| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/28/2015 - 10/29/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51481 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION TEXAS
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: 03893
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/20/2015
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN SOURCE OPERATING CABLE
The following information was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On October 19, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that the operating cable on a 150 milliCurie Cesium - 137 source used in a Berthold model 21357 nuclear gauge broke during routine operation of the source. The licensee stated the source is stored in the fully shielded position. The licensee stated the source does not create an exposure risk to its personnel or any member of the general public. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer for assistance in repairing the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9350 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51482 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MET-CHEM TESTING LAB, INC
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800146
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/20/2015
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2015
Event Time: 07:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ADAM TUCKER (ILTA)
| Event Text UTAH AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INVOLVING PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The RSO of MET-CHEM Testing Labs, Inc. contacted the State of Utah, Division of Radiation Control to report an incident involving the installed security system. All radioactive material has been accounted for by the RSO. The State of Utah is sending investigators to the company facility today.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GWYN GALLOWAY TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 2142 EDT ON 10/20/2015 * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Utah via email:
"The State of Utah inspectors determined that the activity contained in all of the cameras (in aggregate) stored behind one barrier was less than the quantity found in Table 1 of 10 CFR 37. Therefore, the additional security measures were not required to be implemented. All sources are accounted for and will be secured in accordance with requirements tonight."
Notified R4DO (Werner), ILTAB (Tucker) and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51486 | Rep Org: EVONIK CORPORATION
Licensee: GENERAL LICENSE
Region: 3
City: LAFAYETTE State: IN
County:
License #: General
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: APRIL RADEMAKER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 10/21/2015
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
A tritium exit sign was mistakenly placed in general waste by an employee who was replacing the sign on 10/11/15. The employee reported the mistake on 10/13/15 and the licensee initiated attempts to locate the sign. The sign was determined to have been placed in a general waste container which had already been collected. The manufacture date of the sign was 2/2009 and at the time of the disposal the source was intact. The lost source material (0.426 TBq of Tritium as of 2/2009) is considered unrecoverable.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51504 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 10/28/2015
Notification Time: 13:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2015
Event Time: 06:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0628 [EDT] on 10/28/15, the Salem Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) train was declared inoperable due to the results of charcoal filter testing not meeting the surveillance requirement. Prior to declaring the Unit 1 train inoperable, the system was operating in the single train filtration operation mode due to refueling outage activities being performed on Unit 2 with the Unit 2 CREACS train inoperable. This resulted in both units' CREACS trains being inoperable.
"Prior to the event on 10/28/15, Salem Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 with fuel movement in progress.
"At 0628, Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, and Unit 2 suspended fuel movement to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.6 (Modes 5 and 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), action c. The Unit 2 train was placed in service at 0755, allowing Unit 1 to exit Technical Specification 3.0.3. Operators continued to align the Unit 2 CREACS to single train filtration operation to comply with Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.6.1, Action a. Actions to place the Unit 2 CREACS in single train filtration operation were completed at 0950.
"This 8 hour notification is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for 'any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to : (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51505 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK TURKAL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 10/28/2015
Notification Time: 13:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2015
Event Time: 21:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe invalid actuation containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On September 9, 2015 at 2103 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Unit 1 experienced a loss of electrical power to motor control center 1CB when the substation E6 feeder breaker tripped. The loss of power resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e. Drywell Equipment and Floor Drains, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, RHR Process Sample, and Traversing lncore Probe), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), and Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems). It has been determined that affected PCIVs appropriately closed. However, the limit switch within the motor operator of the inboard RWCU PCIV (i.e. 1-G31-F001) malfunctioned; resulting in an inaccurate remote position indication. Testing has confirmed that 1-G31-F001 properly closed and can perform its intended safety function.
"These PCIV isolations were the result of a substation E6 feeder breaker trip to motor control center 1CB and not in response to actual plant conditions (i.e., to mitigate the consequences of an event) and, therefore, were invalid.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |