, the seismic monitoring system was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).
"At 0300 EDT on May 16, 2016, Seabrook Station's seismic monitoring instrumentation will be removed from service for a planned upgrade to the Seismic Monitoring Control Panel and its accelerometers. Modifications are expected to be complete on May 27, 2016. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place and have been communicated to applicable emergency response decision makers. This preplanned action is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/26/16 AT 2049 EDT FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
At 2045 EDT on 5/26/16, the seismic monitoring system was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).
Agreement State
Event Number: 51933
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SEADRIFT State: TX
County: CALHOUN
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Licensee: DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SEADRIFT State: TX
County: CALHOUN
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILED TO OPERATE
The following information was received via E-mail
"On May 16, 2016 the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Service] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer that the facility was unable to isolate a gauge for maintenance when the shutter failed to operate. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega model SHF2 containing a 200 millicurie cesium - 137 source, serial number 7548GK. The shutter was left in the normal operating, unshielded position. The source does not pose any additional risk of exposure to the workers or members of the general public. The RSO stated they have called TechStar to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9404
The following information was received via E-mail
"On May 16, 2016 the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Service] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer that the facility was unable to isolate a gauge for maintenance when the shutter failed to operate. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega model SHF2 containing a 200 millicurie cesium - 137 source, serial number 7548GK. The shutter was left in the normal operating, unshielded position. The source does not pose any additional risk of exposure to the workers or members of the general public. The RSO stated they have called TechStar to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9404
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51934
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DANIEL MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DANIEL MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 14:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 14:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1457 [CDT] on 5-16-16, U-2 [Unit 2] High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable after isolation of the system due to a steam leak on the HPCI steam inlet drain pot drain line.
"The event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences an accident. This is an eight hour report requirement.
"The Dresden NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1457 [CDT] on 5-16-16, U-2 [Unit 2] High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable after isolation of the system due to a steam leak on the HPCI steam inlet drain pot drain line.
"The event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences an accident. This is an eight hour report requirement.
"The Dresden NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51935
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT URBANSKI
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT URBANSKI
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 21:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 21:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 21:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 21:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADES PLANT SAFETY
"On May 16, 2016 at 2105, Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant identified a nonconforming condition involving the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fire dampers installed in Units 1 and 2. Specifically, it has been identified that if a tornado causes a differential pressure across the east and west sides of the EDG Building, this could create a high airflow rate through the EDG Building ventilation path. The fire dampers for each EDG bay (required to isolate the space for CO2 fire suppression per SQN Fire Protection Report) have not been analyzed to withstand high air flows resulting from a tornado and could possibly fail in a way that impedes airflow for EDG cooling. This is an unanalyzed condition that could prevent all EDGs from supplying electrical power as designed during a tornado or other similar weather events.
"All 4 EDGs are required to be operable by both units' Technical Specifications to provide electrical power to safe shutdown/safety related equipment following accident conditions coincident with a loss of offsite power. The Current Licensing Basis (CLB) requires that tornado effects be considered in the design of safety related SSCs [Systems, Structures, and Components], and it cannot be demonstrated at this time that the described SSCs will withstand the design basis tornado. It has been determined that the CLB may not adequately address possible design basis tornado scenarios.
"The EDGs are located inside the power plant structure and are currently capable of performing their safety function. The occurrence of such an event is highly unlikely and there is no imminent concern regarding severe weather involving tornadoes. Compensatory measures have been developed to address the associated nonconformance.
"The condition described above is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On May 16, 2016 at 2105, Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant identified a nonconforming condition involving the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fire dampers installed in Units 1 and 2. Specifically, it has been identified that if a tornado causes a differential pressure across the east and west sides of the EDG Building, this could create a high airflow rate through the EDG Building ventilation path. The fire dampers for each EDG bay (required to isolate the space for CO2 fire suppression per SQN Fire Protection Report) have not been analyzed to withstand high air flows resulting from a tornado and could possibly fail in a way that impedes airflow for EDG cooling. This is an unanalyzed condition that could prevent all EDGs from supplying electrical power as designed during a tornado or other similar weather events.
"All 4 EDGs are required to be operable by both units' Technical Specifications to provide electrical power to safe shutdown/safety related equipment following accident conditions coincident with a loss of offsite power. The Current Licensing Basis (CLB) requires that tornado effects be considered in the design of safety related SSCs [Systems, Structures, and Components], and it cannot be demonstrated at this time that the described SSCs will withstand the design basis tornado. It has been determined that the CLB may not adequately address possible design basis tornado scenarios.
"The EDGs are located inside the power plant structure and are currently capable of performing their safety function. The occurrence of such an event is highly unlikely and there is no imminent concern regarding severe weather involving tornadoes. Compensatory measures have been developed to address the associated nonconformance.
"The condition described above is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Part 21
Event Number: 51936
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: THOMAS AND BETTS AND CYBEREX PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS
Region: 1
City: Norcross State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KORINA LOOFT
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Licensee: THOMAS AND BETTS AND CYBEREX PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS
Region: 1
City: Norcross State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KORINA LOOFT
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - FOR PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS
The following was received by email:
"Required information as per 10CFR Part 21.21(d)(4) follows:
"(i) Name and Address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission
"Luis Sanchez, Vice President
United Controls International
205 Scientific Drive
NORCROSS, GA 30092
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Printed Circuit Boards (Gate Drive Assemblies P/Ns: 41-01-229677 & 41-01-229678, Reference Oscillator Module P/N: 41-01-808901) & Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) Fuses P/N: A30QS400-4 items were installed in PSEG [Public Service Enterprise Group] inverter unit and resulted in opening of P/N: A30QS400-4 fuses. When the original equipment was installed this issue was not present.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"United Controls International
205 Scientific Drive
Norcross, GA 30092
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Opening of the subject fuses prevents operation of the host inverter unit.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"March 17,2016
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this Part.
"The following is a compilation of UCI supplied items with like part numbers as the subject components. Only the printed circuit boards identified by the end-user [supplied under purchase orders 4500576271 (Qty. 1), 4500728702 (Qty. 1), and 4500625591 (Qty. 1)] along with the subject fuses supplied under purchase orders 4500810474 (Qty. 10) and 4500772093 (Qty. 6) are considered to possibly be affected by the end-user's reported issue.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"UCI is not capable of performing additional evaluation of the subject printed circuit boards because UCI does not have the capability to simulate the in-service condition of these items. UCI suggests that the end-user perform additional evaluations with the subject printed circuit boards installed in their training inverter unit. UCI has requested that the end-user supply additional fuses supplied under purchase orders 4500810474 and 4500772093 for evaluation of current carrying performance since the fuses already provided were open.
"(viii) Any Advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"None
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"Not Applicable."
The following was received by email:
"Required information as per 10CFR Part 21.21(d)(4) follows:
"(i) Name and Address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission
"Luis Sanchez, Vice President
United Controls International
205 Scientific Drive
NORCROSS, GA 30092
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Thomas & Betts Power Solutions/Cyberex Printed Circuit Boards (Gate Drive Assemblies P/Ns: 41-01-229677 & 41-01-229678, Reference Oscillator Module P/N: 41-01-808901) & Mersen (formerly Ferraz Shawmut) Fuses P/N: A30QS400-4 items were installed in PSEG [Public Service Enterprise Group] inverter unit and resulted in opening of P/N: A30QS400-4 fuses. When the original equipment was installed this issue was not present.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"United Controls International
205 Scientific Drive
Norcross, GA 30092
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Opening of the subject fuses prevents operation of the host inverter unit.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"March 17,2016
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this Part.
"The following is a compilation of UCI supplied items with like part numbers as the subject components. Only the printed circuit boards identified by the end-user [supplied under purchase orders 4500576271 (Qty. 1), 4500728702 (Qty. 1), and 4500625591 (Qty. 1)] along with the subject fuses supplied under purchase orders 4500810474 (Qty. 10) and 4500772093 (Qty. 6) are considered to possibly be affected by the end-user's reported issue.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"UCI is not capable of performing additional evaluation of the subject printed circuit boards because UCI does not have the capability to simulate the in-service condition of these items. UCI suggests that the end-user perform additional evaluations with the subject printed circuit boards installed in their training inverter unit. UCI has requested that the end-user supply additional fuses supplied under purchase orders 4500810474 and 4500772093 for evaluation of current carrying performance since the fuses already provided were open.
"(viii) Any Advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"None
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"Not Applicable."