Event Notification Report for March 28, 2016

LOSS OF POWER TO METEOROLOGICAL TOWER

"At approximately 1900 EDT on March 28, 2016, an unplanned loss of retail power to the McGuire Meteorological tower occurred. This loss of power impacted communication between the Meteorological tower and the control room, which resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures existed within the site's emergency planning procedures to obtain meteorological data from the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC operations center.

"Power was restored at 2245 EDT on March 28, 2016.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to the public."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1423 EDT ON 4/19/2016 FROM SCOTT SLIETER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This notification is being made to retract event EN 51828 that was reported March 29, 2016. Based on further investigation, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods to perform emergency assessment that are in addition to the control room indications from the meteorological tower. Furthermore, it was determined that the meteorological tower data was valid and available in the control room during the applicable period. It was therefore determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, rev 3, supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, rev 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction."

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

MANUAL SCRAM FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR CLOSED COOLING

"At 1322 PDT on Monday, March 28, 2016, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100% thermal power due to the loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC). Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon loss of RCC. The cause of the loss of RCC is being investigated.

"Regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours of any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.

"All control rods were fully inserted. Valve RWCU-V-4 automatically closed upon high water temperature due to loss of RCC flow. No other safety system actuations were reported. All systems operated as expected. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser. The station is in normal shutdown electrical lineup.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

No safety/relief valves lifted and no emergency core cooling systems injected following the reactor scram.

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSEE SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE

A non-licensed, licensee supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On 3/28/16, at approximately 1320 [EDT], a loss of power occurred on the Unit 2 E124 480 volt load center due to an equipment operator inadvertently opening the main feed breaker during the process of applying a clearance to de-energize the E124-P-A motor control center for planned maintenance. Loss of the E124 load center resulted in Group II and Group III primary containment isolations due to an invalid ESF actuation signal. Systems impacted by the containment isolations included containment instrument nitrogen, containment atmospheric monitoring, reactor water cleanup, and secondary containment.

"Balance of plant impacts included partial loss of feedwater heating and a reduced condenser vacuum. Reactor power lowered to 86% as a result of the event and further decreased to approximately 80 percent when re-establishing the 3A, 4A and 5A feedwater heaters.

"Following direction from the control room, the E124 main feed breaker was promptly re-closed by equipment operators. Affected equipment was restored to its normal or planned configuration and containment isolations were reset at 1406.

"The containment isolation signal was generated as a result of the loss of power to the E124 load center and was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INVALID ACTUATION OF INBOARD ISOLATION LOGIC

"On Monday, March 28, 2016, Unit 1 was in OPCON 5 (Refueling) conducting a refueling outage. A modification was being installed for an NSSSS [Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System] Test Box on Division 1A Group 1 NSSSS logic. At 0150 hours, a logic jumper was removed as directed by the work order and a logic fuse failed. The fuse failure caused an unplanned invalid actuation of the inboard isolation logic. The isolations were reset and the valves were restored to initial conditions at 0246 hours. On Sunday, April 3, 2016, at 0134 hours, one additional logic fuse opening event occurred during the testing which also caused an invalid actuation which was reset at 0405 hours. The fuse openings occurred during jumper manipulations as the modification was tested on the Division 1A and 1D logic during the refuel outage. The investigation determined the fuse openings were due to the testing process. The suspected devices that caused the condition are not permanent plant equipment and there is no degradation of the actual circuit. They were part of a temporary configuration that was installed to support modification installation and acceptance testing. The temporary devices have been removed.

"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.

"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on reactor water cleanup (RWCU), drywell chilled water (DWCW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), drywell sumps and the suppression pool cleanup systems."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.