| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/02/2016 - 03/03/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51752 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: EVONIK CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: MAPLETON State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02078-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/24/2016
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECT ON FIXED GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Illinois via email:
"On February 23, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) called to advise that a sealed source of Cs-137 became separated from its handling rod within a fixed gauge and was now resting at the bottom of a seven foot 'well tube' within a nine foot conical reaction process vessel on their property. The well tube is centered on the vertical axis of the vessel and provides a protected environment for the source holder and rod. Previously the vessel had been emptied for routine maintenance and was being returned to service when the event took place. The current configuration is similar to that of its routine operating configuration other than the gauge is now 'always on' and cannot be returned to its normal shielded position, should the need exist. The plant plans on returning the vessel to service and refilling the vessel with reactants. This material should provide additional shielding such that accessible surface dose rates of the vessel are less than 1 mR/h.
"The licensee is making arrangements with the manufacturer to come to the site and recover/dispose of the gauge and the source. Until that time, on site safety personnel and the process operating engineers have been advised of the situation and of the necessary precautions to observe should it become necessary to empty the vessel under emergency conditions. Under no circumstances will individuals be allowed access to the interior of the vessel without otherwise receiving explicit approval for the activity.
"Pending recovery of the source by the manufacturer and receipt of the formal written report from the licensee, this matter remains open. No investigation by the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] is planned at this time."
Fixed Gauge Manufacturer: Kay-Ray/Sensall
Model Number: 7065
Serial Number: 28219
Source: Cs-137
Activity: 0.027 Ci
Illinois Incident #: IL16001 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51753 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: BEAVER FALLS State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/24/2016
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION AT METAL RECYCLING FACILITY
The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: The non-licensee discovered the event on February 23, 2016 and notified the Ohio Department of Health, who then notified our Department [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] after normal business hours on the same evening. It is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(i) and 20.2201(a)(i).
"Event Description: On Monday, February 22, 2016, a large orphan radium-226 (Ra-226) source of unknown total activity or origin was shredded at the PSC Metals facility in Beaver Falls, PA. The recycled material was then shipped to two different Ohio facilities where it was discovered during an inbound radiation scan on February 23, 2016.
"Cause of the Event: The Pennsylvania facility was [apparently] not performing outbound gamma radiation surveys on recycled materials.
"Actions: The contaminated shredder, with gamma radiation levels of over 400 mrem/hr, has been isolated. The locker room, clothes, vehicles and workers have been surveyed and no contamination has been found. The gloves of two workers were found to have contamination. A reactive inspection occurred the evening of the 23rd to survey the entrance/gate area of the Beaver Falls facility, and a full emergency response occurred the morning of February 24, 2016. PA and OH Radiation Control Programs are onsite in their respective states and communicating findings. Surveys of employees, vehicles and equipment are ongoing. The response will continue until isolation and containment of Ra-226 is ensured. A local health physics service provider has also been contracted by PSC to assist with the decontamination operation. More information will be provided upon receipt.
"Media Attention: None at this time, but OH may issue a Press Release.
"Event Report ID No: PA160007" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51755 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 02/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2016
Event Time: 15:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation | Event Text POWER REDUCTION DUE TO AUTOMATIC OPENING OF THE TURBINE BYPASS VALVES
"On January 6, 2016, at approximately 1514 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) automatically opened for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.0 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valves closed.
"Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were not declared inoperable since the functions were verified to remain enabled.
"Since the RPS functions were not declared inoperable, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, after further evaluation, it was determined that this event met the reporting criterion. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve drifting was due to an actuator malfunction that has since been corrected.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51756 for a similar event that occurred on 02/21/16.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO STEVEN VITTO ON 03/02/2016 AT 1530 EST * * *
"Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (01/06/2016).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Valos). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51756 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 02/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2015
Event Time: 00:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation | Event Text POWER REDUCTION DUE TO AUTOMATIC OPENING OF A TURBINE BYPASS VALVE
"On February 21, 2015, at approximately 0030 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the West Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) automatically opened in response to the number two High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) cycling from full open to closed and then to 22 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.5 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valve closed.
"Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were declared inoperable. The Limiting Condition for Operation was exited at 0031 EST following TBV closure.
"Since the RPS functions were verified to remain enabled, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, this event was subsequently determined to meet the reporting criterion and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve cycling was due to a communication card failure that has since been corrected.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51755 for a similar event that occurred on 01/06/16.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO STEVEN VITTO ON 03/02/2016 AT 1530 EST * * *
"Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (02/21/2015).
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Valos). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51762 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDY CARAMIHALIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/02/2016
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2016
Event Time: 02:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text TURBINE TRIP CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP
"The turbine tripped for an unknown cause followed by a reactor trip. All systems are functioning as designed. Operators have transitioned out of the EOP [Emergency Operating Procedure] network into normal operating procedures. The plant is stable in mode 3."
All control rods fully inserted during the trip and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Emergency Feedwater actuation occurred to restore steam generator levels. The plant expects to make a press release.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1043 EST ON 3/2/16 FROM BARRY BRADBURY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee will not issue a press release for this event.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51764 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/02/2016
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2016
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 79 | Power Operation | 79 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE
"On March 2, 2016 at 1330 hrs. [EST], Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3).
"The inoperability was caused when Unit 2 Reactor Building Airlock doors were inadvertently opened simultaneously.
"Secondary Containment was restored March 2, 2016 at 1331 hrs. when the doors were closed.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51765 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 03/02/2016
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2016
Event Time: 13:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text VALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER
"On 3/2/2016, [at] 1312 hours EST, while in the process of a plant cooldown, a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) occurred when B steam generator levels were reduced to 20 [percent]. The lowering level was a result of the unanticipated tripping of the start up feed pump on low condensate storage level while it was the feed source to the steam generators. The start up feed pump was restarted and feed flow had been restored when the actuation took place. The EFW flow was secured per procedure and the start up feed pump remains the feed source to the steam generators.
"This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |