Event Notification Report for December 21, 2015

PART 21 REPORT - ERROR IN REPORTING THE VARIABILITY IN THE DOSE DELIVERED ON CERTIFICATE OF PROCESSING

The following information was received from Homewood Products Corporation via fax:

"Steris Isomedix Services measuring and test equipment used by NTS (Formerly Wyle Laboratories, Inc.) to determine the applied radiation dose did not account for all of the uncertainties involved, and therefore the actual radiation dose applied to components and reported to Homewood Products Corporation by Wyle Laboratories, could be less than the requested service condition dose."

The following information was received from Homewood Products Corporation as provided to them by National Technical Services, Inc. (formerly Wyle Laboratories, Inc.):

"The defect is an error in reporting the variability in the dose delivered or lack thereof on the lsomedix Certificate of Processing for the Whippany, NJ facility. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B issued a Notice of Nonconformance 99901145/2014-201-01 to Steris stating that the measuring and testing equipment used to determine the applied radiation dose reported on the lsomedix Certificate of Processing provided with each gamma irradiation run did not account for all the uncertainties involved (i.e. density of unrelated products in carriers, off-carrier locations within the irradiator, and Cobalt-60 source decay) and therefore the actual radiation dose applied to components could be less than requested as reported on the Certificate of Processing.

"Steris lsomedix Services completed an evaluation of the dose rate variability of items processed in off-carrier locations in the irradiator. Steris Isomedix Services Position Paper dated 4/27/15 states the overall variability (uncertainty) associated with gamma radiation exposures at their Whippany, NJ facility."

The affected facilities have been notified of the non-conformance. They are:

Homewood Products Corporation, Pittsburgh, PA
Homewood Energy Services, Pittsburgh, PA

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IDENTIFIED AT WASTE RECYCLING FACILITY

The following report was received from the State of Arizona via email:

"On December 21, 2015, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulator Agency] received a telephone call from SA Recycling that they had identified a waste load that contained low levels of radioactive material. The Agency responded on December 22, 2015, and was positively able to identify a pig containing a Cesium 137 waste from the licensee. The average reading on the pig was 5 mR/hr on contact using a Thermo Interceptor. No other sources were identified. The source appears to be an Amdel Model AM213, SN Z-591 contained in an Amdel Model CSA device. The source contains 3.47 mCi of Cesium-137, as of April 1, 1994.

"Several issues are under investigation regarding how and when the radioactive material got into the scrap.

"The Agency continues to investigate the event."

Arizona State First Notice: 15-026

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER ISOLATION

"At 1519 [CST], the Main Turbine was tripped due to an Oscillating Governor Valve 2 (cause not known). At 1533, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to a feedwater isolation P-14 [caused by steam generator swell induced high steam generator level, resulting in] steam generator low level [after the isolation]. Aux feedwater actuated as designed.

"All Control and Shutdown Rods fully inserted.
"Intermediate Range NI 36 failed above P-10 so SR-Nis [source range nuclear instruments] were manually energized.
"No primary relief valves lifted.
"All Steam Generator PORVs [power operated relief valves] opened.
"There were no electrical bus problems.
"Normal operating temperature and pressure (NOT/NOP) is 567F and 2235 psig.
"There were no significant TS LCOs [Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations] entered.
"This event was not significant to the health and safety of the public based on all safety systems performed as designed."

Unit 2 was not affected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO NON-COMPLIANT FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

"As part of the License Amendment development to transition to NFPA 805, PINGP [Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant] Calculation ENG-ME-353, Mechanical MOV [Motor Operated Valve] Analysis to support IN-92-18 Response, revision 1, issued in 1998, was reviewed for applicability for the transition to NFPA 805. Recent consultation with an MOV engineer regarding the scope of the revision indicated ENG-ME-353 is out of date.

"On 12/21/2015, during technical review for a new weak link calculation, several MOVs were identified from the list of MOVs that are credited to be manually operated from outside the control room in the event of a fire in the control room or relay room per PINGP Procedure F5 Appendix B, Control Room Evacuation (Fire), that could be damaged if hot shorts were to bypass the torque and limit switches. There are also four other motor valves associated with the Gland Steam system of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 that were added to the procedure F5 Appendix B, Control Room Evacuation (Fire), that have not been analyzed for a weak link. This unanalyzed condition could impact the ability of plant operators to implement procedure F5 Appendix B, Control Room Evacuation (Fire).

"New hourly fire watch impairments were created for Fire Area 13 (Control Room) and Fire Area 18 (Relay and Cable Spreading Room) as compensatory measures.

"Therefore, this is an unanalyzed condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The public health and safety is not impacted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 0107 EST ON 01/14/16 FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

"Reviews of the list of MOVs susceptible to hot shorts bypassing the torque and limit switches credited to be manually operated from outside the control room in the event of a fire have continued. Additional valves have been noted to be affected by this failure mechanism in areas outside of the Control Room or Relay Room. The additional MOVs affected by this unanalyzed condition could impact the ability of plant operators to implement PINGP Procedure F5 Appendix D, Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room.

"As a compensatory measure, additional hourly fire watch impairments were created for the following fire areas:
Fire Area 031 ( A Train Hot Shutdown Panel & Air Compressor/Aux 695 Feedwater Room)
Fire Area 032 ( B Train Hot Shutdown Panel & Air Compressor/Aux 695 Feedwater Room)
Fire Area 058 (Aux Building Ground Floor Unit 1)
Fire Area 073 (Auxiliary Building Ground Floor Unit 2)

"The public health and safety is not impacted.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Duncan).

LOSS OF TONE ALERT RADIO SYSTEM TOWER

"At 1955 CST on 12/21/2015, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 2017 CST, Nemaha, Richardson and Atchison county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize local route notification (backup notification method) making this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies.

"Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is a loss of communication with the tower.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:

"On December 21, 2015, [the] RSO of Standard Soil Geotech, Inc. contacted the Radiologic Health Branch (RHB), Brea Office, to report a gauge (CPN MC-3 S/N M39129253, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241) had been run over at the Southern California Edison facility in Porter Ranch in a section that was undergoing construction. The RSO stated that [the] casing of the gauge was damaged by a bulldozer and the Cs-137 source was in the extended position. The RSO confirmed that construction personnel were told to leave the area where the incident occurred. The only path to the incident site was secured by a construction vehicle. The RSO then left his office to assess the scene. After arriving at the scene [at approximately] 7:45 p.m. [PST], the RSO [was] provided photographs that indicated the Am:Be-241 source had detached from the casing and the Cs-137 source appeared to be exposed and not able to be returned to the shielded position. The RSO was asked if he had contacted the fire department and they confirmed that he had not. The RSO was informed that an RHB inspector would go to the scene and assist in removing the radioactive sources from the site.

"After the RHB inspector arrived at the site [at approximately] 10:15 p.m., the damage to the gauge was assessed and it was determined that the Am:Be-241 source was not damaged but was detached from the gauge body. The Cs-137 source was also intact, but was still in the extended positon with the opposite end of the source rod broken off at top of the shield, preventing the source from being retracted into the shielded position. After the two parts containing the sources were moved away from the rest of the gauge parts, a survey was performed, using a Victoreen 451B-DE-SI. The dose rate of the remaining parts was found to be background (0.01 mR/hr) and the parts were placed in a plastic bag and removed from the site. The two sources were then placed in the transportation case and a small lead pig was taped to the Cs-137 source to reduce the radiation levels. The box was then closed and locked. A survey of the transport case found the highest dose on contact was 17 mR/hr. The gauge was then secured in [the RSO's] vehicle. Due to the damage to the gauge and the dose rates approaching the maximum allowable for a Type A package, DOT Special Permit 110646, CA-CA-15-99 was issued to allow the RSO to transport the gauge to secure storage at the Standard Soil Geotechnical facility until disposal can be arranged."

California Report No.: 5010-122115