Event Notification Report for January 25, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/24/2016 - 01/25/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5168651682516835168451907
Agreement State
Event Number: 51686
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: 05268
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: 05268
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/26/2016
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 18:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2016
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 18:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2016
Emergency Class:
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - VEHICLE ACCIDENT WHILE TRANSPORTING A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On January 26, 2016, at approximately 1015 CST, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that at approximately 1815 CST on January 25, 2016, one of its technicians had been involved in a vehicle accident while transporting a Troxler Model 3430 (Serial #24412) moisture/density gauge. The accident occurred near Cumby, Texas. The technician was hospitalized as a result of injuries received in the accident.
"The gauge contained a 40 millicurie americium-241 and an 8 millicurie cesium-137 source. The licensee reported that the gauge's insertion rod was locked and the gauge was inside its transport case which had locks on the hasps, the transport case was chained with locks inside a steel box which was bolted to the bed of the pick-up, and there were 2 locks on the steel box. A wrecker service removed the vehicle from the scene and took it to its business location where the vehicle was placed behind a fence with a locked gate. The licensee was notified of the accident after midnight. One of the licensee's employees retrieved the gauge from the vehicle at approximately 0830 this morning. The employee reported the shipping papers were on the seat of the vehicle. The licensee reported that it does not appear anyone was aware of the presence of the gauge until the employee removed it this morning. The gauge was not damaged. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident #: I 9375
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On January 26, 2016, at approximately 1015 CST, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that at approximately 1815 CST on January 25, 2016, one of its technicians had been involved in a vehicle accident while transporting a Troxler Model 3430 (Serial #24412) moisture/density gauge. The accident occurred near Cumby, Texas. The technician was hospitalized as a result of injuries received in the accident.
"The gauge contained a 40 millicurie americium-241 and an 8 millicurie cesium-137 source. The licensee reported that the gauge's insertion rod was locked and the gauge was inside its transport case which had locks on the hasps, the transport case was chained with locks inside a steel box which was bolted to the bed of the pick-up, and there were 2 locks on the steel box. A wrecker service removed the vehicle from the scene and took it to its business location where the vehicle was placed behind a fence with a locked gate. The licensee was notified of the accident after midnight. One of the licensee's employees retrieved the gauge from the vehicle at approximately 0830 this morning. The employee reported the shipping papers were on the seat of the vehicle. The licensee reported that it does not appear anyone was aware of the presence of the gauge until the employee removed it this morning. The gauge was not damaged. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident #: I 9375
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51682
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK STROLLO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK STROLLO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 03:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 01:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 03:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 01:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP
At 0147 EST on 1/25/16, the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped offline. This caused a reactor trip on low coolant flow. As expected, the Aux Feedwater System (AFW) initiated on the reactor trip. The trip was uncomplicated and the plant is currently shutdown in Mode 3 with a normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the 'B' RCP trip is under investigation. A containment entry is planned for dayshift on 1/25/16 to inspect and troubleshoot the 'B' RCP.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0147 EST on 1/25/16, the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped offline. This caused a reactor trip on low coolant flow. As expected, the Aux Feedwater System (AFW) initiated on the reactor trip. The trip was uncomplicated and the plant is currently shutdown in Mode 3 with a normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the 'B' RCP trip is under investigation. A containment entry is planned for dayshift on 1/25/16 to inspect and troubleshoot the 'B' RCP.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51683
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ERVIN LYSON
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ERVIN LYSON
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 03:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 03:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 10 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO ELEVATED CONDENSER SODIUM LEVELS
At 0315 EST on 1/25/16, Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 was manually tripped from 10 percent power due to elevated condenser sodium levels. All systems responded per design. Main Feed was secured and auxiliary feed water was initiated. The elevated sodium levels are believed to be due to a condenser tube leak. The reactor is currently shutdown and stable in Mode 3 and will remain in Mode 3 until repairs are effected. Unit 2 was not affected and remains at full power.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0315 EST on 1/25/16, Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 was manually tripped from 10 percent power due to elevated condenser sodium levels. All systems responded per design. Main Feed was secured and auxiliary feed water was initiated. The elevated sodium levels are believed to be due to a condenser tube leak. The reactor is currently shutdown and stable in Mode 3 and will remain in Mode 3 until repairs are effected. Unit 2 was not affected and remains at full power.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51684
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY ODOMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY ODOMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO DISCOVERED CONDITION
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 1/25/2016. At 1030 [EST], maintenance personnel reported the compressor local power breaker was tripped open and that all 3 phases of the compressor indicated grounded. Maintenance will begin repairs as soon as parts are made available. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 1/25/2016. At 1030 [EST], maintenance personnel reported the compressor local power breaker was tripped open and that all 3 phases of the compressor indicated grounded. Maintenance will begin repairs as soon as parts are made available. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Part 21
Event Number: 51907
Rep Org: ROTORK CONTROLS, INC.
Licensee: JOHNSON ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: ROCHESTER State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK SHAW
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: JOHNSON ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: ROCHESTER State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK SHAW
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/04/2016
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART 21 - ANOMALY RELATED TO MICRO SWITCHES
The following report was received via email:
"Based on test data, Rotork believes an unsafe condition may exist as defined under 10 CFR 21. The adhesive formulation used for the construction of V12 and K5 safety related micro switches was altered by the switch maker's sub-supplier. K5 switches have no reported failures, but are affected because of construction. The altered adhesive formulation outgases an insulating material at elevated temperatures, which coats the switch contacts as it cools and can prevent the conduction of electricity."
* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 10/31/16 FROM PATRICK A. SHAW TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
"This letter provides an update to the Rotork Controls Inc. Part 21 filing submitted May 4th 2016; documented in U.S.NRC Event Number 51907.
"Rotork have developed versions of the V12 & K5 switches that eliminate adhesive from the materials of construction.
"Evaluation of pre-production V12 switches, by thermal aging for 10 days at 125øC (257F), demonstrate the switch non-metallic housing and plunger also outgas materials that contributed to the accumulated contamination observed on switch electrical contacts as reported in Event 51907. The cause of the new outgassing sources and extent of condition is currently being investigated. For the moment suitable replacement switches remain unavailable that correct the issue reported in Event 51907.
"At this point in time, Rotork do not have grounds to believe the extent of condition is altered from that reported in Event Number 51907."
Notified R1DO (Schroeder), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Vasquez) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
The following report was received via email:
"Based on test data, Rotork believes an unsafe condition may exist as defined under 10 CFR 21. The adhesive formulation used for the construction of V12 and K5 safety related micro switches was altered by the switch maker's sub-supplier. K5 switches have no reported failures, but are affected because of construction. The altered adhesive formulation outgases an insulating material at elevated temperatures, which coats the switch contacts as it cools and can prevent the conduction of electricity."
* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 10/31/16 FROM PATRICK A. SHAW TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
"This letter provides an update to the Rotork Controls Inc. Part 21 filing submitted May 4th 2016; documented in U.S.NRC Event Number 51907.
"Rotork have developed versions of the V12 & K5 switches that eliminate adhesive from the materials of construction.
"Evaluation of pre-production V12 switches, by thermal aging for 10 days at 125øC (257F), demonstrate the switch non-metallic housing and plunger also outgas materials that contributed to the accumulated contamination observed on switch electrical contacts as reported in Event 51907. The cause of the new outgassing sources and extent of condition is currently being investigated. For the moment suitable replacement switches remain unavailable that correct the issue reported in Event 51907.
"At this point in time, Rotork do not have grounds to believe the extent of condition is altered from that reported in Event Number 51907."
Notified R1DO (Schroeder), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Vasquez) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.