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Event Notification Report for January 11, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/08/2016 - 01/11/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51510 51629 51642 51643 51644

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51510
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JONES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/02/2015
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2015
Event Time: 09:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"A planned modification at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant will remove the Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitoring system from service. The planned out of service window is expected to be 7 weeks, beginning 11/02/15 and ending 12/18/2015. During this time portable radiation monitors will be installed as compensatory measures to monitor and support timely and accurate EAL declarations. Affected Emergency Response Organization personnel have been made aware of the compensatory measures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a planned event that affects Emergency Preparedness Assessment Capability for greater than 72 hours. An update will be provided once the Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitoring system is restored to normal operation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE AT 1616 EST ON 12/18/2015 FROM BRIAN HAYDEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This is concerning the planned modification to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Area Radiation Monitoring System. The modification window is extended to January 8, 2016. Compensatory measures that were put in place on November 2, 2015 will continue to be in effect until the completion of the modification testing and the new equipment is fully in service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

* * * UPDATE FROM TIM HUBER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1547 EST ON 01/08/2016 * * *

"This is concerning the planned modification to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Area Radiation Monitoring System. The modification window was originally extended to January 8, 2016 as updated on December 18, 2015. Based on field equipment issues during the installation process, the modification window has been extended to February 12, 2016. Compensatory measures that were put in place on November 2, 2015 will continue to be in effect until the completion of the modification testing and the new equipment is fully in service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51629
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PENNSY SUPPLY, INC.
Region: 1
City: HARRISBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MEINIC
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/31/2015
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/31/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE REPORTED STOLEN IN 1998

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"On December 22, 2015, the Department [PA Department of Radiation Protection] was notified by Troxler Electronic Laboratories Inc. that a nuclear density gauge was found at a facility in York, Pennsylvania. [The gauge] was initially reportable per 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii) [EN #34669 - dated 8/27/1998].

"On August 21, 1998, McMinn's Asphalt Co., Inc., NRC License No. 37-19659-01, reported that a Troxler density gauge was stolen from their storage area in Petersburg, PA. Local law enforcement was notified, as well as the NRC (NMED Item Number 980902). Seventeen years later, on December 22, 2015, Zech's Towing from York, Pennsylvania called Troxler informing them that while cleaning out a storage shed a gauge was found. Troxler's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] called the Department and a follow-up call was made to NRC Region 1. It was learned that McMinn's license was purchased by Pennsy Supply, Inc. (NRC License No. 23-2729496) on March 11, 2008. Pennsy Supply currently has an active Pennsylvania license, PA-1252.

Gauge information:
"Radionuclide: Cs-137
Manufacturer: Troxler
Model: 4640-B
Serial Number: 1112
Activity: 8.0 mCi (measure date 10/10/1991)

"Two PA [Department] inspectors performed a reactive inspection on December 23, 2015, verifying the details of the gauge. All indications are that the gauge has been isolated in storage since close to the time it was reported stolen. Pennsy Supply took possession of the gauge and will add it to their Pennsylvania license."

Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA 150038

Previous NRC EN #34669, dated 8/27/1998.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51642
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/08/2016
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 19:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R CREDITED PROCEDURES NOT IN PLACE

"Prairie Island's Appendix R calculations credit a procedurally established repair instruction to the Train B Pressurizer Vent valves for a postulated fire in Fire Area 59 (Unit 1) and Fire Area 74 (Unit 2) to obtain Mode 5 during a postulated fire in the affected areas. At 1900 [CST] on 1/7/2016, during a review of corrective actions associated with Prairie Island's NFPA 805 transition, it was identified that the required procedures are not in place to make the analyzed repairs.

"It has been determined that this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"As compensatory measures, hourly fire watches are in place in the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building. The operating crew and Fire Brigade have been briefed on the impact of a fire in the affected area. This brief will continue to future operating shifts via a standing instruction. Fire detection equipment for the affected zones has been protected to ensure availability and operating crews are walking down the affected areas to verify any required transient combustibles in the affected areas are controlled in accordance with plant procedure. These compensatory measures, in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression capability in these fire areas, ensure protection of the potentially affected equipment until corrective actions can be completed.

"This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 51643
Rep Org: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE BAITINGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/08/2016
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2015
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - COMMERCIAL GRADE CAP SCREWS PROVIDED WITH SAFETY RELATED FISHER TYPE 3570 POSITIONERS

The following information was provided by the reporting organization via fax:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a failure to comply concerning Type 3570 positioners when provided as safety-related equipment.

"On November 11, 2015, Fisher became aware of an issue with the dedication of a Type 3570 positioner. When replacement Type 3570 positioners are ordered, the two cap screws (SAE J429 Grade 5 cap screws/size 3/8-16x1.5) used for mounting the positioner to the actuator cylinder are also included. It was not clearly communicated to the end user that these mounting cap screws are included with the positioner. Further, the dedication plan only addresses the 3570 positioner and does not include dedication of the mounting cap screws.

"As a result, these cap screws had not been dedicated on any safety-related Type 3570 positioner orders. There is no reason to believe any of the cap screws supplied were defective, only that they were not dedicated and were therefore supplied as commercial grade items. There have been no reported failures of the cap screws in question.

"An extent-of-condition investigation is underway to identify all potentially affected bolt-on accessories. Any identified affected products will be reported per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21 (b). This extent-of-condition review is expected to be completed by January 29, 2016.

"Corrective Action 1791 has been opened to document corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.

"Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249.

Individual informing the NRC: Chad Engle, Director, Nuclear Business Unit, Fisher Controls International LLC, phone (641) 754-3011.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51644
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANIEL PIPKIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/09/2016
Notification Time: 07:04 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2016
Event Time: 02:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON MAIN STEAM ISOLATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT

"On 1/9/16 at 0237 [CST], River Bend Station sustained a reactor scram during a lightning storm. An electrical transient occurred resulting in a full main steam isolation [MSIV] (Group 6) and a Division II Balance of Plant isolation signal. During the scram, level 8 occurred immediately which tripped the feed pumps. A level 3 signal occurred also during the scram. Subsequent level 3 was received three times due to isolated vessel level control. The plant was stabilized and all spurious isolation signals reset, then the MSIVs were restored. The plant is now stable in Mode 3 and plant walkdowns are occurring to assess the transient."

During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. The plant was initially cooled down using safety relief valves. Offsite power is available and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, January 11, 2016
Monday, January 11, 2016