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Event Notification Report for April 14, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/13/2016 - 04/14/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51776 51849 51852 51864

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51776
Facility: LOUISIANA ENERGY SERVICES
RX Type:
Comments: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
                   GAS CENTRIFUGE FACILITY
Region: 2
City: EUNICE State: NM
County: LEA
License #: SNM-2010
Agreement: Y
Docket: 70-3103
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SLAMA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/07/2016
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2016
Event Time: 16:15 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
SHANA HELTON (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) NOT PERFORMED

"During the afternoon of March 7, 2016, UUSA [Urenco USA] operators moved drums containing uranic material into an IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] controlled array. This IROFS requires initial and independent operator verification to ensure a subcritical geometry exists prior to adding any new material to the array. The operators moving the drums did not perform the administrative IROFS; that is, neither an initial nor an independent
verification were completed prior to adding five additional drums to the array.

"UUSA management and nuclear criticality staff have ensured the drums are in a safe and subcritical configuration.

"The drums contain clean up materials contaminated with UF6 at unknown levels of enrichment. A nuclear criticality did not occur. The array is in a subcritical geometry. No external events are affecting this event. No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.

"No state or other federal agencies will be notified. No press releases are planned.

"Number and types of controls necessary under normal operating conditions: One enhanced sole IROFS. The enhancement is an initial verification and an independent verification of geometry prior to movement of material into the area.

"Number and types of controls which functioned properly under upset conditions: Neither the IROFS initial verification, nor the independent verification of geometry were performed before movement occurred.

"Number and types of controls necessary to restore a safe situation: A member of operations management passed through during a routine plant tour, questioned the operators, and determined that the drums had been placed in a safe geometry in the array without performing the required IROFS surveillance.

"Safety significance of events: Loss of geometry controls preventing criticality.

"Safety equipment status: The array is in a subcritical geometry.

"Status of corrective actions: Corrective actions to be developed."

* * * UPDATE FROM SLAMA TO SHOEMAKER ON 4/13/16 AT 1542 EDT * * *

"Isotopic analysis has been conducted for the material in the stored drums; the uranium enrichment is characterized as depleted. As such, criticality was not possible during the operations and the as-found configuration reported in Event Notification 51776 on March 7, 2016. However, the required IROFS was not implemented. The event is hereby being reclassified as a 24-Hour Event Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(2).

"The previously reported IROFS was available and should have been implemented at the point of storage to ensure safe storage array configuration, thus meeting 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements. During the ongoing Root Cause Evaluation for this event, it was discovered and documented that an additional IROFS was not implemented during the March 7, 2016 movement evolution. This additional IROFS requires the use of a transfer cart for movement from the point of generation to the point of storage. This cart is to ensure proper spacing between the container and any materials which may be passed during movement. This is a sole administrative IROFS enhanced with initial and independent verifications.

"As stated above, analysis has been completed which characterizes the material as depleted UF6. As such, during the movement of the drums, criticality was not possible. The required IROFS was available, however the failure to implement applicable controls resulted in a situation in which no reliable barrier was in place to provide assurance that interaction control would be maintained during movement. The failure to implement this additional IROFS during movement is hereby classified as a 24-Hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(2). The information required per 10 CFR 70.50 (c)(1) is same as that contained in the event description [of the original notification]."

Notified the R2DO(Bonser) and the NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51849
Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: SEATTLE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-C001-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANINE GRUMBLES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 04/06/2016
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - PACKAGE CONTAINING 40 MILLICURIES OF NI-63 REPORTED MISSING

The following report was received from the Washington Department of Health via email:

"[The] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of UW [University of Washington] reported on 4/6/2016, that a package containing four 10 mCi electron capture devices (ECDs), a total activity of 40 mCi, went missing on 3/31/2016, while being transported from Sydney airport to Tasmania, Australia on a Quantas flight. Quantas has put a trace out for the missing package. The ECDs were being sent to the Marine National Facility, CSIRO [Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization] Marine Laboratories. The ECDs were to be used in gas chromatographs (GC) on board a marine vessel by a University of Washington researcher for obtaining research results. The GCs were shipped separately and these are not missing. The Radiation Safety Office did obtain an import permit from Australia for the ECD shipment, and can provide that documentation if needed.

"Device Manufacturer:
Shimazdu Scientific Instruments Mini-2 GC
Serial Number: 500401
Activity: 0.010 Ci
Radionuclide: Ni-63

"Device Manufacturer:
Shimazdu Scientific Instruments GC-8A
Model Number: ECD-8A
Serial Number: SS1932
Activity 0.010 Ci
Radionuclide: Ni-63

"Device Manufacturer:
Shimazdu Scientific Instruments GC-8A
Model Number: ECD-8A
Serial Number: SS1953
Activity: 0.010 Ci
Radionuclide: Ni-63

"Device Manufacturer:
Shimazdu Scientific Instruments GC-8A
Model Number: ECD-8A
Serial Number: SS2047
Activity: 0.010 Ci
Radionuclide: Ni-63"

Package was shipped from University of Washington to Australia on 3/23/16.

Washington Incident # WA-16-010

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51852
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARQUEST
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: GENERAL LICEN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 04/06/2016
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2015
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following report was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

"An audit of the radioactive materials general license files was conducted on the site at 800 W 84th Avenue. Inventory report showed Carquest - Denver had 6 Tritium exit signs registered in 2014. The report received from Carquest in December of 2015 showed a transfer of 5 Tritium exit signs being shipped to TritiumDisposal.com. An inquiry was made with the corporate office to obtain clarification as to lost exit sign. The property was further inspected to try and locate the missing sign however it was not discovered.

"The corporate office [Advanced Auto Parts] contacted the location to obtain further clarification regarding the report of shipping the exit signs to TritiumDisposal.Com. The notification of lost exit sign was mailed to the corporate office Advanced Auto Parts to obtain a corrective action."

"Model: SLX TURW10
Source Serial: #175174
Isotope: H-3, Activity
Activity: 7300 mCi"

Event Report ID No.: CO16-I16-06

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51864
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE HEBLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/13/2016
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2016
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION

"At approximately 1430 hours EDT on 4/13/2016, it was determined that the source document for the mass and energy release parameters used to determine the containment pressure and temperature response to a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) does not adequately account for all possible single active failure scenarios in the steam or feedwater line isolation provisions. The source document addresses the active failure of the Main Feedwater Control valves to close in the faulted steam generator feed line, but not the failure of a feedwater bypass valves to close in the faulted steam generator feed line. An active failure of a feedwater regulating bypass valve whereby the valve fails to close will increase the secondary mass available for release to the containment structure. This can result in a higher peak containment pressure that could challenge the containment design pressure. This condition is only a concern when the feedwater regulating bypass valves are in the open position in modes 1, 2 or 3, and they fail to close on a engineered safeguards actuation signal. The feedwater regulating bypass valves are currently closed.

"This determination is being reported as an unanalyzed condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, April 14, 2016
Thursday, April 14, 2016