Event Notification Report for October 26, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/25/2015 - 10/26/2015
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51498
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL FINHOLM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL FINHOLM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/26/2015
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2015
Event Time: 07:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2015
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2015
Event Time: 07:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNANALYZED CONDITION ASSOCIATED WITH A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK
"At 0703 CDT on 10/26/2015, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) identified Door 62, '11/21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFW) Room to 12/22 AFW Pump Room' to be in a closed position. Door 62 functions as a fire door, and closes in the event of a fire in either A or B Train AFW Pump Rooms. When Unit 1 or Unit 2 is in modes 1-4, Door 62 is required to remain open in the event of an internal flood in AFW Pump Room or a Turbine Building High Energy Line Break (HELB) Flood into the AFW Pump. Currently, Unit 2 is in MODE 6, so only the Unit 1 Turbine Building HELB applies. Door 62 is normally open with a fusible link to allow closure during a fire.
"Door 62 was closed during maintenance. With the door closed the Unit 1 side of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room lost its ability to adequately drain water in a Unit 1 HELB event and was in an unanalyzed condition. Upon discovery, Door 62 was immediately repositioned to be open per the analyzed condition and a fire watch established per plant procedure.
"This notification is being conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition.
"The plant remains safe, and this condition does not pose any additional risk to the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1703 EST ON 11/30/2015 * * *
"Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant is retracting this event notification, EN# 51498.
"Further analysis determined that the closure of Door 62 would not have prevented the structures, systems and components (SSC) located in the AFW Pump rooms, or SSCs powered from Motor Control Centers (MCCs) located in the AFW Pump rooms, from performing their safety functions. This is because the door closure would not have caused water level to rise above the maximum tolerable water height during any design basis flooding event. The acceptance criteria of the area flooding calculations were still met with Door 62 closed.
"Therefore, the Unit 1 side of the AFW Pump room did not lose its ability to adequately drain water in a Unit 1 HELB event, this event was not an 8-hour notification for an Unanalyzed Condition that significantly degrades plant safety, under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
"At 0703 CDT on 10/26/2015, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) identified Door 62, '11/21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFW) Room to 12/22 AFW Pump Room' to be in a closed position. Door 62 functions as a fire door, and closes in the event of a fire in either A or B Train AFW Pump Rooms. When Unit 1 or Unit 2 is in modes 1-4, Door 62 is required to remain open in the event of an internal flood in AFW Pump Room or a Turbine Building High Energy Line Break (HELB) Flood into the AFW Pump. Currently, Unit 2 is in MODE 6, so only the Unit 1 Turbine Building HELB applies. Door 62 is normally open with a fusible link to allow closure during a fire.
"Door 62 was closed during maintenance. With the door closed the Unit 1 side of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room lost its ability to adequately drain water in a Unit 1 HELB event and was in an unanalyzed condition. Upon discovery, Door 62 was immediately repositioned to be open per the analyzed condition and a fire watch established per plant procedure.
"This notification is being conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition.
"The plant remains safe, and this condition does not pose any additional risk to the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1703 EST ON 11/30/2015 * * *
"Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant is retracting this event notification, EN# 51498.
"Further analysis determined that the closure of Door 62 would not have prevented the structures, systems and components (SSC) located in the AFW Pump rooms, or SSCs powered from Motor Control Centers (MCCs) located in the AFW Pump rooms, from performing their safety functions. This is because the door closure would not have caused water level to rise above the maximum tolerable water height during any design basis flooding event. The acceptance criteria of the area flooding calculations were still met with Door 62 closed.
"Therefore, the Unit 1 side of the AFW Pump room did not lose its ability to adequately drain water in a Unit 1 HELB event, this event was not an 8-hour notification for an Unanalyzed Condition that significantly degrades plant safety, under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
Agreement State
Event Number: 51499
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5934-L01 A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5934-L01 A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/26/2015
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2015
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE POTENTIALLY DAMAGED DURING SHIPMENT
The following report was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:
"On 10/26/2015, [The] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] / Technical Service Manager for QSA Global notified the LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] about an incident where a [common carrier] delivered a device containing radioactive material to their facility on Langley Dr., Baton Rouge, LA. When the receipt surveys were being performed, they noticed at one point on the surface they had a reading of 2 R/hr at the surface. It appears that one or more of the pull ties used to secure the shutters on the device broke causing a shift in the shielding. Part of the bracing material minimized the shielding shift.
"The device in question is a Texas Nuclear level/density gauge, Model # 5210, SN B1110, loaded with [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60 sealed source. The origin of the shipment was Puerto Ordaz, EDO Bolivar, Venezuela. It came stateside via [common carrier] to Houston, TX and then to the QSA Global facility in Baton Rouge, LA by [common carrier]. The shipment arrived [at approximately] 1145 [CDT] on 10/26/2015. The activity is below Cat 2 quantities at [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60.
"The device was surveyed and moved to a bunker on the QSA Global site. Re-enactments and calculations will be conducted on 10/27/2015 AM when [the RSO] is present. The LDEQ personnel will be on site for the measurements, calculations and follow-up information [dissemination].
"This is a preliminary notification of an incident reported to LDEQ [at approximately] 1530 [CDT]. After the source was secure, safe and locked in a bunker at the QSA Global Baton Rouge, LA facility. Possible exposure calculations will be determined from the reconstruction of events.
"The Baton Rouge facility is compliant for the IC [Increased controls] principles and Radiation Safety procedures/aspects for the receipt activities. The Department, LDEQ personnel will be on site for the corrective actions and calculations. The NRC, Region IV, was made aware of this situation on 10/26/2015. Follow-up information will be [disseminated] when available.
"This is being reported as a preventive and protection action under 10 CFR Part 30.50(a).
"Information will be updated when available. LDEQ considers this incident still open."
Event Report ID No.: LA-150019
The following report was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:
"On 10/26/2015, [The] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] / Technical Service Manager for QSA Global notified the LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] about an incident where a [common carrier] delivered a device containing radioactive material to their facility on Langley Dr., Baton Rouge, LA. When the receipt surveys were being performed, they noticed at one point on the surface they had a reading of 2 R/hr at the surface. It appears that one or more of the pull ties used to secure the shutters on the device broke causing a shift in the shielding. Part of the bracing material minimized the shielding shift.
"The device in question is a Texas Nuclear level/density gauge, Model # 5210, SN B1110, loaded with [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60 sealed source. The origin of the shipment was Puerto Ordaz, EDO Bolivar, Venezuela. It came stateside via [common carrier] to Houston, TX and then to the QSA Global facility in Baton Rouge, LA by [common carrier]. The shipment arrived [at approximately] 1145 [CDT] on 10/26/2015. The activity is below Cat 2 quantities at [approximately] 733 mCi of Co-60.
"The device was surveyed and moved to a bunker on the QSA Global site. Re-enactments and calculations will be conducted on 10/27/2015 AM when [the RSO] is present. The LDEQ personnel will be on site for the measurements, calculations and follow-up information [dissemination].
"This is a preliminary notification of an incident reported to LDEQ [at approximately] 1530 [CDT]. After the source was secure, safe and locked in a bunker at the QSA Global Baton Rouge, LA facility. Possible exposure calculations will be determined from the reconstruction of events.
"The Baton Rouge facility is compliant for the IC [Increased controls] principles and Radiation Safety procedures/aspects for the receipt activities. The Department, LDEQ personnel will be on site for the corrective actions and calculations. The NRC, Region IV, was made aware of this situation on 10/26/2015. Follow-up information will be [disseminated] when available.
"This is being reported as a preventive and protection action under 10 CFR Part 30.50(a).
"Information will be updated when available. LDEQ considers this incident still open."
Event Report ID No.: LA-150019