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Event Notification Report for September 29, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/28/2015 - 09/29/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51407 51408 51413 51428 51429 51430

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Agreement State Event Number: 51407
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICE INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00087
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/18/2015
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2015
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On September 18, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was informed by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect at a temporary field site [Galveston, Texas]. The RSO stated the crew was working inside a vessel using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 52.9 curie Iridium-192 source. The device fell from a distance of 30 feet and hit the floor of the vessel. The source was in the fully shielded position when the device fell. The radiographers noted the guide tube had a small kink in it and replaced the guide tube. The radiographers tested the source by cranking the source out, but when they attempted to retract the source, the drive cable did not stop at the rear outlet of the camera. The radiographers contacted their supervisor and performed a dose rate survey at their barrier. The dose rate was 1 millirem per hour. An individual qualified in source recovery was able to remove the source from the guide tube and place it in a source changer for storage. The RSO stated their inspection of the source drive cable found the connecter on the drive cable had separated from the drive cable. The RSO stated all equipment involved in the event will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. No individual received an over exposure as a result of this event. No member of the general public received an exposure due to this event. The licensee is conducting an investigation into the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident: I-9339

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51408
Rep Org: KNAUFF INSULATION
Licensee: KNAUFF INSULATION
Region: 3
City: SHELBYVILLE State: IN
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER MAHIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/18/2015
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ROBERT BUNCH (email) (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST GAS CHROMATOGRAPH SOURCE

When requested by the NRC, the licensee was unable to locate a 15 mCi Ni-63 source. The source was used in a Perkin-Elmer gas chromatograph electron capture detector. The licensee noted that the device may have been decommissioned, but a fire at their facility effectively destroyed all records that could be used to located the source.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51413
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: JV INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES, LTD
Region: 4
City: LAPORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 05785
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/20/2015
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO THE SHIELDED POSITION

The following information was obtained from the state of Texas via email:

"On September 19, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that one of its radiography crews was unable to return a 63 curie Iridium-192 source to the fully shielded position in an IR-100 exposure device. The licensee stated the radiographer had made several attempts using the crank-outs to return the source to the shielded position, but surveys indicated the source was not fully shielded in the camera. The radiographer isolated the area and contacted the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO). The RSO contacted a service contractor who is qualified to recover sources who then responded to the location. The retrieval team arrived at the location at 2030 hours [CDT]. The service provider moved the camera to the ground and then straightened source tube. The service provider stated it was apparent that the source would move, but was unable to return the source completely into the camera. The service provider then realized that the key on the camera was locked and that the source indicator was up in the locked position instead of down as it should be when the source is out. The radiographer informed the service provider that the indicator had popped up and that he had removed the key and realized the source was in the exposed position so [he] put the key back in the lock and attempted to crank the source back in. The service provider made several attempts to return the source into the exposure device, but was not able. The service provider had a new set of crank-outs and an empty exposure device delivered to the location. The service provider cranked the source into the [collimator] and placed additional shielding over the source. The guide tube was removed from the original device and the source were disconnected from the drive cable. The drive cable from a different crank-out device was inserted through the new exposure device then connected to the source. The source was then retracted to the fully shielded position in the new device.

"The dosimetry of all involved was reviewed periodically during the event. The radiographer trainer's self-reading dosimeter was noted off scale when the service provider arrived at the scene. He was removed from the work area. The service provider believes his exposure was approximately 300 millirem for that day. No other individual received an exposure that exceeded any limit.

"The dosimetry for the two radiographers involved in the event will be sent to the processor for reading on September 21, 2015. No member of the general public received exposure from this event. All equipment used in at the site when the failure occurred will be sent to the manufacture for inspection. The cause for the inability to retract the source into the initial exposure device is not currently known. The licensee will investigate the event and provide its findings to this Agency. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9340

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51428
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STENGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 14:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID SEISMIC EVENT ALARM

"At 1444 CDT on September 28, 2015, the station's seismic instrumentation generated a seismic event alarm that was determined to be invalid based upon no seismic activity being felt on site, and no activity detected in the area by either the National Earthquake Information Center, or nearby nuclear plants. The instrumentation that actuated recorded steady values of -0.3 to -0.4g on three axes of one instrument, which is greater than the +/- 0.02g threshold value in the Emergency Action Level in the station's emergency procedures; however, no other instrument channel or axis indicated a valid event exceeding the 0.02g threshold. Since the event alarm was determined to be invalid as described above, no EAL thresholds were met.

"The seismic instrumentation was declared non-functional since it would not generate a seismic event alarm during an actual event until the invalid event was reset. The alarm was reset through the alarm reset process. The seismic instrumentation alarm capability was restored and returned to service at 1746. The Seismic Instrumentation remains non-functional pending troubleshooting.

"This resulted in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while the seismic instrumentation was out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

This is a recurring event. See EN #51263 and EN #51282.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51429
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 13:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE AT THE SAME TIME

"At approximately 1327 CDT on September 28, 2015, both D1 and D2 Diesel Generators (EDG) were inoperable simultaneously until corrected at 1345 CDT. The D2 Diesel Generator had been declared inoperable for the planned performance of SP1307, D2 Diesel Generator 6 Month Fast Start Test. Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1 Condition B had been entered for D2 Diesel Generator. Subsequently, D1 Diesel Generator was determined to be inoperable but available due to Train A Cooling Water Header being inoperable during post maintenance testing of SV-33133, Backwash Water Supply to the 121 Safeguards Traveling Screen. Tech Spec LCO 3.7.8 Condition B was entered for the Cooling Water Header inoperability, which forced a cascade to Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B for D1 Diesel Generator. With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was entered, which required the restoration of one Emergency Diesel Generator to operable status within 2 hours. D2 was returned to operable status through completion of SP 1307, and Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was exited at 1345 CDT.

"With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.

"The plant remains safe, and this condition does not pose any additional risk to the public. Additionally, our defense in depth strategies are relied upon to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public. D2 Diesel Generator remained available with full cooling water flow during this time. The safety significance of this event is low, as engineering hydraulic analysis has demonstrated that with the safeguards traveling screen backwash water supply valve fully opened, the Cooling Water System would have continued to provide full cooling flow to the D1 Diesel Generator.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51430
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICHARD FICARRA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 20:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING TRIP OF BOTH REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS

"On September 28, 2015 at 2046 EDT, the Hope Creek reactor scrammed following a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps.

"All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel.

"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.

"The Outage Control Center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram.

"The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek township of the event.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, September 29, 2015
Tuesday, September 29, 2015