Event Notification Report for May 02, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/01/2016 - 05/02/2016
Agreement State
Event Number: 51898
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ARIAS & ASSOCIATES INC
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 04964
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: ARIAS & ASSOCIATES INC
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 04964
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/02/2016
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 05:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2016
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 05:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 2, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [State of Texas] that one of its technicians had discovered at approximately 0530 CDT, that a Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge had been stolen out of the back of the licensee's pickup while it was parked at the technician's residence. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) reported the technician had checked out the gauge on Saturday, April 30, 2016, to do a job in another town. After traveling to the job site, the job was cancelled. The technician failed to follow the licensee's procedures and went home instead of returning the gauge to the facility. The gauge was left chained inside the back of the company pickup. The technician told the RSO that the trigger lock was on the device. The technician told the RSO he heard noise outside his house at approximately 0300-0400 CDT this morning and suspects that was when it was being stolen. He found the chains had been cut and the transport case and gauge were gone along with another concrete testing device. Local law enforcement was notified and the technician drove around searching the area. The RSO contacted multiple pawn shops in the area.
"Device: Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge Serial #: 31528
Sources: Cesium-137 - 8 millicuries; Americium-241 - 40 millicuries
"More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No.: I-9395
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 2, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency [State of Texas] that one of its technicians had discovered at approximately 0530 CDT, that a Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge had been stolen out of the back of the licensee's pickup while it was parked at the technician's residence. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) reported the technician had checked out the gauge on Saturday, April 30, 2016, to do a job in another town. After traveling to the job site, the job was cancelled. The technician failed to follow the licensee's procedures and went home instead of returning the gauge to the facility. The gauge was left chained inside the back of the company pickup. The technician told the RSO that the trigger lock was on the device. The technician told the RSO he heard noise outside his house at approximately 0300-0400 CDT this morning and suspects that was when it was being stolen. He found the chains had been cut and the transport case and gauge were gone along with another concrete testing device. Local law enforcement was notified and the technician drove around searching the area. The RSO contacted multiple pawn shops in the area.
"Device: Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge Serial #: 31528
Sources: Cesium-137 - 8 millicuries; Americium-241 - 40 millicuries
"More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No.: I-9395
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51899
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/03/2016
Notification Time: 01:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 22:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2016
Notification Time: 01:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 22:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRIP
"At 2229 [CDT] on 05-02-2016, River Bend Station declared the High Pressure Core Spray system INOPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.9, Condition E (Declare High Pressure Core Spray System and Standby Service Water System Pump 2C inoperable immediately) due to Division 1 Control Room Air Conditioning System HVK-CHL1C being INOPERABLE due to a trip of the chiller on high inboard bearing temperature.
"Actions taken to exit the LCO: Alternated divisions of Control Room Air Conditioning System to Division 2 HVK-CHL1D in service and Division 1 HVK-CHL1A in standby."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/22/16 AT 1137 EDT FROM JACK MCCOY TO DONG PARK * * *
"Supplement: An operability evaluation has been performed based on system operating procedures in place at the time of this event, and on calculations regarding heat-up rates of the spaces served by the main control room air conditioning system. Operating procedures already in place on May 2 specified the operator actions required to restore the air conditioning system to service following the unanticipated trip of a chiller. The normal shift complement was on duty at the time of the event, and could have provided an adequate number of operators to accomplish this task. The operability evaluation made no new assumptions regarding availability of operators. The manual actions to be performed for the start of an alternate chiller following a trip of an in-service chiller system have been determined to require 2.15 hours, based on ANSI 58.8 guidance. (ANSI/ANS 58.8, Time Response Design Criteria for Nuclear Safety Related Operator Actions, provides the industry guidance In this regard.)
"Calculations of building heat-up rates have demonstrated that the loss of the air conditioning system can be sustained for 19 hours before temperatures in the rooms containing the Division 3 electrical equipment that support operability of the HPCS system exceed their maximum allowable ambient value.
"Based on the conclusions of the operability evaluation, the trip of the 'C' HVK chiller on May 2 had no actual adverse effect on the ability of the electrical distribution systems in the main control building to support the safety function of the HPCS system. Event Notification No. 51899 is hereby withdrawn."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Rollins).
"At 2229 [CDT] on 05-02-2016, River Bend Station declared the High Pressure Core Spray system INOPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.9, Condition E (Declare High Pressure Core Spray System and Standby Service Water System Pump 2C inoperable immediately) due to Division 1 Control Room Air Conditioning System HVK-CHL1C being INOPERABLE due to a trip of the chiller on high inboard bearing temperature.
"Actions taken to exit the LCO: Alternated divisions of Control Room Air Conditioning System to Division 2 HVK-CHL1D in service and Division 1 HVK-CHL1A in standby."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/22/16 AT 1137 EDT FROM JACK MCCOY TO DONG PARK * * *
"Supplement: An operability evaluation has been performed based on system operating procedures in place at the time of this event, and on calculations regarding heat-up rates of the spaces served by the main control room air conditioning system. Operating procedures already in place on May 2 specified the operator actions required to restore the air conditioning system to service following the unanticipated trip of a chiller. The normal shift complement was on duty at the time of the event, and could have provided an adequate number of operators to accomplish this task. The operability evaluation made no new assumptions regarding availability of operators. The manual actions to be performed for the start of an alternate chiller following a trip of an in-service chiller system have been determined to require 2.15 hours, based on ANSI 58.8 guidance. (ANSI/ANS 58.8, Time Response Design Criteria for Nuclear Safety Related Operator Actions, provides the industry guidance In this regard.)
"Calculations of building heat-up rates have demonstrated that the loss of the air conditioning system can be sustained for 19 hours before temperatures in the rooms containing the Division 3 electrical equipment that support operability of the HPCS system exceed their maximum allowable ambient value.
"Based on the conclusions of the operability evaluation, the trip of the 'C' HVK chiller on May 2 had no actual adverse effect on the ability of the electrical distribution systems in the main control building to support the safety function of the HPCS system. Event Notification No. 51899 is hereby withdrawn."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Rollins).
Part 21
Event Number: 52055
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT
Licensee: TARGET ROCK, CURTISS-WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: TARGET ROCK, CURTISS-WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 06/30/2016
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2016
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - INADEQUATE SWAGING AND ADHERENCE OF SILICONE O-RING AND SILICONE PAD IN SOFT SEAT MAIN DISC AND PILOT DISC ASSEMBLIES
The following is a summary of the information from the email provided:
"[The] soft seat main disc and pilot disc assemblies are installed in certain process solenoid operated valves, some of which perform safety related functions such as containment isolation. These designs include a soft seat insert in the main and/or pilot disc that could loosen and potentially result in excessive leakage or failure of the valve to operate properly.
"Supplier:
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road, East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, General Manager at (631) 293-3800.
"Plant Site Locations:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Grand Gulf, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, Hatch, Perry, Shearon Harris, Brunswick, Limerick, Pilgrim, South Texas, Dresden, Millstone, Quad Cities, Susquehanna, Duane Arnold, Nine Mile Point, River Bend, Three Mile Island, Fermi, Palo Verde, Saint Lucie, Watts Bar."
The following is a summary of the information from the email provided:
"[The] soft seat main disc and pilot disc assemblies are installed in certain process solenoid operated valves, some of which perform safety related functions such as containment isolation. These designs include a soft seat insert in the main and/or pilot disc that could loosen and potentially result in excessive leakage or failure of the valve to operate properly.
"Supplier:
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road, East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, General Manager at (631) 293-3800.
"Plant Site Locations:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Grand Gulf, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, Hatch, Perry, Shearon Harris, Brunswick, Limerick, Pilgrim, South Texas, Dresden, Millstone, Quad Cities, Susquehanna, Duane Arnold, Nine Mile Point, River Bend, Three Mile Island, Fermi, Palo Verde, Saint Lucie, Watts Bar."