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Event Notification Report for May 13, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/12/2016 - 05/13/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51853 51906 51909 51922 51923 51924 51925

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51853
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: CHRIS TERRY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 04/07/2016
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
CRAIG ERLANGER (FCSE)

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY

An employee was reported to the Fitness for Duty Coordinator due to improper prescription medicine handling. The employee's site access has been suspended pending outcome of a drug test and investigation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS TERRY TO STEVE VITTO ON 05/11/2016 AT 0726 EDT * * *

The licensee has completed the investigation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified Heisserer (R2DO), Erlanger (FCSE), FFD Group (email), NMSS Events Notification Group (email).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51906
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: JAMES HARDIE BUILDING PRODUCTS
Region: 1
City: PLANT CITY State: FL
County:
License #: G0663-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RENO FABII
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/04/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOACTIVE THICKNESS GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the State of Florida via email:

"An audit conducted on James Hardie Building Products on April 4th, 2016 discovered a thickness gauge (NDC Model 102) was unaccounted for. The company was in the process of transferring equipment and under going an expansion. The auditor gave the company time to search for the device. As of 5/4/2016 all nine (9) of their facilities have been searched and the gauge has not been found. The last positive 'eyes on' sighting of device occurred in 2013 at the Plant City facility. The device was locked down to a wooden pallet. New policies and procedures are being implemented by James Hardie Building Products."

Although the audit was completed on April 4, 2016, the licensee did not conclude their search of all their facilities until April 7, 2016. The gauge was an NDC Systems Model 102, serial number 11838, containing 25 mCi of Am-241.

Florida Incident Number: FL16-059

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51909
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: N/A
Region: 1
City:  State: PA
County: BLAIR
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/05/2016
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCOVERY OF VACUUM GAUGE

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:

"On May 5, 2016, the Blair County Emergency Management Agency notified the Department [of Environmental Protection] of the discovery of a NRC Equipment Corporation Model 530 Alphatron vacuum gauge. This gauge was located in a wooded area in Blair County, Pennsylvania. The gauge was manufactured with approximately 100 microcuries of radium-226. The manufacturer is no longer in business. The Department has retrieved the gauge and will safely store it until its annual collection of radium sources in September, 2016. No exposures have occurred with this discovery. It is reportable under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i)."

Event Report ID No: PA160013

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51922
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TERRY AVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 05/12/2016
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2016
Event Time: 07:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
FITNESS FOR DUTY GRO (EMAI)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY POLICY VIOLATION

"A non-licensed contractor supervisor violated the fitness-for-duty policy [for alcohol] during a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 51923
Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FORTH WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/12/2016
Notification Time: 19:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE

The following information was a licensee received facsimile;

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.

"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.

"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4):

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.
-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'.
Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.

"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.

"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.

"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.

"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.

"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.

"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.

"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNPUlchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNPKor i- This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.

"(vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised
technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.

"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.

"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.

"Please contact NLI with any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51924
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GOODALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/12/2016
Notification Time: 20:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2016
Event Time: 16:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DETERIORATION OF SPENT FUEL POOL RACK NEUTRON ABSORBING MATERIAL

"On May 12, 2016, at 16:47 EDT with the reactor at 100% power and the mode switch in RUN, an assessment of the Spent Fuel Pool racks containing neutron absorbing material concluded that some degradation had occurred. The result is that we cannot assure we are maintaining Keff < 0.95 as required per design. Conservative measures have been implemented to ensure public health and safety.

"Recent planned testing conducted in the spent fuel pool determined that one rack panel had degradation of the neutron absorbing material in excess of what had been analyzed. An extent of condition review indicated additional potential at-risk locations may exist. Analyses are being performed to determine the potential impact and mitigating actions. Fuel pool conditions are safe and stable. Conservative measures have been implemented and spent fuel safety is maintained.

"Based on the above, the condition is reportable to the NRC as an Unanalyzed Condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), and requires an 8 hour notification. The condition is also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51925
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CARL YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2016
Event Time: 01:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE AFTER LOSS OF AN ESSENTIAL MOTOR CONTROL CENTER

"At approximately 0110 hours [EDT] on May 13, 2016, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor was manually scrammed by plant operators due to a sustained loss of AC power to essential plant loads. Power to MCC 2B246 was lost at 2355 on May 12, 2016, resulting in a loss of Drywell cooling. Drywell pressure increased to 1.3 psig when operators placed the mode switch to the shutdown position to manually SCRAM the reactor. All rods inserted as expected. Reactor water level lowered to -27 inches and was immediately restored by normal feedwater level control. Level 3 (+13 inch) PCIS isolations occurred, along with an initiation of the RCIC system (-30 inches). Once adequate level was verified, RCIC was overridden. Pressure was controlled with turbine bypass valves, and subsequently main steam line drains. All safety systems functioned as expected.

"The power loss also tripped Reactor Building HVAC, causing a loss of secondary containment differential pressure resulting in a loss of safety function.

"Due to the loss of drywell cooling, high drywell pressure actuations and a second reactor SCRAM signal, this signal was automatic, occurred at 0314 hours. HPCI [which automatically initiated on high drywell pressure] was subsequently overridden and declared inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. [HPCI did not inject into the vessel].

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Initial reports from the field indicate a phase to phase fault on the MCC 2B246 bus bars."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be issuing a press release.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 13, 2016
Friday, May 13, 2016